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Abstract
Context in dialogue is at once regarded as a set of resources enabling successful interpretation and
is altered by such interpretations. A key problem for models of dialogue, then, is to specify how
the shared context evolves. However, these models have been developed mainly to account for
the way context is built up through direct interaction between pairs of participants. In multi-party
dialogue, patterns of direct interaction between participants are often more unevenly distributed.
This thesis explores the effects of this characteristic on the development of shared contexts.
A corpus analysis of ellipsis shows that side-participants can reach the same level of ground-
ing as speaker and addressee. Such dialogues result in collective contexts that are not reducible
to their component dyadic interactions. It is proposed that this is characteristic of dialogues in
which a subgroup of the participants are organised into a party, who act as a unified aggregate to
carry the conversation forward. Accordingly, the contextual increments arising from a dialogue
move from one party member can affect the party as a whole. Grounding, like turn-taking, can
therefore operate between parties rather than individuals. An experimental test of this idea is
presented which provides evidence for the practical reality of parties.
Two further experiments explore the impact of party membership on the accessibility of con-
text. The results indicate that participants who, for a stretch of talk, fall inside and outside of the
interacting parties, effect divergent contextual increments. This is evidence for the emergence of
distinct dialogue contexts in the same conversation.
Finally, it is argued that these findings present significant challenges for how formal models
of dialogue deal with individual contributions. In particular, they point to the need for such
models to index the resulting contextual increments to specific subsets of the participants.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Studies of the different aspects of human dialogue and interaction have until recently, been mostly
limited to dyadic dialogue (interactions between 2 persons)1. In other words, dyadic dialogue has
tended to be treated as the canonical form of interaction/communication. Levinson (1988) argues
that the success of the research on dyadic interaction has been at the price of greatly limiting
the types of social situations being considered. This is true: taking into account all dialogues
transcribed in the British National Corpus (BNC), over 80% involve more than 2 people present
according to the BNC transcript headers. This figure is striking and clearly demonstrates the
importance of understanding the processes involved in multi-party dialogues.
Indeed, dyadic dialogue is by now a flourishing domain with an ever increasing corpus-based,
experimental, theoretical and implementational literature. However, the question of whether
multi-party dialogue requires a unique treatment remains an open one. To what extent do exist-
ing theories of dyadic dialogue (e.g. the psycholinguistic, formal and computational flavours)
scale up to multi-party dialogues? Is engaging in a multi-party dialogue a qualitatively differ-
ent experience? Are the mechanisms posited for dyadic dialogue also at work in multi-party
dialogues? If not, which ones are and which ones aren’t? Can dyadic dialogue be regarded as
a special case of multi-party dialogue? This thesis is a step towards answering some of these
general questions, with the specific focus to be narrowed down below.
Many would agree that the primary effect of engaging in dialogue is the accumulation and
1It may be worth noting that “dialogue” is derived from ‘dia-’ meaning ‘through’ and not ‘di-’ meaning
‘two’ and so covers interactions between multiple participants.
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development of shared context or common ground (Stalnaker, 1978; Clark & Schaefer, 1989).
This is conceived of as a set of resources enabling the successful interpretation of utterances and
is altered by such interpretations. It includes but is not exhausted by a dynamic set of assump-
tions or presuppositions that the interlocutors hold in common at any given time, as part of the
background of the conversation. The question of how the shared context evolves on a moment
by moment basis through the course of a conversation has received wide attention in psycholin-
guistic (e.g. (Clark & Schaefer, 1989)), formal (e.g. (Ginzburg, 1996)) and philosophical (e.g.
(Lewis, 1979)) circles alike, although as noted, they have tended to concentrate mainly on dyadic
dialogue.
It has been argued by psycholinguists that it is only in the aftermath of successful mutual un-
derstanding that the participants add the content of what was uttered to the common ground
(Clark & Schaefer, 1989; Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), and therefore the question of how
common ground develops reduces to how people come to establish that something uttered has
been understood, on a moment by moment, utterance by utterance basis, i.e. how grounding
is achieved. Although psycholinguistic theories differ on the mechanisms they posit as respon-
sible for successful communication/mutual understanding, they all emphasise the role of direct
interaction in this process. In other words, adding to the common ground is not an autonomous
mechanism. Participants collaborate directly to achieve grounding, by providing moment by mo-
ment feedback, positive or negative, as to whether something said has been understood, and if
so, whether they agree with it. With few exceptions, these theories have mainly concentrated on
how shared context is built up through direct interaction between pairs of participants.
But multi-party dialogue is, unlike dyadic dialogue, conditioned by an overall lack of balance
in the participants’ levels of direct interaction and involvement with one another. This means that
there are differences in the levels of feedback that they provide as to whether and to what extent
they are following what is being said and whether they agree with it. It is not only possible but
likely that a participant will be left out temporarily or during a whole conversation/topic. Studies
have shown that multi-party dialogues are often comprised of a series of pair-wise discussions
(e.g. (Parker, 1988)). Moreover, an inspection of the dialogues in the BNC reveals that for each
turn, if one looks only at the number of speakers in the preceding 10 turns, about 50% involve
only 1 or 2 speakers and 50% more than 2. This is a significant drop from the 80% of all the
dialogues, in which there are more than 2 persons present as noted above, suggesting that a great
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proportion of naturally occuring multi-party dialogues are comprised of pair-wise interactions.
This immediately raises the question of what, if anything, is the difference between those
participants who are in direct interaction for a stretch of talk and those who provide little or no
feedback during it. Are the latter at a disadvantage in terms of the level of grounding that they
reach of the material they provided little or no feed back on? Studies have shown that they could
be (e.g. (Schober & Clark, 1989; Healey & Mills, 2006)). But would these results persist even
if this lack of involvement was only ‘temporary’? If not, then what are the differences between
a participant who is only momentarily inactive in order to avoid interruptions or overlapping
talk, with one who plays a completely passive role? What is the difference between the kinds of
common ground increment that they effect in the absence of overt feedback? More broadly, how
does shared context evolve and when and for whom is it shared in multi-party dialogue? What
are the influential factors in this? Indeed, what should the notion of context look like for multi-
party dialogues? These are all open empirical questions which this thesis attempts to address.
To this end, this thesis provides a typology of such locally uninvolved third participants, which
determines how the various aspects of the shared context of the conversation evolves for them.
First, we show that there are dialogues in which the third silent participant, despite the lack of
overt feedback, does reach the same level of grounding as the dyad engaged in direct interaction.
These dialogues lead to collective states of understanding or contexts that are not reducible to the
component dyadic interactions that gave rise to them (Eshghi & Healey, 2007).
It is then proposed that such collective contexts are the effect, at least, of those dialogues in
which subgroups of the participants are organised into parties (Schegloff, 1995; Lerner, 1993),
such that there are fewer parties than there are individuals. The claim is developed that grounding
operates in such dialogues, in the first instance, between parties rather than individuals, such that
the party acts as a unified aggregate. That is, the party is responsible as a whole, for grounding
and carrying the conversation forward and thus satisfying the constraints imposed by the current
context of the conversation. In this manner, one member can stand proxy for others in doing this
such that it doesn’t matter which member is doing the talking as the rest effect the same contextual
increments as that individual. This seems to provide a pragmatic parallel to Schegloff’s (1995)
proposal that turn-taking operates in the first instance between parties. An experimental test of
this idea is presented which provides causal evidence for the practical reality of parties, in the
form of ‘extra’ intra-party interactions (what Lerner (1993) has called ‘conferring’), which, all
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things being equal, are caused by the failure of one of the party members to ground.
We then develop and test experimentally the claim that in contrast to the dialogues leading to
the evenly shared irreducible collective contexts just mentioned, multi-party dialogues can also
under some circumstances, give rise to multiple shared contexts that are unevenly distributed
across the (ratified) participants (Eshghi & Healey, 2009). This is manifested in systematically
divergent interpretations of one and the same utterance by different participants owing to the
distinct contexts against which the utterance is assessed, a phenomenon we dub ‘Pragmatic Plu-
ralism’ in dialogue. This occurs we argue, when a participant is publicly assumed not to have
any concern/responsibility with respect to the current topic of the conversation: she falls outside
the interacting parties for a stretch of talk, and as a result is more weakly attached to the local
context than the members of the interacting parties.
Finally, it is argued that these results present significant challenges for how formal models of
dialogue context deal with individual contributions. In particular, they point to the need for such
models to augment the resulting contextual increments with information about which individ-
ual/party has processed the contribution and to what degree. Some tentative ideas are put forth
at the end of this thesis, as to how this might be achieved in Ginzburg’s (1996, 2009) question
based approach to modelling contextual change.
1.1 Outline
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with some of the existing literature on dialogue and interaction.
Chapters 2: Reviews some of the existing literature on the different aspects of dialogue.
The aim in this chapter is both to cover the relevant theoretical background to this thesis, and to
establish that studies of the different aspects of dialogue have tended to concentrate mainly on
dyadic dialogue. These include grounding, conversational structure and adjacency, repair, con-
ceptual pacts, audience design debates, communication accommodation, synchrony and more.
At various stages it is pointed out whether/how the notion being introduced, may present further
puzzles when it is considered with respect to multi-party dialogue. The discussions in this regard
are mostly deferred until the next chapter.
Chapter 3: Aims at a critique of the dyadic speaker/hearer model of communication. It
deals with some of the existing literature on multi-party dialogues, with the objective, partly, of
bringing to the fore the empirical differences between dyadic and multi-party dialogues and the
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open questions and problems that we encounter in scaling up theories of dyadic dialogue. The
central notion that we will be concerned with in this chapter is that of Participation Framework,
constituted by roles other than Speaker and Hearer, an issue which does not really arise in studies
of dyadic dialogue. In particular, we will be concerned with the grounds on which such roles
are distinguished. Everything else will count towards the characterisation of these roles and
the difficulties therein, in terms of patterns of turn-taking, grounding and contextual updates,
conversational responsibilities, sequential coherence and coordination mechanisms in general.
The particular questions that this thesis will attempt to address are highlighted.
Chapter 4: is a corpus study which uses an analysis of the different surface forms of context-
dependency as an index of mutual understanding, showing that in certain multi-party dialogue
settings (characterised in the next chapter), active participants of the moment (Speaker and Ad-
dressee) assume that a third silent party (a side-participant) has understood/grounded what they’re
saying to each other, despite the third participant’s lack of overt feedback. We also show that the
side-participant can utilise, via the use of elliptical expressions, elements introduced into the
shared context/common ground that the primary participants are collaboratively building up, in
the same way that they themselves do. Withholding of negative feedback by the side participants,
then, is taken as positive evidence of understanding. We conclude that these dialogues lead to
collective states of understanding or collective contexts that, unlike dyadic dialogues, are not
reducible to their component dyadic interactions. This leads to the idea, explored experimentally
in the next chapter, that a ratified participant can stand proxy for another in grounding/providing
evidence of understanding or more broadly in carrying the conversation forward.
Chapter 5: We argue that the emergence of the irreducible collective contexts in the dia-
logues studied in the previous chapter, is characteristic, at least, of those dialogues in which a
subgroup of the ratified participants are organised into a party (Schegloff, 1995), such that the
party as a whole is responsible for carrying the conversation forward. In this manner, a dialogue
move from one party member is not associated with that particular individual alone, but the party
as a whole, via a process that we dub ‘grounding by proxy’. An individual member can thus stand
proxy for others in satisfying the constraints imposed by the current context of the conversation.
Accordingly, the contextual increments or commitments arising from a dialogue move can, in the
absence of overt dissent from that move by other members, affect the whole party, that is, all its
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individual members. The joint responsibility of the party members to ground implies that a party
member who cedes the floor, bears the responsibility to butt in ‘to compensate’ if anything goes
astray; that is, in case of hedgings, pauses, signs of non-understanding and falsities in what is
being said by the member who won the floor (the proxy). This is the situation that we try to create
experimentally using an online 3-person variant of Garrod and Anderson’s (1987) Maze Game
and provide evidence that such mutual responsibilities between party members are operational.
We show that this ‘compensation’ often takes the form of ‘extra’ intra-party interactions or what
Lerner (1993) has called ‘conferring’ among the party members, which all things being equal, is
caused by the apparent failure of one party member to ground. We conclude that, modulo op-
portunities for intra-party conferring, grounding can operate in the first instance between parties
rather than individuals.
Chapters 6 and 7: These chapters will be summarised here together as the two experiments
carried out are closely intertwined. Given the results from the previous chapter and additional
corpus evidence relating to long-distance resolution possibilities for ellipses, we hypothesise that
participants who fall inside and outside the locally interacting parties, dubbed as primary and
peripheral participants respectively, need to be distinguished. The locally involved/primary par-
ticipants should be strongly attached to the local conversational context (expressed in terms of
the higher saliency of potential antecedents in this context and a strong tendency to interpret dis-
tant fragments incorrectly against them), and their level of access to a distant context/antecedent
should thus be impaired. In contrast, the locally peripheral participants should have no such at-
tachment to the local context and should therefore find that the distant context, in which they were
a primary participant, is more salient/accessible to them. We show experimentally that this is in-
deed the case: the utterances in the local conversational context (an overarching topic and a set
of sub-topics during which the current parties remain unchanged) were available and had priority
for the primary participants as antecedents of the (elliptical) utterances they received. By con-
trast, for a peripheral participant, this context was a ‘distant’ set of utterances, during which they
were last (at some earlier stage of the dialogue) a primary participant. In other words, there was a
systematic disparity between primary and peripheral participants’ interpretations of ‘equally el-
liptical’ Reprise Fragments, received from the same individual, all of which were separated from
their antecedents, by the same number of turns/topics on average. We argued that this is evidence
for the emergence of distinct dialogue contexts within one and the same conversation, as a result
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of one or more previously primary participants falling outside the active/interacting parties for
a local stretch of talk/topic. The context that they shared as primary participants with other pri-
mary participants, prior to when the new parties were established, is suspended. All the while, the
shared context between those who ‘carried on’ as primary participants ‘moves forward’. A single
utterance, therefore, can result in divergent contextual updates, applied to primary and peripheral
participants’ information states/contexts, resulting in what is dubbed ‘Pragmatic Pluralism’ in
multi-party dialogues.
Chapter 8: This chapter rehearses the overall argument of this thesis. It is argued after-
wards, that the experimental results obtained in this thesis present significant challenges for for-
mal models of dialogue context. In particular, they indicate that models of dialogue should index
the contextual increments arising from an utterance to specific subsets of the participants as these
are not guaranteed to be the same for all. Some tentative ideas are presented as to how this might
be achieved in Ginzburg’s question based approach to tracking contextual change.
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Chapter 2
Aspects of Dialogue
2.1 Introduction: Why dialogue is unique
The study of behaviour while speaking and the study of the behaviour of those who
are present to each other but not engaged in talk cannot be analytically separated.
(Goffman, 1981)
Most traditional linguistic theories (descendants of Chomskyan Generative Grammars) de-
rive from judgements of acceptability/grammaticality of decontextualised sentences in isolation
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004), where the most contextualisation provided is that of a preceding
sentence in the form of a conjunction. These are theories of production and comprehension of
isolated words and sentences in situations where no interaction is possible:
. . . the interaction of the speaker and hearer in producing the turn at talk . . . has been
almost totally ignored in traditional linguistics. (Goodwin, 1981)
Dialogue on the other hand is, at first glance, untidy and highly contextualised. According
to the tradition, dialogue or natural speech - the most pervasive form of language use and the
primary site of language acquisition - is of marginal grammaticality making it an uninteresting
and defective data source for the investigation of linguistic structure. Chomsky (1968) suggests
that spoken language is:
a highly degenerate sample, in the sense that much of it must be excluded as irrel-
evant and incorrect - thus the child learns rules of grammar that identify much of
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what he has heard as ill-formed, inaccurate, and inappropriate.
The argument, very briefly, is that what people produce in natural conversation often includes
fragments, phrasal breaks (syntactically and semantically incomplete), repairs and disfluencies
which are taken to be instances of defective performance. This makes it extremely difficult to
use dialogue as a data source for determining when a sentence is well-formed.
There is, however, a great deal of evidence that dialogue is actually a lot more orderly and
systematic than traditional linguistics assumes, hence yielding grammaticality data for dialogue
in its own right.
Importantly as we shall also see, dialogue is essentially a shared, collective process, where
the talk emerges as a product of the interaction between speakers and hearers. The listeners in
dialogue are not passive recipients, rather they are co-creators of the utterances, on a moment by
moment basis (Goodwin, 1981; Kraus, 1987; Clark & Schaefer, 1992; Clark, 1996). Moreover,
some have argued that production and comprehension are not independent, but coupled processes
((Garrod & Anderson, 1987), but see also Dynamic Syntax (Cann, Kempson, & Marten, 2005)
for a grammatical framework which reflects directly the dynamics of incremental growth of inter-
pretations in context and in which production and parsing are seen as basically the same process,
hence making it particularly suited to modelling the seamless shift, often mid-utterance, between
speaking and hearing in dialogue). This is in direct contrast to the Chomskyan tradition, in which
language-production is an autonomous mechanism.
2.1.1 Dialogue as a systematic, collaborative achievement
Work both in the area of Conversational Analysis (a descendent of Ethnomethodology, henceforth
CA), and psycholinguistics has shown that if dialogue - as an instance of social interaction - is
looked at more carefully, regularities start to emerge. These regularities can often be described
as structural norms or conventions governing conversational conduct (we will have something to
say about the distinction between rules and norms in the next section).
Having a ‘coherent’ conversation demands a lot more than what is required in producing or
parsing an isolated grammatical sentence. In other words in participating in any social encounter
including dialogue, there is a different but dependent set of competencies that are required. These
competencies involve knowledge of a set of tacit shared norms that the members of a community
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adhere to when engaged in talk. The aim of CA is to discover and make these explicit as structural
rules. But before we move on to discuss and go into any detail as to what some of these are, a
word or two about the CA methodology and a criticism often levied at it are in point.
A common criticism of the CA methodology
The CA methodology draws heavily on retrospective analysis of conversational transcripts. This
has always been a point of contention as regards the practice of CA. Others have argued that the
analyst has no direct access to people’s states of mind during a particular phase of a conversation,
at the time of analysis, and hence that the transcripts cannot really count as evidence for partici-
pants’ orientation to any rule arrived at in such manner. In other words, the criticism is that there
is a difference between some rule as merely descriptive of a regularity in a data set, and a rule as
prescriptive of certain patterns of behaviour.
Indeed, this would be a valid criticism if it were not for CA’s reliance on ‘negative’ instances
where these normative rules are deviated from or breached. These cases are often marked: they
are accompanied by hesitations, hedgings and often involve participants immediately providing
justifications, excuses or accountings for their deviant behaviour. It is precisely such cases which,
supposedly, reveal both to the other participants and to the analyst that such norms are in fact
operative.
Systematicity in conversation: some examples
Indeed, at first glance, dialogue seems untidy. Nevertheless, there is order in the untidiness. The
following examples should demonstrate how speakers use these apparent disfluencies systemati-
cally for special purposes, and how hearers on the other hand take them to be meaningful displays
of different aspects of a speaker’s mental state. This will in turn mean that it would be strange
if not wrong, for theoretical linguistics to disregard such phenomena as instances of defective
performance:
Goodwin (1980) establishes an intricate connection between what he calls a Restart and the
Achievement of Mutual Gaze, in face to face dialogue:
(2.1)
(1) Debbie: Anyway, (0.2) Uh:, (0.2) We went t- I went to bed.
(2) Chuck: X———-
2.1. Introduction: Why dialogue is unique 25
Here Debbie restarts her sentence “We went”, to produce the fully grammatical “I went to
bed”. She does this exactly when Chuck’s gaze reaches her. This is not coincidental as the pattern
here can be found in most such restarts as Goodwin shows. In fact a restart almost always has
the following format:
(2.2)
(1) A: [Fragment][Complete Sentence]
(2) B: X——————-
The above – as an example of the interaction between speaker and hearer along the course
of producing a turn at talk – is highly relevant in the area of language production and hence
theoretical linguistics (Goodwin, 1981). Goodwin argues that sentences in everyday dialogue
emerge as a product of the interactions between the speaker and hearer (Goodwin, 1979). In
other words, speaker and hearer collaborate directly in constructing the turn at talk. The hearer’s
behaviour, linguistic or otherwise, has a direct impact on what is produced by the speaker.
Other work in the CA literature regarding interactional structures and norms, includes the
organisation of turn-taking, repair, adjacency etc, all of which attempt to spell out the shared
methods/devices people use, or the norms people adhere to while engaged in talk. All of these
devices require an analysis in terms of the interaction between the speaker and hearer(s) and
cannot be otherwise accounted for. Some of these will be expanded on in later sections.
In the psycholinguistic tradition, Clark and Fox Tree (2002) investigate the role of the parti-
cles ‘uh’ and ‘um’ in speech, concluding that they have a systematic/purposeful role. Speakers
use these fragments to announce that they are initiating what they expect to be a delay in speak-
ing and that they plan this immediately before uttering these fragments. According to the paper,
such announcements implicate “that they are searching for a word, are deciding what to say next,
want to keep the floor, or want to cede the floor”.
Analogously, Fox Tree and Clark (1997) reveal the systematic role of the alternative pronun-
ciation of the definite article - ‘thiy’ instead of the standard ‘thuh’. They find that 81 percent
of the instances of the former were followed by a suspension of speech, meaning that people
involved were signalling problems at various levels of language production such as articulation
and word retrieval.
From a hearer’s perspective, Brennan and Schober (2001) show that listeners comprehend
interrupted words better when signals such as ‘uh’s and ‘um’s are present than when they are
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absent, or even when there was no interruption at all in the utterance.
The crucial point to be taken here is that there is systematicity to how people manage conver-
sation, despite its apparent disorderliness, and that apparent instances of disfluency often serve
various systematic, interactional functions. Moreover, as evident in the Goodwin example above
among others, dialogue can only be looked at in terms of an interactive, collaborative achieve-
ment by all the parties involved in it.
In general, it seems that we cannot but look at dialogue as a shared, orderly and therefore
coordinated activity to which two or more persons contribute, while adhering to a certain set of
tacit shared norms. Although much research has addressed these (some of which are summarised
in later sections), exactly what these are and indeed the dynamics of how they evolve as a product
of interaction, remain open to question.
2.1.2 Rules or Norms?
What we say above seems to imply that the task of the dialogue analyst is, in fact, very similar
to the task of the syntactician or semanticist. That is, while the syntactician seeks to describe
what it is for a sequence of words to be well-formed, or the semanticist seeks to describe how
semantic concepts of various types can be combined to yield propositions, the dialogue analyst
strives to make explicit a set of shared norms that people adhere to when conversing, thus seeking
to establish a notion of dialogue coherence. She tries, in other words, to spell out what it is for a
sequence of dialogue utterances to be coherent or well-formed. As we will see, a lot of work in the
computational literature on dialogue (e.g. Ginzburg (2009) or Traum (1994) both to be sketched
in later sections), drawing on the work by Conversational Analysts and Psycholinguists, attempts
to do just this. The result is always a protocol for interaction. Given the current ‘dialogue
state’, a protocol essentially constrains the set of next actions or dialogue moves that can ensue.
Interaction protocols arise as a result of combining a set of finer-grained interactional norms. As
we will see shortly, interaction protocols under Ginzburg’s (2009) KoS, arise as a result of the
composition of a set of Conversational Rules. We won’t expand on the details here.
Nevertheless, none of these models seem to adequately address the very complex problem
of what happens when such norms are deviated from or breached. This is a significant aspect of
dialogue and interaction, and seems to be what makes language and meaning dynamic, normative
and emergent phenomena. Let’s explore this a little. Note that no claims are being made here.
What follows is only intended as a brief discussion.
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A person’s deviation from an interactional norm often carries ‘extra’ meaning or significance.
Such meanings have been called implicatures by the philosopher Grice (1975), who has tried to
give a systematic account of just how these non-surface meanings are generated in virtue of
the mutual recognition of that norm being shared and in place. People often intentionally - in
the sense explicated by Grice (1957), that is, as a non-natural meaning, which is intended and
recognised as such by the hearer - exploit this. A simple example is that greetings are usually
followed by greetings (as we will discuss in more detail in later sections this is an instance
of the more general Conversational Analytic notion of ‘conditional relevance’). But we have
all experienced the unpleasant moment when someone does not return our Hello, though we’re
certain that they’ve heard us. We would in such cases invariably think that something was wrong,
perhaps immediately asking for an account if we couldn’t readily make a guess at it.
Nevertheless, Grice formulates such norms quite abstractly (e.g. his Maxim of Relevance),
indeed leaving plenty of room for variability in context. But it is precisely when such norms
are breached that it is conceivable that there will be a displacement, a joint modification - via
coordination between speaker and hearer - to the meaning of the norm itself (e.g. what it is to be
relevant in that particular context of use), and with the possibility of such displacement becoming
permanent and hence inseparable from the norm, so far as the same pair of people are considered.
Semantically, a parallel argument can be made that the meaning of words or concepts them-
selves are normative and emergent (we will discuss this in more detail in later sections). Upon
repeated use within novel contexts, words can get conventionally associated with concepts dif-
ferent from those before, i.e. semantic ontology is essentially dynamic. Strictly speaking, a
dictionary has the shelf life of less than a day! This also implies that, so far as word meaning
is concerned, no 2 speakers of a language community, if abstracted away from any particular
context of use (a dialogue), would speak exactly the same dialect of that language as they have,
one way or the other, had to deal with different situations using the same words. But as we will
see, there are devices in dialogue, such as repair, for the local resolution of such mismatches, so
that this will not and indeed does not lead to complete mayhem and miscommunication.
What is the status of Grammar in this regard? Can instances of ‘ungrammaticality’ be in-
tended as meaningful and recognised as such by a hearer? It would certainly be more difficult to
construct examples of this sort. However, it does seem possible. For example, one might do this
for poetic or rhythmic effect. This happens quite often in traditional Persian poetry where there
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are very strict rhythmic rules, and as a result the poet violates the Grammar of the language to ac-
commodate the required rhythm. Some of these instances of ‘ungrammaticality’ may well have
been routinised, i.e. they would now be used in everyday conversation, hence rendering them
‘grammatical’. But note also that in order to get a meaningful effect such as the absence of the
‘Hello’ above, the interlocutor would have to know that the person breaching the rule is in fact a
fluent speaker of that language and that he’s breaching it for an intended effect. We should note
that within the Chomskyan tradition, syntactic rules (or at least the principles in Chomskey’s
Universal Grammar) are supposed to reflect fixed rules, characteristic of the brain’s language
processing module or indeed of ‘the language of thought’ in general. But what we say above
implies that even syntax may be normative, and hence emergent from social interaction and ac-
tual language use. There have been arguments to this effect: see e.g. Ford, Fox, and Thompson
(2002) for arguments that syntax can be emergent from turn taking pressures. There are also
arguments in historical linguistics that diachronic syntactic change can be caused by processing
and production pressures.
In any case, this is an extremely interesting, fundamental, intricate and perhaps somewhat
dangerous debate (it has a large number of important philosophical consequences), to which
many theses could be dedicated. We will not go into any further detail in this regard. We will,
however, come back briefly to the discussion of the relationship between Conversational Rules
and interaction protocols in the context of Ginzburg’s model of dialogue context.
2.2 Dialogue as the accumulation of common ground
The primary effect of engaging in a dialogue is the accumulation of mutual-knowledge or as
we shall prefer common ground. Stalnaker (1978) defines common ground as ‘the propositions
whose truth he [the speaker] takes for granted as part of the background of the conversation’.
Upon the production of an utterance by a dialogue participant, the content should somehow be
added to the common ground, since a new utterance would inevitably presuppose the information
already conveyed by the previous utterances in the dialogue: ‘the essential effect of an assertion
is to change the presuppositions of the participants in the conversation by adding the content of
what is asserted to what is presupposed.’ (Stalnaker, 1978). This brings us to the question of
what it takes to contribute to a dialogue. We need to know the systematics of the accumulation
of common ground through the course of a conversation. A theory of dialogue context is needed.
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This is essential for any adequate account of how people are able to participate in dialogue:
• Comprehension: We need to interpret utterances. But dialogue is demonstrably a heavily
context-dependant form of language use. Utterances are often incomplete sentences (frag-
ments) the resolution of which relies heavily on what is assumed to be already part of the
participants’ common ground.
• Production: We need to produce the right utterance at the right time. But the relevance or
felicity of an utterance in any conversation is largely dependant on what the speaker takes
to be common ground, between himself and his interlocutors.
Prior to the emergence of the grounding model (Clark & Schaefer, 1989), most models of
discourse (e.g. (Kamp, 1981; Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 1978)) assumed that the accumulation of
common ground is a unilateral mechanism - that contributing to the conversation only requires
action (uttering the right words at the right time) from the current speaker, whereby the content
of what is uttered is added to the common ground between the speaker and all those in the
perceptual range of the utterance. Models of communication such as Searle’s speech act theory
(Searle, 1969), also assume perfect communication where the speaker has complete control over
the communicative process and thus the securing of uptake by the interlocutor is not considered
in the model:
[It is] not the symbol or word or sentence or even the token, but rather the production
[by the speaker] of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes
the basic unit of linguistic communication
These models then, all assume that dialogue participants add to the common ground au-
tonomously.
In their seminal paper, Clark and Schaefer (1989) criticise this view, proposing that con-
tributing to discourse is a joint collaborative process. Communication, on this view, is a form of
joint action, with conversationalists often likened to dancers or musicians, performing together as
members of an ensemble. Having a conversation demands that the participants coordinate both
on the content of what they say (e.g. sequential coherence) and the process (e.g. turn-taking). The
rest of this section will elaborate on the different aspects of the coordination between participants
in the orderly accumulation of common ground.
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In conversation, the main issue is that of establishing that something uttered has been under-
stood by the interlocutors. According to Clark and Schaefer (1989); Clark and Brennan (1991)
common ground cannot be properly updated without a joint process referred to as grounding.
Grounding can be roughly defined as the process by which participants mutually establish that a
certain utterance has been understood and that the conversation can now move on. The utterance
is then said to be grounded.
2.3 The Grounding Model: A sketch
What does it take to contribute to a conversation? Consider the example below:
(2.3)
(1) Alan: Now, -um, Do you and your husband have a j- car?
(2) Barbara: have a car?
(3) Alan: Yeah
(4) Barbara: Yes
(5) Alan: What is the make of it?
(6) Barbara: It’s a Ford
Speech act theorists, who conceive of communication as an individualistic process/capacity,
would argue that what Alan has done here is ask Barbara whether she and her husband have a
car and that in this way he has carried the conversation forward. However this is not quite what
happens. What has really happened is that Alan has initially failed to get his question across,
which is why Barbara is forced to request clarification by uttering “- have a car?”. It is only
after Alan responds to the clarification request that Barbara answers the original question. This
shows that asking a question involves more than the production of an interrogative. Before any
question - or any utterance type for that matter - can be appropriately responded to, the dialogue
participants need to establish mutually that the question has been understood; i.e. Barbara should
believe that she has understood the utterance and Alan must be able to believe that Barbara
believes that she has understood the question. An utterance needs to be grounded before any
relevant response can ensue.
According to Clark and Schaefer (1989), an utterance is grounded if “the contributor and
his/her partners mutually believe that the partners have understood what the contributor meant to
a criterion sufficient for current purposes.” This is referred to as the grounding criterion. Ground-
ing then, is the process by which conversational participants try to reach this mutual belief.
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So, what does it take to contribute to a conversation? Clark and Schaefer (1989) propose that
any complete contribution in dialogue is composed of the following two phases:
1. Presentation phase: A presents utterance u for B to consider. He does so on the assump-
tion that if B, gives evidence e or stronger, he can believe that she understands what he
means by u.
2. Acceptance phase: B accepts utterance u by giving evidence e that she believes she un-
derstands what A means by u. She does so, on the assumption that once A registers that
evidence, he will also believe that she understands.
Grounding is generally the desired end result of the two phases. The acceptance phase is
necessary because when A finishes an utterance, B can be in any one of the following states:
1. B didn’t notice that A uttered any u.
2. B noticed that A uttered some u (but wasn’t in state 3).
3. B correctly heard u (but wasn’t in state 4).
4. B understood what A meant by u.
Below in section 2.5, we will consider cases of miscommunication, i.e. when B is not in state
3, thereby necessitating meta-communicative interaction or repair, before the conversation can
move on.
2.3.1 Taxonomy of Evidence of Understanding
As already implied, the exchange of evidence of understanding (in the acceptance phase) is cru-
cial to the interlocutors reaching the mutual belief that something said is understood. Different
forms of evidence of understanding have been analysed and classified in Clark and Schaefer
(1989); Clark and Brennan (1991). There are two main categories, namely positive and negative
evidence. In dialogue excerpt 2.3, “-have a car?” is an instance of negative evidence or a request
for repair (more on this below). However, absence of negative evidence is not enough to move
the conversation forward. A speaker also expects positive evidence of understanding from the
hearer that their utterance has been understood.
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Clark and Brennan (1991) provide the following taxonomy of positive evidence, ordered
from strongest to weakest:
1. Demonstration: B demonstrates all or part of what he has understood A to mean.
2. Acknowledgement: B produces a backchannel response (Schegloff, 1982).
3. Relevant next turn: B produces a relevant next turn. E.g. if a question is asked, an
appropriate answer is a relevant next turn.
4. Continued attention: A non-verbal form, which simply points to positive signs of atten-
tion like gaze.
2.3.2 Recursion in the grounding cycle
The grounding cycle, presented above, is recursive in the sense that any acceptance is itself an
utterance, and hence a presentation per se, which needs to be accepted before it can take effect
(grounding of the initial presentation), meaning that we’re faced with the problem of infinite
regress. Clark and Schaefer (1989) attempt to rectify this problem by positing the Strength Of
Evidence Principle:
The participants expect that if evidence e0 is needed for accepting presentation u0,
and evidence e1 for accepting evidence e0, then e1 is weaker than e0.
So grounding cycles should end in continued attention, at which point the acceptance in
question takes effect and the corresponding presentation is grounded.
2.3.3 Levels of grounding
Analogously to the model developed by Allwood (1995), Clark (1996) distinguishes 4 levels of
(collaborative) action in dialogue. These correspond to distinct levels at which an utterance or a
presentation u may be grounded. They have different terminologies for these levels. Here, we
will adopt Clark’s terminology:
• Acceptance: whether the hearer has integrated the content of u
• Recognition: whether the hearer has understood what u means
• Identification: whether the hearer has heard/perceived u
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• Attention: whether the speaker and hearer have established a channel of communication
Note that each of these levels presupposes the next. The levels are distinct to the extent that
the grounding of any utterance can be negotiated on each level. For example, while a hearer
may understand fully what u means (Recognition), she might not agree to what is proposed in
u (Acceptance): “A: That’s a nice building. B: No. I think it’s actually quite ugly”. Or if u is a
question, the hearer might be unwilling to answer the question, although she has fully understood
it: “I’d prefer not to answer that right now”.
So after any u is presented, the speaker and hearer are faced with questions concerning each
of these levels. It follows that for any speaker and hearer, for each presentation, each of these
levels of grounding is represented in the common ground.
Corresponding to each of these levels, there are specific kinds of feedback that the hearer can
use to signal whether or not a presentation has been grounded at that particular level. For instance,
acknowledgements can be used to signal both Recognition and Acceptance, while rejections (e.g.
“no”) can be used to signal Recognition while rejecting the content of an utterance (Acceptance).
In the next chapter, where we discuss the differences between dyadic and multi-party dia-
logues, we will consider the idea that participants in different roles may or may not have access
to feedback ‘tool sets’ corresponding to the above levels, and moreover that participant role plays
a part in the assumptions made by a speaker about a participant’s grounding of an utterance on
each level.
2.3.4 The contribution model is dyadic
We should note that the grounding/contribution model outlined above - taken here as an inter-
action protocol for establishing that a presentation has been mutually accepted - is dyadic. It
assumes that there are only 2 people engaged in the dialogue, despite the fact that the grounding
criterion vaguely covers multi-party settings. It is unclear how the model, as specifying a system-
atic account of grounding in conversation, would scale up to multi-party dialogues. This is the
main theme of this thesis and will be taken up in considerable detail in the next chapter, where
we consider different forms of participation and their implications for patterns of grounding.
2.3.5 Textual Vs. Situational Common Ground
Once grounding has been achieved and a particular piece of information has been introduced
into the common ground, the participants can refer to it freely and assume that the other will be
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able to understand these subsequent references. Moreover, these subsequent references are made
using definite reference clauses and anaphora which presuppose that the interlocutor knows about
the referent. In example 2.3, once Alan’s question is grounded and answered, both participants
can subsequently refer to Barbara’s car as ‘it’ or ‘the car’. In fact, participants have access
to two different aspects of the common ground which together constitute the overall discourse
representation.
Clark and Schaefer (1992) make the distinction between these two components: situational
and textual common ground. The former refers to the semantic common ground. In other words,
this is a set of representations in which all references have been resolved, effectively representing
a set of beliefs, so far established as common by the interlocutors. Note that in this component
information about the linguistic means used to establish these propositions is not represented.
The textual common ground, comprises a linguistic record, which represents the linguistic
means (phonology, words and syntax) that have been used in the dialogue to mutually establish
the propositions in the situational common ground. Some of this information will not be retained
for long. For example people are not good at remembering past utterances verbatim (see e.g.
Marslen-Wilson and Tyler (1976)). But other information such as the way in which a person
has conceptualised an entity, using a particular definite description or name - a phrase-concept
pairing - may be retained throughout the course of the conversation and sometimes beyond, so
that subsequent references to the same entity will employ the same phrase. Moreover, as we shall
see below, people are sensitive to what word has been used with a particular partner so that the
same term might not be used with others to refer to the same entity.
But what empirical evidence is there that people retain in their common ground such textual
representations or word-concept pairings? Or indeed that people remember which term they’ve
used with a particular interlocutor? In other words, is the linguistic common ground indexed
to specific dialogue partners? This brings us to what Brennan and Clark (1996) have dubbed
conceptual pacts.
2.3.6 Conceptual Pacts and Least Collaborative Effort
Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986) and Brennan and Clark (1996) carried out a series of experiments
upon pairs of subjects, with one subject assigned to the role of Director and the other to the role
of Matcher. In these experiments the Director had to describe a sequence of abstract figures (so-
called Chinese Tangrams) to the Matcher, so that she, who had the same figures at her disposal
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but shuffled, could arrange them into the sequence described by the Director.
They found, first, that once a nominal, or a definite phrase had been used by the director with
a particular partner, the director tended to re-use that phrase again in subsequent interactions
with the same partner, even if the current context/figure meant that the expression was not totally
appropriate.
Second, they found that once a term had been used to refer to one of the figures with one part-
ner, if the director then went on in a later trial to describe the same item to a different partner she
would often NOT use the same term, and that indeed this would require a brand new grounding
cycle for the different term used.
These observations therefore, provide evidence for partner-specific choices of referential ex-
pressions, so that in the textual common ground the linguistic expressions used to refer to dif-
ferent entities are somehow indexed to specific participants, a property of utterances which fits
under the very general rubric of audience design, discussed in more detail below.
In section 2.6 below, we will review some of the literature on the phenomenon of alignment;
the interrelatedness of the behaviour of people engaged in interaction at a local level, i.e. the
way a speaker’s behaviour (linguistic or otherwise) directly influences the immediate subsequent
behaviour of another participant - that is, NOT just as a result of grounding a common perspective
or a conceptual pact.
A third result recurring in all referential tasks of this sort, is that once an expression has been
grounded as referring to a specific figure, in subsequent trials with the same partner, when the
director encounters the same figure again, the expression used tends to contract, get shorter than
the one used previously. For example, “the dancer with his leg up in the air” could become “the
dancer” in later trials. Moreover, the grounding cycle itself gets shorter over repeated trials.
To account for this, Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs (1986), in their model of grounding definite
references, propose the principle of least collaborative effort:
In conversation, the participants try to minimize their collaborative effort, the work
that both do from the initiation of each contribution to its mutual acceptance.
Apart from the contraction of referring expressions, the principle of least collaborative effort
is supposed to account for people’s preference for both self-initiation and self-repairs (Schegloff,
1977). As we shall see in section 2.5 below, both of these result in shorter grounding cycles, and
hence require less joint effort.
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This principle contrasts with individualistic, speaker-centred accounts of meaning and com-
munication, such as the Gricean maxims of Quantity and Manner, or Searle’s principle of least
effort, which would predict that once an expression has been used successfully by the speaker,
she should carry on using the same expression on subsequent occasions. Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs
(1986); Clark and Brennan (1991) trace this problem back to the assumption of perfect commu-
nication in such models. “They assume flawless presentations and trouble-free acceptances and
therefore cannot do justice to what really happens in conversation” (Clark & Brennan, 1991)
2.3.7 The role of common ground in utterance production and understanding
Audience design is a pervasive property of utterances in both conversational and written form
(Bell, 1984). It designates how an addressee has an impact on the speakers’ utterance formula-
tions or behaviour in general, i.e. how speakers tailor their utterances to their specific interlocu-
tor(s), thus taking the unique common ground that they have with their interlocutors into account.
Gergen (1972) notes in this regard that when he writes letters to close friends, depending on his
current knowledge of and relationship with that friend, he comes across as a completely different
person in each case: “In one, I was morose, pouring out a philosophy of existential sorrow; in
another I was a lusty realist; in a third I was a lighthearted jokester”.
Successful communication in Clark’s grounding model, in line with the Gricean cooperativ-
ity principle (Grice, 1975), relies heavily on speakers cooperatively designing their utterances
for the benefit of their addressees, through reasoning about the addressee’s state of mind (beliefs,
intentions etc.), and hence taking the unique common ground that they have with their addressees
into account. The Gricean Maxims in the grounding model, are supposedly instantiated by speak-
ers in specific cases, against the common ground between them and the addressees. For example,
what counts as “as informative as required” (Grice’s Maxim of Quantity) when addressed to A,
may not be so when addressed to B, and this is determined by the common ground.
Some of the empirical evidence for audience design relates to the semantic content of the
utterances produced. For example, Fussell and Krauss (1992) showed that the referential ex-
pressions that speakers used to refer to photographs, reflected their prior beliefs (possibly mis-
taken) about their addressees. For example if they thought that the addressee was likely to
know about the person in the photograph they tended to use more concise descriptions, or often
names, whereas otherwise, they produced more elaborate descriptions. There is also evidence
that through the course of a conversation, people can dynamically adjust their behaviour, e.g. the
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amount of detail they provide about some referent/concept, as the degree to which the addressee
knows about the concept is gradually revealed (Isaacs & Clark, 1987).
Other evidence has to do with the form of speaker’s utterances, e.g. phonology, speech-
rate and syntax; speakers may speak more slowly or use less complex syntactic constructions
if they believe that the addressee is not a fluent speaker of the language. We will discuss such
‘accommodations’ by the speaker, in a little more detail in section 2.6.2.
So far, we’ve talked about how common ground guides language production. Common
ground also has an impact on how others interpret the speaker’s utterances. The addressee may
take what he knows about the knowledge/situational representations of the speaker into account
when interpreting her utterances (see e.g. (Hannah & Tanenhaus, 2004)). Comprehension, then,
is also guided in the grounding model by assumptions of cooperativity. For example, suppose
a colleague asks me where I live, and I say, in London (he obviously knows this already). This
would probably be taken by him as some sort of joke or insult, as he assumes that I am inten-
tionally flouting Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. So what the addressee takes the speaker to know
(common ground), guides his interpretation of the speaker’s words. Another example is that for a
reference by a speaker that is ambiguous for the addressee, she might perform disambiguation by
inferring that the speaker could not be talking about some referent because he could not possibly
know about it.
Although it is uncontroversial that common ground plays a part in both production and com-
prehension of utterances, the exact nature of the psychological memory processes which enable
access to common ground - and hence a characterisation of the situations in which this may or
may not occur - are still a great source of contention. For example, Keysar and colleagues (e.g.
(Keysar, 2007; Horton & Gerrig, 2005; Horton & Keysar, 1996)) have been arguing, through
a series of studies, that both language production/audience design and interpretation are con-
strained by subconscious memory processes and that therefore the time available for the retrieval
of representations has a direct impact upon the degree to which common ground is taken into
account during production/comprehension. These studies suggest that people’s real-time utter-
ance production/comprehension in dialogue, are at least initially egocentric, depending upon
their own private knowledge/memory representations (which are, they argue, more accessible
through quicker, less computationally expensive, ‘automatic’/post-conscious mechanisms), and
that common ground is only consulted when something goes wrong (e.g. negative feedback from
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interlocutor). Nevertheless, this contention does not seem to have been resolved as there are
conflicting pieces of empirical evidence in both directions (see Schober and Brennan (2003) for
a review).
We should note that issues of audience design and partner specificity in language use are
of great importance in multi-party dialogues. It is, as yet, unclear to what degree speakers in
multi-party dialogues take all participants in the conversation into account when they plan their
utterances. This becomes an extremely complex, if not impossible, task when the participants’
knowledge about the topic under discussion is not aligned, e.g. when two participants are experts
but one is a novice, or when group size increases, forcing speakers in such circumstances to issue
more ‘generic’ utterances.
With regards to comprehension, the impact of common ground on a participant’s interpreta-
tion of an utterance implies that in multi-party dialogue, discrepancies between what is mutually
known to a speaker and each hearer, can lead to differences in interpretation of the same utterance
by different hearers, in one and the same conversation. This latter problem will be of great con-
cern in the final chapters of this thesis. We will come back to these issues once we’ve introduced
multi-party dialogues in the next chapter.
2.4 Sequential coherence in dialogue
Within the CA tradition, a lot of attention has been paid to the sequential coherence of an unfold-
ing interaction. In this section we will take a glance at some of their findings in this regard.
2.4.1 Adjacency and Conditional Relevance
As we saw above, any presentation requires some form of acceptance from the interlocutor. It is
very often the case that an acceptance is implicit in an appropriate reaction to the presentation.
But what counts as appropriate here?
It turns out that for a given type of utterance, there is indeed a very restricted set of appropriate
types of utterance that can be produced as a response. For example, a greeting is followed by a
greeting, a question by an answer, while an assertion requires an acceptance or rejection. This
is the sense in which a turn is sequentially implicative, meaning that a turn projects a response.
This leads to units which are larger than the individual utterance; the exchange or the adjacency
pair:
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A given sequence will be composed of an utterance that is a first pair part produced
by one speaker directly followed by the production by a different speaker, of an
utterance which is (a) a second pair part, and (b) is from the first pair type as the first
utterance in the sequence is a member of. (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973)
The production of a first pair part, then, makes the second pair part ‘conditionally relevant’:
By conditional relevance of one item on another we mean: given the first, the second
is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first;
upon its non-occurrence it can be seen to be officially absent - all this provided by
the occurrence of the first item. (Schegloff, 1972b)
Importantly for grounding, such projectability, or sequential implicativeness allows partici-
pants to monitor stage by stage, turn by turn, the others’ interpretation of their utterances, so that
each turn displays the uptake of the previous one. So if B produces T2 in response to A’s turn
T1, this reveals B’s interpretation of T1 to A. Below in section 2.5, we will see how this allows
for subsequent third position repairs by A.
2.4.2 Insertion Sequences
Often, the second pair part of an adjacency pair cannot be found immediately after the first
pair part, but separated from it by another embedded adjacency pair, referred to as an insertion
sequence (Schegloff, 1972a), as in example 2.4 below:
(2.4)
(1) A: Do you want to go for lunch?
(2) B: Where are you going?
(3) A: Turkish shop down the road
(4) B: Yes. I like that place.
Insertion sequences then, are preliminary from the point of view of the responder, to the
response (second pair part) subsequently produced to the initial first-pair part. As we will see
shortly, this is the reason why in computational models of dialogue context, the QUD (Ques-
tions Under Discussions) element as modelling the highly constrained ‘discursive potential’ in
conversation, is a partially ordered set (often a stack).
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2.5 Repair
Whatever the case may be as regards the role of common ground in interpretation, non/mis -
understandings can arise, among other things, as a result of speakers making erroneous presup-
positions about what they share (linguistically or otherwise in their common ground) with their
interlocutor, which can in turn arise because speakers are behaving egocentrically. Keysar (2007)
conceives of the latter as a systematic source of miscommunication. Considering moreover that
dialogue is spontaneous, this is more likely to occur in dialogue than in written language, where
a participant has time for revision. A characteristic feature of conversation, then, is the work that
people to do to resolve such problems.
So what conversational mechanisms are there for rectifying such problems in understanding?
Below, we will summarise the extensive analysis within the CA tradition of different types of
repair phenomena.
In contrast to models of repair which try to characterise specific kinds of trouble in under-
standing, the reasons behind them and the corresponding techniques that people use to deal with
them (see e.g. Clark and Marshal’s (1981) model of definite reference repair), CA analyses (ini-
tiated by Sacks) focus primarily on the sequential unfolding of troubles in understanding. They
provide a detailed structural characterisation of these repair procedures.
Schegloff (1977) highlighted the way in which the repair initiation stage (the signalling of a
problem) is distinct from the repair itself, and how both of these can be carried out either by the
original speaker (self) of the trouble source turn (henceforth TST) or another person (other).
He pointed out the way speakers may foresee a potential, prospective trouble in the interlocu-
tor’s understanding, and repair the problem by restating or further qualification of part of their
turn before the floor was ceded to the interlocutor, thus performing a self-initiated self-repair in
the same turn.
If, on the other hand, the turn is released by a speaker as complete, the interlocutor now has a
chance in the turn immediately following the TST, either to repair the problem herself by correct-
ing some part of the TST (other-repair), or to initiate repair resulting in a meta-communicative
insertion sequence ending by the turn containing the repair itself (other-initiated self-repair).
Jefferson (1983) further distinguishes within other-corrections in the next turn, between ‘ex-
posed’ and ‘embedded’ corrections. The former occurs when the other-correction results in a
break in the talk-in-progress, in the sense that in the ensuing talk the corrected participant, pro-
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vides ‘accountings’ of why the original term was used. Embedded corrections, in contrast, occur
when the correction is ‘adopted’ by the corrected participant, in a sequentially relevant turn
following the other-correction, thus not breaking the talk-in-progress.
As regards other-initiated repairs or Clarification Requests (CR), see Purver (2004) for a
full empirical corpus study of the different forms such CRs can get, and the range of semantic
readings thereof. As indicated above in section 2.4.2, we should point out that repair initiations
act effectively as the first pair part of an adjacency pair, where the second pair part is the repair
itself.
Schegloff (1992) distinguished a further class of repairs; repair-after-next-turn. These occur
when it is an interlocutor’s - proferred as - conditionally relevant response (the acceptance phase
in the grounding cycle), which reveals to the speaker of the TST, that the interlocutor has misun-
derstood it. The speaker of the TST then has the opportunity to perform a self-repair in the next
turn. These usually take the form of “no I didn’t mean A I meant B”.
The following schema summarises the different types of repair and their relative positioning
with respect to the TST (Schema adapted from Levinson (1983); Schegloff (1992, 1997)):
(2.5)
(1) A(TST): There are two opportunities for self-initiated self-repair: 1. Im-
mediately after the error; 2. At the end of the turn.
(2) B: Other-initiation or other-repair.
(3) A: 1. Self repair by A upon other initiation in turn 2; 2. Third posi-
tion self repair upon realisation by A of B’s misinterpretation of
A’s turn 1, revealed in the response by B in turn 2.
(4) B: Fourth position, other initiated repair; B realises after hearing A’s
response in 3, that she had misunderstood A’s turn.
Although this thesis will not be dealing with repair phenomena specifically, it’s worth noting
that most of the conversations or the segments therein on which these analyses of repair are based,
involve only 2 participants as also evident in the scheme above. It is unclear how these repair
mechanisms would scale up in multi-party dialogues.
We will return to this discussion, in section 3.9 of the next chapter, where we briefly discuss
some of the questions that arise concerning repair phenomena in multi-party dialogues.
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2.6 Coordination between, and Interrelatedness of the behaviour of interactants
It has long been known that when one interacts with others, one accommodates them by way of
adapting to their needs and to the situation at hand, across a wide range of behaviours. One may
act in a range of fashions or talk in different styles depending on the social situation/context in
which one finds oneself. Indeed as Erving Goffman puts it, one’s ‘projected self’ is potentially
different in each case. But the same goes for those others that one is interacting with. In other
words, they too, adapt their behaviour to ours, and hence are affected by the way we behave. So
in interaction, the influence that we exert on one another is a reciprocal one.
In this section, we’ll be concerned with some of the ways in which the behaviours of interac-
tants are interrelated and how they influence one another locally, on a moment by moment basis.
We will be looking at some of the existing literature relating to such coordination phenomena
arising in social interactions, spanning both linguistic and non-verbal levels of behaviour. It will
turn out that with few exceptions, all of the literature on behavioural coordination/alignment is
based on the analysis of dyadic interactions.
2.6.1 Synchrony/Alignment in non-verbal behaviour
There is a relatively large body of empirical evidence to do with how one’s immediate behaviour
is directly affected by the behaviour of others present. Research in the social psychology litera-
ture, to do with the interrelatedness of behaviours of those involved in the same interaction, dates
back to Condon and Ogston (1966).
The study in Condon and Ogston (1966), involved frame by frame microanalysis of recorded
video and audio of dyadic interactions. The first problem in any such study is to determine the
units of analysis according to which similarity in behaviour can be construed. To this end, Con-
don developed the notion of a process unit, which is roughly defined as a sequence of frames
during which the directionality of the movement of one or more body parts is maintained. It
is important to note here that if this involved more than one body part, then the inertial bound-
aries of the movements of each would need to coincide with those of the other body parts that
moved, as though they were all dancing together to the same rhythm. Indeed, the rhythm here
was being dictated by the speech that was simultaneously being produced. They also annotated
the frames for the phonetic units that were being uttered during them. They found that the audi-
tory boundaries coincided with those of the movements of the body parts. So far, this involves
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only one person which is why the phenomenon is referred to as Self-Synchrony. Interactional
Synchrony occurs, when the boundaries of the process units of the behaviour of the speaker, co-
incides with those of his interlocutor. Amazingly, it was found that in their data, interactional
synchrony was the rule. Moreover, synchrony was maintained even when the participants were
not paying visual attention to one another. Thus, it was all happening primarily via the auditory
channel. They conclude by stating that interactional synchrony is an invariant characteristic of
normal/non-pathological human interaction.
Condon’s work was later followed up by Kendon (1970). Whereas Condon thought that syn-
chrony was a pervasive, invariant property of normal human behaviour in interaction, Kendon’s
study (using the same methodology as Condon) shows that there are degrees or kinds of syn-
chrony. This standpoint implies that synchrony may actually serve particular communicative
functions in interaction. For instance the more ‘strong’ kind of synchrony found in Condon’s
study contributes, Kendon claims, to a general feeling of rapport between the interactants. De-
gree of synchrony is also said to correlate positively with degrees of engagement/attention in the
interaction on the part of an interlocutor and hence could serve to regulate turn-taking. This leads
Kendon to suggest that the task at hand is to describe the situations in which synchrony may or
may not occur.
Specifically relevant to our concerns, is that Kendon’s data in fact, comes from multi-party
dialogues. We will not go into any more detail here, but in the later discussion of participation
framework where this is more relevant. Suffice it to say that degrees of synchrony may serve to
distinguish between the (normatively appropriate) behaviour of participants in different roles (for
example primary vs. peripheral participants) in face to face interaction, which will be one of the
main topics in our later discussion.
Also pertinent to non-verbal coordination, is Kendon’s F-formation system (Kendon, 1976),
which describes how people in face to face conversation manage to create and maintain the shared
physical space between them. The F-formation as a ‘ratificational device’ (Goffman, 1981) will
be more appropriate once the context is properly set in the next sections. We will not go into
more detail here.
Condon’s method of analysis (and Kendon’s) has not remained uncriticised. In two papers,
(McDowall, 1978b, 1978a), the first experimental tests of Condon’s results were undertaken. It
is concluded firstly, that the methodology of frame by frame analysis is not sufficiently replica-
2.6. Coordination between, and Interrelatedness of the behaviour of interactants 44
ble, and secondly, that Condon’s results are not more than a random coincidence of body part
movements, meaning that the likelihood of these coincidences is not greater than what would be
expected by chance. McDowell’s claim is thus that interactional synchrony is not a genuine phe-
nomenon. Gatewood and Rosenwein (1981) however, review of McDowell’s work, concluding
that McDowell’s results are based chiefly on a misunderstanding of what Condon intended by
the notion of a process unit, and hence that McDowell’s experimental methodology is not a real
test of the phenomenon of interactional synchrony. The details of this ongoing debate will not
concern us any further in this thesis.
The kind of work alluded to above has more recently been taken up by other researchers.
Synchrony has been defined overall as the matching of behaviours, the adoption of similar be-
havioural rhythms, the manifestation of simultaneous movement and the interrelatedness of in-
dividual behaviours (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991). Research has shown synchrony and non-
conscious mimicry of behaviour to be related to positive affect (Bernieri, Reznick, & Rosenthal,
1988), interpersonal liking and smoothness of interactions (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This
is often referred to in the literature as the coordination-rapport hypothesis. Most such studies
found that degrees of affiliation with the interlocutor positively predict degrees of non-conscious
mimicry. However, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) show that people mimic their interaction part-
ners’ mannerisms even when they were up to that point complete strangers and where it is un-
likely that there is any pre-existing rapport or a goal to develop any future affinity. This has
been explained by positing the perception-behaviour link hypothesis, whereby perceiving some
form of behaviour in your interlocutor activates the same behaviours at an immediate/local level
in you. 1 Despite all of this, Lakin and Chartrand (2005) among others, have shown mimicry
to be stronger when a person has been socially excluded. So, the link between affiliation and
mimicry/synchrony is still not completely straightforward in the social psychology literature.
2.6.2 Linguistic Coordination
So far in this section, we have only considered coordination/synchrony in non-verbal behaviour.
A good starting point to move the discussion on to verbal/linguistic behaviour - dialogue - is
Giles’ Communication Accommodation Theory (Giles & Coupland, 1991). Analogously to the
coordination-rapport hypothesis outlined above, according to the theory, interactants adapt to
1We will shortly discuss a linguistic counterpart of this hypothesis, namely Garrod and Anderson’s
(1987) input/output coordination principle
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each other’s behaviours to create, maintain or decrease the social distance between themselves,
in order to promote social approval or communicational efficiency. This can be done at various
different levels, linguistic or otherwise, including e.g. code switching, modification of accent,
idioms, dialect, gaze, pitch (e.g. see Giles and Smith (1979)), and word choice (Niederhoffer &
Pennebaker, 2002).
As regards the coordination-rapport hypothesis alluded to in the previous section, Niederhoffer
and Pennebaker (2002) find a rather surprising result. Although they had initially hypothesized
that lexical matching (not defined as using the same words but words that belong to the same
categories, e.g. articles, positive, negative, sex related etc.) would be positively correlated with
‘clicking’ or rapport, they found that while there was always a high correlation on both turn-by-
turn and conversational levels between the word categories used by the two participants, there
was no correlation between degree of lexical matching and rapport (judged both by outsiders and
the participants themselves). This leads them to suggest a rather different hypothesis, namely
coordination-engagement. It would help to think for example of a couple who are having a seri-
ous row. Intuitively their non-verbal behaviour would be quite synchronised, while they would
also match each other constantly in the use of negative words. They are highly engaged in this
interaction although something the opposite of rapport holds at that point. These results, Nieder-
hoffer suggests, are not inconsistent with Communication Accommodation Theory, as the theory
allows for interactional complexity. This means that in the model, interactants can converge on
some aspect of communication while diverging on another, to manage their identities. After all,
different people do come across as different and this seems to be, at least partly, intentional.
Particular to our concerns here is the success of verbal communication as a consequence
of coordination/synchrony/alignment in dialogue, which brings us to the interactive alignment
model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004). The central idea in this psychological model, is repre-
sentational alignment, whereby at various levels, the representation used by a speaker primes
similar representations, in subsequent utterances by the interlocutor. If A uses some representa-
tion, then his addressee is very likely to use the same representation in his response to A. This
priming takes place at all levels of representation, including phonological (Goldinger, 1998),
lexical (Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002), syntactic (Brannigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000)
and semantic. On this account production and comprehension are not psychologically indepen-
dent mechanisms (as traditional generative linguistics assumes they are). Garrod and Anderson
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(1987) describe this via the input/output coordination principle whereby an interlocutor aligns
the representations he uses in producing an utterance, with those he has just used in interpret-
ing/comprehending the previous utterance addressed to them.
It is generally alignment at the level of the situation model (top-level semantic representa-
tion) that leads to successful communication. Pickering and Garrod claim that alignment at lower
linguistic levels percolates and leads to alignment at higher levels, and that priming is the cen-
tral automatic, resource-free mechanism, responsible for such alignment, and successful mutual
understanding.
It should be noted that the most important difference between this model and Clark’s ground-
ing model, is that whereas successful communication in the interactive alignment model, is a
consequence of automatic, resource-free priming mechanisms, in the grounding model, success-
ful communication would require computationally expensive processes of reasoning about an-
other’s beliefs and intentions; ‘other-modelling’, and hence, Pickering and Garrod argue that the
latter cannot be a good characterisation of spontaneous dialogue. They claim that inferencing
about another’s mental state (beliefs and intentions) is a participant’s last resort, that is, it is only
invoked when everything else fails to secure mutual understanding. This criticism is one that has
recently been increasingly directed at Grice’s intentionalist view on communication, and Clark’s
adaptation of it in the grounding model (recall also Keysar’s criticisms sketched in section 2.3.7
above).
Although alignment appears to be a pervasive characteristic of successful, effective interac-
tions, the claim that alignment at one level leads to alignment at others seems to be too strong. We
have already seen that it is at odds with Neiderhoffer and Pennebaker’s (2002) conclusions with
regards to convergence on one level while not precluding divergence on another, hence enabling
the management of identities. Garrod and Clark (1993) also found that while younger children
were aligning on the words/expressions used, the expressions did not have the same reference.
So lexical alignment here did not lead to semantic alignment, on the contrary, it was detrimental
to successful communication. This leads Garrod and Clark to suggest that the automatic compul-
sion to align had to be actively suppressed in such cases.
It’s perhaps useful to recall the tension between Kendon and Condon’s approach, summarised
in section 2.6.1. Namely that Kendon believes that synchrony, rather than being characteristic of
all non-pathological interaction, serves particular purposes such as the regulation of turn-taking,
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or to signal affiliation. Linguistic alignment too, can serve multiple purposes. For example
lexical alignment or repetition can serve to accomplish embedded repairs, initiate repair, signal
affiliation and rapport etc.
Intuitively it appears that if it were the case that we aligned at all levels in what we say to one
another, it would mean that when having a conversation we would be stuck in a loop. Don’t we
switch perspectives, paraphrase another’s utterances to give them the evidence of understanding
they require? If someone repeated verbatim what I say to them, then I’d have the least de-
gree of certainty about whether they’ve understood me. Aphasics can repeat/shadow even when
production and comprehension are heavily impaired (Whitaker, 1982). Conversely, if one para-
phrases what I say involving a radical change in the situation model used, wouldn’t this serve
as a strong basis for the assumption that they’ve understood me? It appears as though we may
exploit representational misalignments - all those repairs and edits that we do of one another’s
utterances/meanings - as a means to situational alignment and hence successful communication.
It’s crucial here to note that most of the literature alluded to above - except Kendon’s work
which will be sketched in the next chapter - uses data from social encounters in which there are
only two participants. We will later discuss how linguistic priming might also be at work in
multi-party dialogues and how it relates to participatory status.
2.7 Computational/formal accounts of dialogue context
We will now, quite summarily, consider two of the most prominent computational models of
dialogue processing/context, namely Ginzburg’s KoS framework (Ginzburg, 1996) later extended
by Larsson (2002) and others, and Traum’s (1994) computational model of grounding. Traum’s
model is a direct formalisation of Clark’s grounding model, while Ginzburg’s KoS, uses various
insights from both the work of Clark and colleagues and the CA tradition on the integration of
meta-communicative interaction (repair) into the model.
As formal models of dialogue context, they need to satisfy the following requirements:
1. They should capture the highly constrained set of next moves that are coherent/felicitous
at any given point in conversation, viz. they specify a protocol for interaction, in terms of
preconditions on the state of the corresponding context model, that should hold if a certain
dialogue act or utterance type (e.g. short answer, acceptance etc.) is to be ‘felicitous’ at that
point. Moreover, for each utterance type they specify the change/update that the utterance
2.7. Computational/formal accounts of dialogue context 48
brings about in context. So we might say that such models are intricate state transition
systems, where utterances are the triggering events, or equivalently the edges between the
states in the transition diagram.
2. They should facilitate the resolution of context-dependant utterances: VP-ellipsis, Clarifi-
cation Ellipsis, Short Answers and the like.
2.7.1 A very brief sketch of Ginzburg’s KoS
As mentioned above in passing, accounts of contextual change can be traced back to the ‘Classi-
cal’ view of Stalnaker (1978). On this view, context is defined at time t as the set of assumptions
that the dialogue participants hold commonly at t (common ground).
How would an utterance modify the context as defined by Stalnaker? He suggests that the
propositional content of an assertion made by a participant is added to the context provided that
his interlocutors accept it. In other words a participant can either accept or reject an assertion. In
the latter case the context will remain unchanged.
However, Ginzburg (1996) argues that such a view would not provide a realistic model of
contextual updates, since it doesn’t properly characterise the highly constrained discursive po-
tential of dialogue after an utterance has been produced. More specifically Ginzburg rejects
Stalnaker’s simplistic Accept/Reject dichotomy.
Stalnaker’s simplistic definition of context is essentially an unordered set of propositions. If
the relevance or felicity of a next utterance were to be characterised in terms of this set alone,
each element in the set would play an equal part, being of equal importance. The relevance of
the next turn would not depend, in this model, on the order in which the propositions were added
to the set. An important property of dialogue however, is, as sketched in section 2.4, sequential
coherence. This corresponds to the Conversational Analytic notion of conditional relevance. The
last utterance greatly constrains the set of relevant follow-ups to that utterance. Moreover, the
semantic content of elliptical follow-ups (Short Answers, VP-Ellipsis, Acceptances, Rejections
etc.) are often resolved against the context of the last utterance, i.e. the semantic content of
an elliptical answer to a question can only be recovered with reference to that question. Hence
Ginzburg suggests that the Latest-Move be retained as a structural feature of a participant’s rep-
resentation of context. The reaction to an utterance could also be an attempt to initiate repair, or
more broadly to open an insertion sequence (the CA notion outlined in section 2.4.2). But the
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opening utterance of the insertion sequence itself is again restricted by and interpreted against
the context of the Latest-Move. The Latest-Move is therefore also needed, to characterise the
range of repair initiations (or Clarification Requests) that can follow.
It is worth noting that in order to account for certain syntactic and phonological parallelism
phenomena, it is not just the semantic content of the Latest-Move which needs to be projected
into context, but also the syntactic and phonological information associated with it. This is
in fact one of the motivations behind using HPSG (Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar), a
constraint-based grammar, as the formal framework in which the theory is couched. Within this
framework the phonological, syntactic and semantic information associated with an utterance are
represented, in parallel, meaning that constraints on production and parsing could be expressed
using a combination of all such information. We will not go into any more detail but here’s a
simple example of syntactic parallelism between the Latest-Move and a Clarification Request
follow-up:
(2.6)
(1) A: I saw her at the party.
(2) B: her? [“she?” would not acceptable here as “her” is the object of
the verb in the previous utterance]
(3) A: I mean Mary.
Now recall that an insertion sequence is preliminary to the discussion of the question which
prompted it. Hence before that original question can be addressed, the issue(s) raised in the in-
sertion sequence (possibly a repair) need to be resolved. This is why QUD, a partially ordered
set (often a stack) of questions, is introduced as an additional contextual feature. Before a ques-
tion can be answered, its more local sub-question (a question on which the original one depends)
needs to be addressed, and popped off the stack. The currently most salient question, the top of
QUD, which any next utterance should be ‘about’, is dubbed QUD-Maximal.
To summarise, the framework structures the context into the following features:
• FACTS: The set of propositional facts accepted commonly by the participants, more formal
but analogous to Clark and Schaefer’s notion of common ground.
• Latest-Move: An attribute representing the linguistic sign (in HPSG) associated with the
latest move made.
• QUD: The feature which keeps track of all the currently discussable questions. QUD is a
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partially ordered set, the maximal element of which (dubbed QUD-maximal) is what the
resulting protocol allows the next utterance to be ‘about’. The next utterance can also be a
question on which QUD-maximal ‘depends’.
The above triple is referred to as the Dialogue Game Board (DGB), which is effectively
a formal view of the participants’ common ground. Each dialogue participant’s view of the
common ground is thus a record containing the attributes outlined above.
Depending on the values of these attributes at a moment in time, the DGB has a configuration.
One could think of the model as an intricate state transition system. Patterns of conversational in-
teraction can in this manner be described in terms of the evolution of the DGB. Now it is Conver-
sational Rules (Larsson, 2002), that determine the mappings from one DGB state/configuration
onto another.
Here are the set of Conversation Rules (stated informally, instead of in HPSG notation),
specifying the (legal) mappings from one DGB state onto the other governing dyadic interactions:
• QUD-Specificity (QSPEC): given MaxQUD = q, one can make an utterance which is
q-specific.
• AskQUD Update: given LatestMove= Ask(A,B,q), q becomes QUD maximal
• Assert QUD Update: given Latest-Move = Assert(A,B,p), p? becomes QUD maximal
• Accept: given LatestMove =Assert(A,B,p), B can make utterance such that LatestMove
=Accept(B,A,p).
• UpdateFacts + DowndateQUD: Given LatestMove = Accept(B,p), conjoin p with FACTS,
downdate p? and all other qs from QUD resolved by FACTS
What constitutes a q-specific utterance is explicated by Ginzburg using the notions of ques-
tion ‘dependence/influence’ and proposition ‘aboutness’, intricate semantic notions that we will
not discuss here. Suffice it to say that, informally, an utterance is q-specific either if it’s a partial
answer to q or a sub-question of q. The important point is that the notion of question-specificity
is intended to provide semantic constraints on the set of next ‘coherent’/felicitous moves, while
facilitating ellipsis resolution.
Recall now what we mentioned in passing regarding interactional protocols, in section 2.1.2.
We mentioned that interaction protocols, in Ginzburg’s model, arise as a result of the composition
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of Conversational Rules such as the above. These can be composed if the set of preconditions of
the second rule is a subset of the set of effects of the first. The above set of rules, for example,
give rise to the following interaction protocol for Querying:
LatestMove = Ask(A,q): A has asked B the question q
A:
push q onto QUD;
release turn;
B:
push q onto QUD;
take turn;
make max-QUD-specific utterance;
release turn.
Such protocols then (there are others for Assertions and Greetings) are intended to provide
constraints on what constitutes a coherent dialogue. Interesting questions arise here: what if
these constraints are violated? How do we characterise the vastly context-dependent and variable
nature of the implicatures that would be generated in such circumstances? And what about the
effects of such violations on the ‘rules’ themselves? On the notion of ‘specificity’ to a some
question which has received an ‘unlicensed’ answer? Although these questions are notoriously
difficult to address at an adequately formal level, they do point to the need for a model in which
such norms or rules are emergent rather than, in some sense already there.
Relevant to our concerns in this thesis is that this model, and the interaction protocols induced
thereby, arrange possible actions of only two interactants; it is dyadic. In the next chapter, once
we’ve introduced the empirical differences between dyadic and multi-party dialogues, we will
return to our discussion of this model, and the attempts which have been made at some transfor-
mations to handle multi-party interactions. We will then raise some questions as to whether the
empirical adequacy criteria, which have given rise to the proposed transformations, bear closer
inspection.
2.7.2 David Traum: Grounding and Collaborative Conversational Acts
Traum (1994) presents a computational theory of grounding, where some problems with the
grounding model are brought out and dealt with. Although the strength of evidence principle
is invoked to rectify the problem of infinite recursions in accepting acceptances, Traum (1994)
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claims that the model is still unclear on whether contributions are ever complete. Indeed Clark
and Shaefer do suggest that some acceptances need not themselves be accepted, and hence aren’t
presentations. However, this is really as far as they go in specifying the conditions under which
the latter is the case.
Also, Traum claims that it is often unclear whether an utterance belongs to the presentation or
the acceptance phase: “we often need to look at large segments of the conversation, both before
and after an utterance before deciding how the utterance fits in” (Traum, 1994). Note that this is
not an empirical problem but a computational one, as people do seem to know in practice how a
particular utterance fits in.
One way or the other, Traum solves such problems, by replacing the presentation and accep-
tance phases with more atomic grounding acts (a single stratum in Traum’s (1992) formulation
of Conversational Acts introduced below, comprised of the actions which contribute to ‘ground-
edness’ in general) and on that basis develops a finite state automaton which will at any stage in
the dialogue, reflect whether a Discourse Unit (the term replacing Clark and Shaefer’s notion of
a complete contribution, also the level of structure at which conversational content is grounded
so that we always speak of the groundedness of a discourse unit) is already grounded and if not,
what it takes to ground it. I will not go into the details of how exactly this is done, due to scope
limitations. Suffice it to say that the problems with the presentation model brought out by Traum
are really only significant if we are to develop a computational protocol for grounding in terms of
exactly what actions are required by which participants (agents) to reach a certain desired state
of the grounding cycle. Clark and Shaefer’s account of grounding seems empirically adequate,
so far as we consider only dyadic dialogue.
Collaborative Conversational Acts
The theory of Conversational Acts (Traum & Hinkelman, 1992), is a generalisation of Speech
Act theory, in dialogue. Conversational Acts are organised into a hierarchy, such that each stra-
tum contains actions relevant to a single discourse level, which correspond to larger and larger
chunks of discourse as we go down the hierarchy. Traditional speech acts are retained in the third
of these strata, corresponding to actions taken at the level of the Discourse Unit. The crucial
consequence of such formulation is that an utterance containing a speech act, does not take effect
until its corresponding Discourse Unit has been grounded. In this manner, discourse is viewed as
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a collection of joint speaker-hearer actions, unlike traditional speech act theory which assumes
autonomy on the part of the speaker and hearer. We should see that Conversational Acts are
essentially the result of incorporating grounding theory into the theory of speech acts. If A asks
B to pass the salt, the request does not take effect until they come to the mutual understanding
that the utterance containing the request has been understood.
The collaborative approach to the notion of action in general has not remained uncriticised.
Below is one such criticism.
A critique of collaborative action
A critique of Clark and Shaefer and also particularly of the consequent collaborative theory of
conversational acts in Traum and Hinkelman (1992), can be found in Allwood (1995). This paper
criticises the central contribution of Clark and Shaefer’s grounding model, namely that speech
acts in conversation are always performed collaboratively (vs. unilaterally). In Traum’s theory,
ordinary/traditional speech acts (high-level stratum in Traum’s taxonomy of conversational acts)
do not take effect in dialogue until they have been grounded, i.e. both agents need to take action.
According to Clark and Schafer it is not possible to perform a communicative act, without
an appropriate reaction on the part of the interlocutor. Allwood’s (1995) argument against this,
is based on cases where dialogue turns are not yielded. For example, when a querier answers her
own question and no one else addresses that question, something which happens not infrequently
and can be done quite smoothly. Or, “I was referring to Bertrand Russell but she did not hear
me”. The point is that one has done something in one turn alone, regardless of whether or not
the interlocutor responds in any kind of fashion. ‘At least as far as the conception of action
which surfaces in ordinary language is concerned, communicative acts need neither necessarily
be resultative [have an effect] nor intentional and the fact that they need not be resultative, in turn,
means that they need not be collaborative’ (Allwood, 1995). In summary, the criticism is that
theory of Collaborative Conversational Acts runs counter to our usual intuitions about action.
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Chapter 3
Scaling up: Multi-party conversation
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, various aspects of two-person dialogues were sketched, and many dis-
cussions deferred until now. In this chapter, we’ll summarise some of the existing literature on
multi-party dialogues, with the aim of bringing into focus the difficulties we face in scaling up
theories of dyadic dialogue to multi-party dialogue. Some of the discussions in the last chapter
will be picked up again here, in the context of multi-party dialogues. The specific questions that
this thesis is concerned with will be highlighted.
The central notion that we will be concerned with in this chapter is that of the Participation
Framework in multi-party dialogues, constituted by roles other than Speaker and Hearer, an issue
which does not really arise in studies of dyadic dialogue. In particular, we will be concerned
with the grounds on which such roles are distinguished. Everything else will count towards the
characterisation of these roles and the difficulties therein, in terms of patterns of turn-taking,
grounding, conversational responsibilities, sequential coherence and coordination mechanisms
in general.
3.2 Participation Framework: Critiques of the dyadic model of communication
There has always been a bias in the literature (linguistics, sociology, semiotics etc.) towards
taking dyadic dialogue as the “canonical” form of communication. Levinson (1988) even speaks
in this regard, of a ‘straitjacket’. He argues that the success of the research on dyadic interac-
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tion has been at the price of limiting the types of social situations being considered. Multi-party
situations, particularly in certain societies are in fact a lot more common than dyadic ones. Pre-
sumably, the assumption that has been made by researchers is that all forms of communication
can ultimately be somehow reduced to the dyadic Speaker/Hearer model. But:
All such schemes appear to agree in either taking the standpoint of an individual
speaker or in postulating a dyad, speaker/hearer (or source/destination, sender/receiver,
addressee/addressor). Even if such a scheme is intended to be a model, for descrip-
tive work it cannot be. (Hymes, 1972)
Levinson (1988), however, points out that ‘beyond one or two suggestions, Hymes does not
offer us a better scheme’. Goffman (1981) is the first researcher to suggest the need for decom-
posing the notions of Speaker and Hearer into their smaller and analytically coherent constituent
concepts. Decomposing the Speaker category yields what Goffman calls the production format
which designates possible kinds of speakers, and Hearer into what he refers to as the participation
framework, designating possible kinds of recipients. Rightly, according to Levinson, these terms
are misleading. We will therefore use Levinson’s alternatives throughout. These are respectively,
Production Roles and Reception Roles, reserving the term Participation Framework for the union
of the two role sets, instantiated with respect to what Levinson calls an utterance-event. This
latter term will be motivated and defined once we’ve introduced Goffman’s analysis.
3.2.1 Footing
Before we begin considering Goffman’s and subsequently Levinson’s proposals, we need to in-
troduce the notion of footing. Goffman himself wasn’t completely clear on what ‘footing’ exactly
meant. But vaguely, issues of footing arise when “participant’s alignment, or set, or stance, or
projected self is somehow at issue” (Goffman, 1981). As alluded to above with regards to be-
havioural coordination, the projection of such a stance can be manifested through various means
including posture, gaze, and more importantly here, linguistically, including via pitch, accent,
dialect and word choice. Changes in footing can be manifested through changes in any of these
aspects of behaviour. For example, Blom and Gumperz (1972) note that in the Norwegian com-
munity, there are effectively separate codes, corresponding roughly to formal/official and col-
loquial manners of speaking. They observe that Norwegian people often switch between these,
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depending on the social context/situation in which they find themselves. For instance, they de-
scribe a situation where an outsider steps up to a group involved in close conversation, at which
point there is suddenly a shift from code to code and also in the posture of the group. Another ex-
ample from Gumperz, shows that speakers switch codes in conversation when moving on to talk
about serious business from intimate greetings and exchanges about their families. This occurs
in the same conversation between the same two people.
It is perhaps a surprise then that Goffman speaks often as if footing always reduces to issues
of participation status: “the alignment of an individual to a particular utterance whether involving
a production format, as in the case of a speaker, or solely a participation status, as in the case of a
hearer, can be referred to as his footing” (Goffman, 1981). It seems that participation framework
is for Goffman, a structural analysis of certain special changes in footing. Once we’ve introduced
fully the notion of participation framework (which is really what we’re concerned with rather than
the more general notion of footing), whereby the speaker/hearer categories are generated, it will
appear that not all changes in footing can be accounted for in terms of changes in the participation
framework. To see this, recall the latter example above from Gumperz in the previous paragraph,
in which there is a change in footing as a result of a change in the kind of talk being had. Indeed
it seems that footing isn’t an issue arising exclusively in multi-party dialogues, but one arising in
any social interaction including dyadic talk.
3.2.2 Production Roles: Decomposing the Speaker
Being a speaker in the ordinary sense (which is the most pervasive) is, as Goffman (1981) sug-
gests, really to be in three roles simultaneously:
1. animator: The utterer of the message.
2. author: The composer of the message.
3. principal: The ultimate source of the message.
It is important to recognise that these roles do not necessarily coincide. For example a
spokesman is the animator and author of his message but not the principal. Or in case some-
one directly quotes another, he is the animator but neither the author nor the principal.
Though the production roles as formulated above, are not without their own problems, we
will not in this review be much concerned about the distinctions made between different kinds
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of speakers, as this doesn’t really bear on the issues arising in theories of multi-party dialogue.
We will therefore not expand Levinson’s revision of Goffman’s production format. This is also
because Goffman’s categories (above) seem empirically sufficient (though not as systematically
formulated as Levinson’s).
3.2.3 Reception Roles: Decomposing the Hearer
Here’s the scheme proposed by Goffman for different kinds of hearers:
• Ratified
1. addressed recipient ‘the one to whom the speaker addresses his attention and to
whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over his speaking role’.
2. unaddressed recipient the rest of the ‘official hearers’, who may or may not be listen-
ing.
• Unratified
1. bystanders ‘inadvertent’, ‘non-official’ listeners.
2. eavesdroppers ‘engineered’, ‘non-official’ followers of talk.
However, “although Goffman’s categories are a notable advance on earlier schemes, they do
not seem sufficient” (Levinson, 1988). Consider the following excerpt from Sacks, Schegloff,
and Jefferson (1974), adapted from Levinson (1988):
(3.1)
(1) Sharon: You didn’ come tuh talk tuh Karen?
(2) Mark: No, Karen- Karen’ I’re having a fight, (0.4) after she wnet out
with Keith an’ not with (me)
(3) Ruthie: Hah hah hah hah
(4) Karen: Wul, Mark, you never asked me out
According to Goffman’s reception roles, with respect to Mark’s utterance, Karen is desig-
nated as a ratified unaddressed recipient. However, she is clearly more than that since we’d
expected her to respond to Mark’s utterance as she does. She is here the intended recipient of
that utterance. This is a case where the addressee (Sharon) does not coincide with the intended
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recipient of the message. What would Karen’s role be if she were unratified and hence could not
respond as she does?
To increase the empirical coverage of Goffman’s scheme Levinson (1988) recognises 4 dif-
ferent features in hearership. Depending on the values of these features which are true or false of
a non-speaking party with respect to an utterance-event (defined below), they will generate a set
of possible reception roles. The features are as follows:
• Address: Is the utterance addressed at the party?
• Recipient: Is the participant the ultimate target of the utterance?
• Participant: Is the participant ratified?
• Channel-Link: Is the participant in the perceptual range of the utterance?
For example, in Karen’s case above the Recipient, Participant and Channel-link features
would be turned on, but not Address, thereby generating the category indirect target. If she were
unratified in Goffman’s sense, she would also have the Participant feature turned off, thereby
generating the targeted overhearer category. While generating all of Goffman’s original cate-
gories, this scheme seems to solve the problems faced by Goffman’s in cases like the example
just discussed or chaired committee meetings.
But what empirical evidence is there that such a scheme is adequate? More importantly, how
can we be sure that participants really make these distinctions and that they are the correct ones?
As Goffman points out, “linguistics provides us with the cues and markers through which such
footings are made manifest”, and these cues and markers are exactly what Levinson (1988) aims
to reveal in different languages. He justifies these categories by linking the linguistic devices
employed in different languages with the distinctions possible both at the production and the
reception end. However, we need to see that Linguistics does not exhaust these cues and markers:
Some of these are purely non-verbal such as those that Kendon (1976) discusses regarding
patterns of how people orient themselves spatially towards one another in order to manage rat-
ification, in face to face conversation. We will discuss this further below when we consider the
problematics of ratification.
Moreover, as mentioned previously, Kendon (1970) shows that different degrees or kinds of
synchronous behaviour serve particular communicative functions. Participants display synchrony
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with the speaker to show that they are attending to him. Different degrees of synchrony may then
serve to distinguish participants in different roles (e.g. primary vs. peripheral). Additionally,
what Kendon refers to as ‘mirror synchrony’ occurs when a non-addressed recipient wishes to
draw the attention of the speaker to facilitate speaker switch, or in the present context, we could
interpret this directly as the management of changes in the state of the participation framework.
Moreover, gross changes in posture occur on the macro level among the non-addressed recipi-
ents, coincident with points of speaker change that do not involve any change in the interactive
axis (when the two participants talking to each other remain the same). We should see how-
ever, that as Kendon’s data comes from focused encounters, it is not completely clear how, for
example, overhearers would be distinguished in this sense. But intuitively, since synchrony is a
non-conscious phenomenon, an overhearer would synchronise with the speaker if she is paying
attention to them.
Now that we’ve presented Goffman’s and Levinson’s proposals for participation structures,
we need to consider the frame of reference, the unit, according to which these roles are to be
determined. As alluded to above, this is the utterance-event.
3.2.4 Frames of reference
There is, in general, a systematic ambiguity in the use of terms like speaker, hearer, audience
etc. This is the speech-event/speech-act ambiguity, in the sense that all participant roles can be
identified with respect to a speech-event as well as a speech-act. It is easy to see that the two
senses do not always coincide. For example, a lecturer is the speaker in the speech-event sense,
even when a student is asking a question. This is in fact a distinction that, according to Levinson
(1988), Goffman fails to consistently make (though he is well aware of it). Levinson points out in
this regard, that ‘we are specifically concerned with the utterance-event use of terms like speaker
and addressee, for the speech-event usage is parasitic on this primary usage’. In other words,
what we need to be focusing on, in describing interaction, is a bit by bit analysis of participation
through the course of a conversation: ‘the investigator is wise to drop the idea of even attempting
to describe a global interaction, and instead be content with taking a more modest approach and
examining only certain moments of talk’. (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 2004)
Before we move on to consider how Levinson defines an utterance-event, let’s look at why
it is generally so difficult to talk about conversation as a unit of interaction, and how definitions
of conversation as such, run into fundamental difficulties when we come to consider multi-party
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gatherings.
3.2.5 Problems of Multi-party Conversation as a unit
Theories of human interaction use conversation as a basic building block. However, as Kendon
(1976) points out, this is not an unproblematic notion:
A central methodological problem in the study of the behaviour of face-to-face in-
teraction is that of defining the structural units in terms of which it is organised. In
particular, it is of great importance to be able to delineate, in terms of the organisa-
tion of observable behaviour, distinct units of interaction which can then be analysed
into their components.
The notion of conversation as a unit is supposed to group together a set of people and commu-
nicative signals, verbal and non-verbal, which are considered together in an analysis. In dyadic
dialogue this choice is relatively unproblematic. In multi-party dialogues on the other hand the
boundaries of interaction become more difficult to both define and track. And this is essential if
we are to understand the pragmatic structure of an unfolding multi-party interaction.
This methodological difficulty has lead researchers to concentrate mainly on what Goffman
(1963) has called focussed interaction: “the kind of interaction that occurs when people gather
close together and openly cooperate to sustain a joint focus of attention”. Goodwin (1981) also
equates conversation with focussed interaction in this sense: “Despite the broad scope of the
term, when used in this sense [in a loose way as an equivalent of talk or spoken interaction],
conversation is but a special case of what Goffman (1963) has called focused interaction”.
Let us now explore the problems that this methodological bias in the characterisations of
conversation as a unit lead to. Goffman (1981) defines conversation as:
a substantive, naturally bounded stretch of interaction comprising all that relevantly
goes on from the moment two (or more) individuals open such dealings between
themselves and continuing until they finally close this activity out. The opening
will typically be marked by the participants turning from their several disjointed
orientations, moving together and bodily addressing one another; the closing by their
departing in some physical way from the prior immediacy of copresence. Typically,
ritual brackets will also be found, such as greetings and farewells, these establishing
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and terminating open, official, joint engagement, that is, ratified participation. In
summary, a social encounter.
As can be seen in the above definition, it is the participants’ physical orientation, movement
and the use of ritual brackets that mark the boundaries of a conversation, and determine the
persons who are officially participants in it.
Analogously, as alluded to previously, Kendon (1976) identified more subtle ways in which
people use body orientation and movement to maintain an ‘interactional unit’ or F-formation:
“the F-formation system serves as an important means of maintaining the separate identity and
integrity of an interactional situation” (Kendon, 1976).
Nevertheless, as Goffman himself is aware, definitions of conversation as focussed interac-
tion, as above, are contradicted in discontinuous strands of interaction where there is an ‘open
state of talk’ (Goffman, 1981), i.e. when conversational contexts are ‘left open’ - questions left
unresolved - and taken up later on, in the sense that what you say later, counts as ‘pragmatically
next’ or a second pair part, to what was said before the conversation was ‘broken’. A simple
example is that of multi-focus gatherings, where one person may be a participant in more than
one parallel conversation, as in the following constructed strand of talk:
(3.2)
(1) Siavash: so where did you end up going last night?
(2) Raha: Arash, where did you put my wine glass? [shouting from the
kitchen]
(3) Arash: It’s in there somewhere.
(4) Raha: oh ok it’s here. thanks.
(5) Arash: sorry yeah errm we went to the cinema.
Importantly, Goffman’s ideas about the participation framework, elaborated previously, also
run into difficulty in such circumstances. A single participant can have more than one partic-
ipatory status depending on the conversation relative to which her participant status is to be
determined.
Perhaps the most difficult as well as the most general question in this regard is: What are
the criteria by which an utterance can be regarded as a coherent extension of a given conver-
sation? What constitutes one conversation as opposed to many? It seems that the pragmatic
cohesiveness, or the dependency of the syntax/semantics of turns on prior ones, showing that
some conversational context is shared by the participants, is a good candidate criterion.
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In such terms, it is notable that in discontinuous, multi-focus strands of interaction, ellipsis or
different surface forms of context-dependency can cross conversational boundaries. Arash’s last
utterance above has its antecedent in the first turn. For another example, consider the following
(this is a real dialogue):
[I have had a prior conversation with Stuart regarding the BNC CD, which I promised to
bring in. I arrive at the office . . .]:
(3.3)
(1) Stuart: So? [This is resolved as “So did you bring the BNC CD?”]
(2) Arash: Yes.
(3) Stuart: [smiles]
(4) Arash: [smiles and gives him the CD]
In the above dialogue, Stuart could also have said: “So, did you bring it?”, or “So, did you
bring the CD?”.
But what are the conditions which make all this possible? Certainly whatever it is that the
utterance is referring to should be salient in the participants’ shared-context. But what is the
correct measure of salience? Distance? Clearly, the notion of distance cannot just be number of
turns or time elapsed, since I could have had the prior conversation with Stuart 1 week before
and this could still be possible. Another question is what if Stuart and I had started to talk
about something different first (different topic)? Wouldn’t Stuart have to avoid at least the highly
elliptical “So?”, since I would take it as a continuation of our ‘current’ conversation (the ‘local’
interpretation being preferred)? How do we investigate this in a systematic fashion?
In section 3.10 below, we will see how even within one and the same focused, multi-party
interaction, the pragmatic structure of turns is different and more complex than in dyadic dia-
logues. The questions raised here and later in section 3.10 are central in this thesis and will be
taken up in chapters 6 and 7.
3.2.6 Utterance-event
Participation Framework (PF) is the union of the production and reception role sets, instantiated
with respect to an utterance-event. Levinson (1988) defines an utterance-event as “any stretch of
a turn at talk during which there is a constant set of participant roles mapped into the same set of
individuals”. An utterance-event as such, is generally neither a turn at talk, nor a sentence.
To see this, consider Goodwin (1979)’s analysis of the sentence: “I gave up smoking cigarettes
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one week ago today actually” in a recorded dinner conversation. This sentence is addressed at
three different participants, as the speaker’s gaze moves from one guest to his wife to another
guest, seeking a direct addressee. This order is not arbitrary. Unlike the guests, his wife already
knows that he’s given up smoking but does not know that exactly one week has passed since.
But “one should not tell one’s co-participants what one takes it they already know” ((Sacks,
1973); see also Grice (1975)), hence addressing only the second part to his wife. Because the
state of the participation framework (the current negotiated set of roles) at any moment has an
impact on the behaviour, linguistically or otherwise, of the speaker, Goodwin is justified to say
that the sentence/turn is comprised of three distinct sections, which correspond to Levinsons’s
utterance-events.
3.2.7 The overarching pragmatic problem
Ideally, from a theoretical viewpoint, we would like to be able to fully instantiate the Participation
Framework for any given utterance-event, so that for an utterance event UE we have PF(UE)
which assigns to each role a unique participant of the utterance-event. In the next section we will
consider the difficulties of this task.
Let’s suppose, for the moment, that we manage to assign roles uniquely in an utterance-event.
Our final goal is from the point of view of dialogue pragmatics, to incorporate the participation
framework as a contextual parameter which will in turn determine the pragmatic ‘force’ of the
utterance-event relative to the role occupied by the hearers thereof. In short we want to know
how an utterance-event changes the context locally for each participant. So, given A’s participant
role with respect to an utterance-event UE, we need to characterise the set of obligatory, as well
as optional next moves or reactions, by A, as sequentially implicated by UE. This of course will
only be possible if we can assign interpretation of UE for A, relative to the existing shared-context
between A and the speaker.
This is a very difficult task. The rest of this chapter will be dedicated to bringing into focus
some the numerous sub-problems of this problem.
3.2.8 Issues in assigning participant role given an utterance-event
As outlined above, given an utterance-event we need to assign to each participant present in the
conversation a participant role. we therefore need to know which of the features summarised in
section 3.2.3 will have a positive value, given the utterance-event. We will consider each of them
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in turn below.
address
We can determine the value of the address feature by taking into account visual address markers
such as gaze, head movements and body orientation. Indeed Goffman defines addressee as ‘the
person to whom the speaker directs his visual attention’. Non-visual cues include use of formal
linguistic features such as second-person pronouns, or names. However, such address markers
are not always present. Participants often recognise that they are addressees by mere reference
to the semantic content of the utterance in question. For example it may be that the utterance
includes information specific to a particular participant.
Recipient
The recipient feature on the other hand, is even more difficult do deal with since unlike the
address feature, it cannot be characterised without reference to the semantic content of the
utterance-event.
Ratification
When is a participant ratified? What are the procedures via which participants get ratified? Can
we recognise different degrees of ratification? All this of course, comes down to the question of
how one should interpret the ‘participant’ feature (Levinson, 1988).
Goffman defines ratified participants as those who are ‘officially’ members of the conversa-
tional group. This can be seen by how participants orient themselves towards one another for
instance in terms of eye-contact, proxemics and spacial orientation (see e.g. Kendon (1976);
Goodwin (1981)). However, there doesn’t seem to be complete consensus among scholars as to
what exactly constitutes ratification. For example, Drew (1992) considers the jurors in a court
room as unratified effectively because they are unable to speak or comment. Indeed this is quite
strange since institutionally they are the intended recipients. Heritage (1985) says the same thing
but regarding this time, the audiences of news interviews. But who is more ratified in a court
room, jurors or spectators? Clearly jurors are in a sense more ratified since they are intended
recipients of the utterances.
At the speech-event level, ratificational devices are perhaps as diverse as the speech-events
themselves (Levinson, 1988). At the utterance-event level, speakers can, for instance, ratify a
former overhearer by addressing her with an utterance relevant to the current conversation. Con-
versely, attempts by an overhearer to seek ratification may sometimes lead to explicit negotiation,
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e.g. “Would you please stay out of this?”.
An example of a non-verbal ratificational device is Kendon (1976)’s F-formation: “An F-
formation arises whenever two or more people sustain a spatial and orientational relationship
in which the space between them is one to which they have direct and exclusive access”. An
F-formation is said to serve as a means to maintain the identity and integrity of an interactional
situation. Changes in the F-formation system occur for example when somebody joins or leaves
the group. Pertinent here in particular, is when a person joins the group. It may be the case that
the current members of the group feel that the ‘integrity’ of the situation will not be harmed if he
joins, and hence are willing to ratify the new person. In this situation say if they were arranged in
a circle, they will move aside a bit and let him in, while maintaining their respective orientations
to the shared space between them, thus allowing the newcomer to orient to it in the same way,
with the same degree of access.
Furthermore, at the utterance-event level, not unlike the ‘recipient’ feature, it seems that rati-
fication too cannot be fully characterised without reference to the semantic content of utterances.
Consider a not very uncommon situation in which there is a normal conversation between a hus-
band, wife and a very close friend of theirs. The conversation develops into a row between the
couple, at which point the friend recognises that it would be inappropriate to intervene. His
rights as a ratified participant have been revoked, merely due to the sensitivity of the content of
the exchange.
As we’ll see in detail in section 3.3, Clark and Schaefer (1992) interpret ratification within
the grounding framework, in terms of the mutual responsibilities the participants have towards
one another for ensuring mutual understanding. This, in turn, comes down to the right to speak,
e.g. request repair, ask questions, reject etc. In summary, the right to tailor the course of the
conversation to one’s own understanding needs. Now, if we are to understand the dynamics
of shared-context (when is context shared?) in multi-party dialogue, which is what grounding
theory needs to describe, this is a justified interpretation of ratification. We will later discuss some
conditions under which the right to speak (strongest form of ratification) can fail to guarantee
mutual understanding (e.g. effect of group size). It is one thing having a right but another to
actually be able to practice that right to an adequate degree.
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3.2.9 Participation as a demonstrative social role
In this section, we will briefly consider how each participant role, incurs a set of normative re-
sponsibilities or a certain pattern of (normatively) expected behaviour by its incumbent: “Partici-
pation is a demonstrative social role, where each kind of participant role requires a particular kind
of appropriate display/behaviour by its incumbent” (Levinson, 1988). A theoretically adequate
characterisation of participant roles cannot do without a predictive description of the participants’
behaviours associated with each role.
In this regard, Goodwin (1984) shows how participants organise themselves in relation to
each other through the telling of a story, with particular attention to how telling-specific roles,
such as teller (speaker), addressed recipient and non-addressed recipient are displayed and differ-
entiated from each other. For example, suppose A and B are jointly telling a story to C. The story
starts shifting into an episode in which D had some direct and salient involvement, i.e. he is about
to become an indirect recipient (like Karen’s case above). D now, organises his behaviour such
that his outward display is appropriate when all gaze is directed towards him. I.e. he displays
‘indirect recipientship’.
As sketched previously, Kendon (1970), following Condon’s methodology, performs a micro
analysis of the phenomenon of non-conscious behavioural synchrony in a focused multi-party
encounter. He found, firstly, that different participants synchronise to different degrees with the
speaker, and secondly that these different degrees serve particular purposes, e.g. that they clearly
distinguish axial from non-axial participants. In particular, it is found that the addressee of the
speaker is in higher synchrony with him, when compared to the unaddressed recipients.
When we consider in later sections, Clark’s attempt to distinguish participant roles, we will
see that there too, the roles are distinguished in terms of normative principles, in effect specifying
what the appropriate behaviour of an incumbent of a certain role should be.
3.2.10 Assignment of roles is not unilateral
Another important point concerning participant role is that it, too - like any other aspect of dia-
logue - is jointly negotiated rather than unilaterally assigned.
When A is addressing B, B might not choose to attend in that capacity. This is initially the
case in the example given previously from Goodwin (1979), where the speaker’s utterance “I
gave up smoking one week ago today, actually”, is divided into three distinct utterance-events.
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Initially the speaker is unable to secure an addressee and consequently falls back on another.
Only upon the third attempt is the speaker able to secure a direct addressee.
Conversely an unaddressed party may try to attract the attention of the speaker by displays
of recipientship (postural changes, head movement, overt backchannels, increased sychrony with
speaker etc).
Ratification too as has already been discussed, involves negotiation.
Participant role then, is both for the analyst and the participants themselves, collaboratively
assigned.
3.3 Grounding and Participation Framework
As alluded to briefly above, Clark and Schaefer (1992) interpret Goffman’s ideas within the
grounding model expanded in the previous chapter. This is done in terms of a normative de-
scription of the mutual responsibilities that dialogue participants occupying different roles have
towards one another for ensuring mutual understanding. These responsibilities are then taken to
be indexed by participant role. But how?
Ratified Participants in the above sense, are those who adhere to the following principle:
Principle of Responsibility: In a conversation, the parties to it are each responsible for keep-
ing track of what is said, and for enabling the other parties to keep track of what is said.
In other words, they are responsible for making sure that what is said is grounded. As
sketched in the previous chapter, in dyadic situations, the speaker and addressee fulfil this re-
sponsibility via direct, moment by moment collaboration between themselves. To enable the
parties to keep track of what is said, first and foremost the speaker needs to tailor his contribution
so as to accommodate his addressee’s understanding, i.e. positive audience design. In addition,
he needs to respect the addressee’s right to repair. The addressee on the other hand, needs to
pay attention and signal non-understanding when it occurs. Also, by providing positive evidence
of understanding, she needs to keep the speaker aware that she understands what is being said.
As we saw earlier, the grounding/contribution model describes a protocol for such collaboration
between speaker and addressee, in dyadic dialogue.
In multi-party settings, the situation is more complex, as there are also non-addressed par-
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ticipants among those who are ratified. We will henceforth follow Clark and Schaefer (1992) in
calling these ratified non-addressed participants, side-participants.
Being a side-participant is clearly different from being a direct addressee of an utterance,
in that “some answer is . . anticipated from them [side-participants], more so than from other
ratified participants” (Goffman, 1981), meaning that side-participants have ‘weaker’ responsi-
bilities as to providing moment by moment evidence of understanding for the speaker. The
obvious question is, how is a side-participant to an utterance-event supposed to collaborate with
the speaker while by definition the speaker does not expect her to respond in any fashion, since
he is addressing someone else?
Clark and Schaefer (1992) answer this question by positing another principle:
Principle of Collaboration: Speakers collaborate directly with addressees and only indirectly
with side-participants.
This basically means that the speaker does not expect side participants to provide direct
evidence of understanding, while both the speaker and side participant remain responsible for
ensuring that mutual understanding does take place. So the speaker designs his utterances for
both addressees and side participants. He is responsible for their understanding of what he says.
The side participant on the other hand needs to “be satisfied with clearing up misunderstandings
in natural breaks in their [speaker and addressee’s] talk”. (Clark & Schaefer, 1992)
Under the same interpretation of Goffman, unratified participants (henceforth overhearers)
are those towards whom the speaker bears no responsibility for ensuring mutual understanding.
In other words, audience design can be intentionally or otherwise negative for overhearers. With
this in mind, as nicely stated by Clark and Schaefer (1992), speakers can adopt a range of atti-
tudes towards overhearers, depending on their goals:
1. Indifference: For any part of what they mean, speakers can be indifferent about whether
or not the overhearers can grasp it.
2. Disclosure: For any part of what they mean, speakers can design their utterances such that
the overhearer can grasp it fully.
3.4. Difference in participant role leads to systematically different patterns of common ground 69
3. Disguisement: For any part of what they mean, speakers can design their utterances such
that the overhearers cannot grasp it and will recognise that they cannot do so.
4. Concealment: For any part of what they mean, speakers can design their utterances such
that the overhearers will be deceived into thinking it is something that it is not.
Regardless of the attitude taken by a speaker on any occasion towards overhearers, they are
expected in the general case to reach a much lower level of understanding of what is said com-
pared to the ratified participants. This is largely because they don’t have the right to request
repair, or more broadly, alter the course of the conversation to accommodate their own under-
standing needs. The following example should illustrate this point:
(3.4)
(1) A: Did you inform the head of department of what happened yester-
day?
(2) B: Yes I did. He said to deal with it ourselves.
Suppose O is overhearing A’s utterance. In order to understand it as B does, he needs to
know what department and what yesterday event A is referring to. Clearly, in the general case,
he is not guaranteed to know any of this. We will also see in the next section that even if, at the
beginning of a conversation, an overhearer shares all the relevant common ground between the
ratified parties, he is still at a disadvantage in terms of understanding as a result of not having the
grounding cycle at his disposal.
Naturally, according to the above, we expect direct addressees and side participants to reach
a higher level of mutual understanding with the speaker, in comparison to overhearers. What
follows is a description of a series of experiments carried out by Clark and co-workers, which
provide empirical evidence that this is the case.
3.4 Difference in participant role leads to systematically different
patterns of common ground
The empirical evidence regarding the level of understanding achieved by participants in different
roles, comes from the Tangram experiments, carried out by Clark and co-workers, mentioned
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briefly in the previous chapter. The essence of these tasks is that on each trial one person, the
Director, describes a series of Tangram figures so that another, the Matcher can identify them. If
the same figure recurs on a number of trials the director and matcher quickly converge on some
concise definite or nominal description for the figure (recall contraction of referring expressions
discussed in the previous chapter. For example, they might go from “Okay the next one is ...
resembles someone that looks like they’re trying to climb stairs. There’s two feet, one is way
above the other and–” on trial one to “Um, stair climber” on trial six (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark,
1992).
3.4.1 Addressees and Overhearers
Schober and Clark (1989) carry out the tangram experiment described above while recording the
whole conversation between the directors and matchers. Overhearers in this experiment were
those who played no direct part in the conversation between the director and matcher but who
listened to these conversations on tape, some with the option to pause it and some not. The
results were compared in terms of the accuracy of Tangram figure arrangements produced by
the matcher (direct addressees) compared to those produced by the overhearers. The matchers
were significantly more accurate than the overhearers in arranging the figures. Moreover, those
overhearers who had the option to pause the recordings did not perform any better than those
who didn’t.
3.4.2 Side participants and Overhearers:
Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992) carried out a two phase variation on the Tangram task. The first
phase has two conditions. In one condition, an additional ‘silent’ side-participant (SP) sits next
to the director. In the other an ‘omniscient overhearer’ (OO) follows all of phase 1 on video but is
not co-present in the room. In both conditions, the director is aware of the additional participants
and they are both able to see each figure as the director describes it. In the second phase the SP
or OO take on the role of matcher for another six trails. The director and former SP pairs are
quicker, use fewer words and produce more definite/nominal description types than the director
and former OO pairs; despite the fact that the SP and OO ostensibly have the same prior infor-
mation.
It is important to see that any such empirical evidence is really more than a confirmation
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of the intuition that overhearers understand less because they lack the information shared be-
tween the parties involved at the beginning of a conversation (like the example given above). At
the beginning of any of these experiments all those involved (including overhearers) have equal
relevant common ground between themselves. Instead these experiments show that direct in-
teraction/collaboration plays a vital role in language understanding and coordination of content
in dialogue. Interestingly, these are the experiments that provide evidence directly against the
autonomous (vs. Collaborative) view of language understanding. Thus, evidence for the ground-
ing model, elaborated in the previous chapter, comes from contrasting levels of understanding
achieved by participants in different roles, in multi-party dialogues.
3.4.3 Side participants and Direct Addressees: Lack of direct empirical evidence
What empirical evidence is there, that side-participants ground to a level comparable with direct
addressees despite the fact that by definition they do not collaborate as actively with the speaker
as the direct addressee does? Is the mutual understanding between speaker and side-participant
as high as that between speaker and addressee? In a review article, Branigan (2006) mentions
that there isn’t yet any empirical evidence that addressees and side-participants differ in the accu-
mulation of common ground. She also points out that “whereas speakers take silence from their
addressees (or, the absence of any overt feedback) as evidence of understanding, it is not clear
that the same is true of silence from side-participants”.1
Note that we also need to distinguish between the levels of grounding that side-participants
can reach. In the absence of overt feedback, are they taken to have accepted what was said
between speaker and addressee (tacit consent/acquiescence)? Or are they merely assumed to
have understood it? This is consequential for most models, where the the effects of a dialogue
are expressed in terms of commitments incurred on the part of each participant. Is the side-
participant committed to something they did not provide any feedback on?
As described in the previous section, there is clear evidence that side participants reach a
higher level of understanding than overhearers. However, the evidence is inconclusive about
the side-participant/direct-addressee contrast. This latter distinction relates to participant status
with respect to the same utterances (recall the utterance-event/speech-event distinction). The ex-
perimental device of two task phases in Wilkes-Gibbs and Clark (1992), effectively breaks the
1Intuitively, silence from side participants is stronger evidence than from direct addressees since side
participants, by definition, can’t really provide any evidence while another dyad is engaged in talk.
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interaction into two successive conversations where a direct comparison of side-participants and
direct-addressees with respect to the same exchanges is not made. The closest approximation is
the comparison of the last trial of phase one and the first trial of phase 2 but this is equivocal. The
director/side-participant pairs are slower and use more words than the original director-matcher
pairs but do make the same number of definite/nominal references. The task situation is also
unusual in that in phase one the side-participant is positioned beside the director and opposite
the matcher. The participants mutually know that the side-participant has direct visual access
to the actual referents of the referring expressions whereas the matcher does not. Arguably this
gives the side-participant an unusually high degree of access to the common ground between the
director and matcher, whereas in natural conversation this is rarely the case for side-participants.
Below we will explore how this lack of empirical evidence regarding side-participant under-
standing as compared with direct-addressees, might be highly consequential for the characteri-
sation of grounding in small groups, and why it is therefore crucial that an analysis to this effect
should be carried out. This is taken up in chapter 4.
3.4.4 Small group discussions as dyadic dialogue with overhearers?
In their analysis of grounding processes in small groups and how this differs from large groups
(which will be expanded in some detail later on), Carletta, Anderson, and Garrod (2002) con-
clude that small group discussions are like dyadic dialogue, employing the same mechanisms for
grounding, but with process loss on the part of peripheral participants (those who are not at that
moment, directly engaged in talk) due to material which they merely overheard. But we should
see that, particularly in smaller groups, we are really dealing with dyadic dialogues with side
participants rather than overhearers (Carletta et al. (2002) do note this but seem to overlook it
too easily). As elaborated above, there is as yet no direct empirical evidence that side partici-
pants are at a disadvantage in terms of grounding what is said between speaker and addressee.
Indeed if it is the case that in certain small groups, side participants ground to a level compared
to the dyad directly engaged in talk, then a (general) characterisation of multi-party dialogue as
dyadic dialogue with overhearers would be invalidated. It might well be the case, that the side
participant understands fully what goes on between speaker and addressee and that they in turn,
might assume in the absence/withholding of repair on the part of side-participants, that they have
understood them. If this is true then there will be no process loss, as the side participant would
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have grounded the material to the same level as the dyad engaged in talk. There would really be
no ‘overhearing’ involved. The question of course, is to identify where or under what conditions,
this may or may not be the case. This is precisely what is at issue in chapters 4 and 5.
3.4.5 Do small groups attempt to establish common ground among all the members?
Moreover, Carletta et al. (2002) describe a map-task experiment in which there are three par-
ticipants. They find that the group established common ground among all the members even
when there was no need to. This leads them to generalise this result to all small group inter-
actions. However, it does not seem overly strange that they got the results they did. They had
two route givers with one route follower. The common ground that they “did not need to” estab-
lish, is claimed to have been largely between the two route givers. But the two route givers had a
number of discrepancies between their maps, and hence would use different ‘situation models’ to
describe the routes. In order for them to be able to collaboratively guide the follower, they needed
to align themselves (consider the confusion that the follower would have to bear otherwise. The
‘optimal’ case here is where one route giver says nothing and the conversation becomes dyadic).
It is the disparity between the route-followers’ maps which is generating that extra talk. But what
if the two route givers had the same map? Wouldn’t we, in that case be inclined to say that route
giver A would be able to ‘follow up’ on route giver B’s descriptions without having to negoti-
ate anything with A directly? Would we still get the ‘unnecessary’ extra talk? Thus, it seems
wrong to claim that the participants “didn’t need” to establish common ground between all the
members, given that the experimental conditions of the task were effectively forcing this. We
should, at least, acknowledge that this is not generalisable to all small groups. As noted above,
we need to characterise the situations in which common ground is explicitly negotiated and those
in which it is tacitly assumed without any overt feedback (chapter 5).
3.5 Collaborative responsibilities
Recall the overall pragmatic problem (section 3.2.7). For an utterance-event u, with a set of
direct addressees, and a set of side-participants, we need to characterise the set of responsibilities
that hold for each participant in either the role of an addressee or a side-participant, locally with
respect to u.
The Principle of Responsibility (section 3.3) states that every ratified participant is responsi-
ble for making sure that what is said is understood by all other ratified participants. But this is
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just a normative description of what should happen, not a systematic description of how it hap-
pens. In other words, Clark and Schaefer (1992) do not specify exactly what mutual grounding
responsibilities hold at the local, utterance-event level between participants in different roles. In
this section we will attempt to raise some related questions.
As stated in section 3.3, the Principle of Collaboration is what discriminates side-participant/speaker
from addressee/speaker responsibilities. However, this is really as far as the authors go in trying
to do this. It remains a question therein:
1. what exactly constitutes a speaker’s indirect collaborative responsibilities towards side-
participants?
2. and, likewise, what, if anything, constitutes a side-participant’s collaborative responsibili-
ties towards the speaker and addressee?
With regards to the first question, the answer could lie in positive Audience Design. But we
already know that even in dyadic dialogue this can fail (recall Keysar and colleagues’ criticisms
of Grice’s cooperativity principle, summarised in section 2.3.7). Indeed, Clark and Brennan
(1991) state that “Speakers often realise they just don’t know enough about their interlocutor to
design a proper utterance. So they are forced to issue an improper utterance instead”. In multi-
party situations, it would be even more difficult for a speaker to design her utterances for all
her interlocutors (side participants as well as direct addressees). In fact it seems that positive
audience design for side participants is often quite weak.
At the beginning of any ordinary multi-party dialogue, at least the personal common ground
between each pair of participants is unique. Taking it that utterances are interpreted against com-
mon ground, what counts as a felicitous utterance by A addressed at B would clearly not in the
general case be felicitous if addressed at C. Indeed, C as a side-participant might not even im-
mediately understand what A is telling B. But being a side-participant means that he can request
repair. We are faced with an immediate problem here: To what degree do speakers consider side-
participants in the design of their utterances? According to Clark and Schaefer (1992), when A
addresses B with C as a side-participant, he intends both B and C to understand. But it seems that
this intention is only manifested prospectively in a speaker’s willingness to repair his utterances
upon the request of a side-participant:
3.5. Collaborative responsibilities 75
(3.5)
(1) A: I was trying to debug a programme I spent 3 hours writing. It took
me about two more days just to finish the debugging. [addressed
at B and C]
(2) B: Yeah . . like John’s project. Do you remember? [addressed at A]
(3) A: oh yeah . . Quite vividly actually.
(4) C: John? [addressed at B]
(5) B: Oh sorry errm John is a friend of ours.
(6) C: oh right. Did the same thing happen to him?
Clearly, B’s first utterance would be infelicitous if it was addressed at C. The point is that in
term of audience design, a speaker really only has strong commitments towards the addressee.
He always tries to design his utterances at least against his common ground with the addressee.
In the above example, B would have to turn to C during the process of answering A’s question,
to say what ‘my project’ refers to. In fact it would be wrong to claim that B is even considering
C at the point of answering A’s question. Of course, since C is ratified, B is more than happy to
provide further information upon request.
However, we should also note that weaker commitments towards side-participants aren’t nec-
essarily to do with lack of knowledge by the side-participant as in example 3.5. It may be the
opposite. Grice’s Maxim of Quantity for example, really still holds only for the addressee. For in-
stance, while it is no problem to address u at A, while a side-participant B already knows about the
content of u, this would not work the other way around. Recall the example from from Goodwin
(1979), given in section 3.2.4, on how a single turn can contain more than one utterance-event.
The speaker, in his attempt to secure an addressee, has to redesign his utterance on the fly as his
gaze moves from one participant to the other, as the same utterance, as it stands, would not be
appropriate for who was until now a side-participant but is now an addressee. Hence he redesigns
the utterance to include something that this present addressee does not know (adding “one week
ago today actually” to “I gave up smoking”).
It seems that, strictly speaking, speakers collaborate with side-participants largely by respect-
ing their right to repair/speak.
Regarding the second question above, about side-participant responsibilities with respect to
something uttered by the speaker, what level of evidence of understanding, if any, do they need
to provide? Continued attention? Withholding of repair? If the latter, for how long? Do side
participants and direct addressees have any responsibilities towards each other with respect to
something uttered by the speaker? We address some of these questions in chapter 5.
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3.6 The pragmatic force of an utterance-event and the problem of
multiple interpretations
In section 3.2.7, we sketched the overall problem that any theory of multi-party dialogue context
would have to deal with. Namely, given an utterance-event u and participant roles with respect
to it, how does u change the context for each of the participants. This is a question which Speech
Act Theory attempts to answer. But apart from the various problems the theory already faces in
dyadic situations, we run into fundamental difficulties in generalising the theory to cover multi-
party phenomena. These difficulties are due mainly to the fact that the pragmatic force of an
utterance-event is relative to the participant role of the participants involved in the event. Let’s
see how this is so.
For reception roles, if A makes a request of B with C present as a non-addressed party,
then clearly this places an obligation on B to do what A asks or issue a rejection. But no such
obligation is placed on C. Similarly a question only commits the addressee to answer.
As for production roles, a promise commits the speaker. But if the speaker is merely an
animator of the message, the promise should only commit the principal.
Clark and Carlson (1982) attempt to solve this problem for the reception role set. Very
briefly they do this by adding another class of speech acts to the originals (request, inform,
promise etc). They call these participant-directed acts and the original acts, addressee-directed
acts. The proposal is that in any addressee directed act, the speaker is in addition to the act
being performed upon the addressee, performing corresponding informative acts towards the
non-addressed participants. This is intuitive since A above is doing more than request something
from B. He is also informing C that he is making this request of B.
However, we should see that issues of participant status alone, do not exhaust the problem
of interpretation relative to shared-context/common ground. We sketched this problem in section
2.3.7 of the previous chapter. The problem is that in multi-party dialogues, for any utterance
uttered by A, the role of common ground (in each case between A and some hearer), in the in-
terpretation of the utterance by a hearer, implies that relevant differences (with respect to current
conversational topic) in what A already shares with each hearer, will result in different interpre-
tations by the corresponding hearers, of the same utterance. This is particularly true of elliptical
utterances.
For example, Sacks, Jefferson, and Schegloff (1995) state that if A addresses B with C as an
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unaddressed recipient, the utterance can do something to B that is different from what it does to
C. For example if A flirts with B, A might be teasing C. Although this is possible only in this
specific arrangement of the participation framework, such differences in interpretation are really
to do with the prior shared-context between A and C, and what A assumes he knows about the
shared-context between B and C, and cannot be otherwise explained.
A more radical case is that of ‘multiple recipient design’, that is, where “the speaker attempts
to tell, within one and the same turn, a proposition A to the therapist, but non-A to his co-present
wife” (Muller, 1997). This is part of Muller’s comments on Lonardi and Viaro’s (1990) work on
interviews between therapists and their patients. Here, again, this is clearly not in and of itself a
matter of the distinction between addressed and non-addressed participants
Another example is as follows:
A and B go food shopping. They have decided to buy milk and some other stuff. They come
back home. A realises that they have forgotten to buy milk. In the presence of C (who is a fully
ratified participant), he points to an empty milk bottle on the table:
(3.6)
(1) A: oh shit, milk!!
(2) B: oops. [resolves as “oh yeah we forgot to buy milk”]
(3) C: what? what’s wrong with milk?
(4) A: no I meant we forgot to buy milk.
(5) C: oh. haha
For such a situation to be possible at all, there has to be some form of pragmatic displacement
- difference in interpretation - occurring between the two readings of an elliptical move, owing
to the difference between the contexts against which they are interpreted. This demonstrates how
interpretation of utterances in dialogue, depends upon the common ground between every pair of
participants - in each case a speaker and a recipient.
In chapter 6 we will return to this problem, where we present conditions under which shared
contexts can systematically diverge in one and the same conversation, resulting, as above, in a
systematic disparity between the interpretations of the same utterance, by different participants.
3.7 Turn-taking in multi-party dialogues
Models of turn-taking attempt to capture and make explicit the set of norms by which conversa-
tionalists manage to take turns to talk in an orderly manner. Indeed, turn-taking is not limited to
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the activity of talking, but is broadly applicable to activities in which there is a single resource
to be shared by several people in some orderly fashion. The resource to be shared in the socially
organised activity of talking is the floor. Thus, accounts of turn-taking in verbal interaction need
to determine, given the history of the conversation, who will hold the floor next, i.e. who speaks
next. Naturally, this is to be determined according to the state of the floor at the moment, i.e. the
current speaker, and what he is saying.
3.7.1 The Simplest Systematics
The most prominent account of turn-taking in verbal interaction is that developed by Sacks et
al. (1974), within the CA tradition. This is widely referred to as the ‘simplest systematics’ of
turn-taking. We’ll see how such a label is justified below. The most general rule/norm enforced
by this system is ‘one speaker at a time’. Of course this is not a matter of choice on the part of
the analyst, but is empirically supported by the observation that overlaps in talk are quite short in
length (though not infrequent). This shows an overwhelming preference by the people engaged
in talk, for the rule above.
On this account, speaker transition can occur at moments referred to as transition-relevance
places (TRP). These occur at the end of turn-constructional-units (TCU), which are instances of
various unit types of a language, e.g. phrase, clause, sentence. At the end of any such unit - at
the TRPs which are discrete moments in the course of a turn at talk - the following rules apply
(here quite roughly stated):
1. If the turn-so-far involves a next speaker selection, on the part of the current speaker, then
the selected next speaker has exclusive right to the floor, i.e. he is obliged to speak next.
2. If 1 does not hold, there is free, equal competition for the floor, meaning that all the rest of
the speakers can self-select. The one who speaks first wins the floor.
3. If nobody self-selects - 2 does not hold - the speaker may, but is not obliged to continue.
As evident in the rules above, this model is developed to be independent of all contextual pa-
rameters including topical, social, circumstantial, and most importantly here, number of partici-
pants and thus applicable to any verbal conversational setting including multi-party interactions.
The simplest systematics has not remained uncriticised over the years. Below, we will con-
sider some of these criticisms.
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3.7.2 Some Critiques
There are three main aspects of the turn taking system outlined above, which have been criticised.
These are:
1. The rule on which the simplest systematics is based, namely ‘One speaker at a time’, need
not be a necessary condition for communication in general.
2. The simplest systematics is not and need not be cross-culturally valid.
3. The CA system for turn-taking not unlike other CA formulations, is supposedly intended
as a set of prescriptive rules for people to adhere to rather than a descriptive account of the
succession of turns in verbal interaction.
As regards the first, Edelsky (1981) points out that instances of simultaneous talk need neither
always be brief nor infelicitous. Spelke, Hirst, and Neisser (1976) had shown earlier that people
can in fact process multiple simultaneous messages coming from different sources, or at least
understand the gist of those messages, provided that they weren’t overly long or complex.
We should therefore expect that, in certain communities, speech overlaps are more common
and less brief than others: “there is at least one speech community where naturally occurring
simultaneous talk is frequent, expected and processed.” (Reisman, 1977). On this view, such
systematics for turn-taking are not valid cross-culturally or even across social groups within the
same community. For example, “Italians interrupt one another. Everybody gets all excited and
tries to make his views prevail by preventing the other from speaking . . . . Americans speak in
turns. (It is no accident that the pragmatic theory of ‘conversation turns’ originated in the United
States. Italian researchers who write articles about this matter treat it as an excavation from
Mars.)” (Eco, 1986) quoted by O’Connell, Kowal, and Kaltenbacher (1990).
The third point above, as sketched in the beginning of the previous chapter, is in general
a source of contention with respect to the overall practice of the CA community. Power and
Martello (1986) point out that the authors of the simplest systematics:
assume too easily that a regularity in social behaviour must be due to a social con-
vention specifically prescribing that regularity. Observing that the first person to
speak up is usually allowed to continue, or that addressed questions are usually im-
mediately answered by the addressee, they assume without discussion that these
3.7. Turn-taking in multi-party dialogues 80
regularities are due to specific turn-taking conventions . . . . In making this criticism
we are assuming, of course, that the rules given by SSJ [simplest systematics] are
supposed to represent a cultural convention and not merely a statistical regularity.
This controversy is due mainly to the philosophical contrast between prescriptive and de-
scriptive rules. Prescriptive rules are essentially those, which people (should) follow due to
social conventions. Descriptive ones on the other hand are only to predictively capture some set
of social data without much concern for the cause - why the data is as it is. But what difference
does this make so long as these ‘rules’ do not fail to predict/capture social behaviour in a certain
predetermined community? It is perhaps relevant here to point out that in my speech community
(Farsi speaking, Iranian) rules of turn-taking as delineated by the simplest systematics certainly
hold as prescriptive. A child is almost always instructed by her/his parents not to interrupt, and
particularly in case an elderly or a person with social status holds the floor, not to speak unless
spoken to. It is otherwise considered ‘rude’.
In conclusion to this section, we should note that none of the criticisms above invalidate the
systematics so long as we restrict ourselves to the English speaking community. The main point
is that turn-taking in conversation follows fairly systematic principles, albeit potentially different
ones in different speech communities.
3.7.3 Small group discussions are comprised of a series of pairwise discussions
As we just discussed, the simplest systematics operates independently of the number of partici-
pants present. However, it is in essence dyadic. It operates between two speakers, namely current
and next. It arranges but two speakers at a time. Consequently the model projects a dyadic ‘in-
response-to’ relation between utterances.
In the floor model developed in Parker (1988), the discussion is in a ‘floor-state’ if the current
utterance falls within an A-B-A pattern of turn-taking, where A and B are participants. This was
applied to data from focused group discussions between 4 persons. The significant finding is
that the discussion is, by a large margin, most likely to be in a floor-state. Thus, dyadic turn
sequences are shown to be preferred. Even if such patterns are broken, new ones are quickly
established. The same floor model has also been applied to groups of 6 (Stasser & Taylor, 1991).
The likelihood of the discussions being in a floor state in these groups is shown to be still the
most likely, though less so than in the 4-person groups in Parker’s original study.
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Most models of turn-taking, then, seem to suggest that small group discussions are primarily
comprised of a series of pair-wise discussions, that are interrupted by another participant to
establish new pairings. But note that it is conceivable that such conversations aren’t really dyadic.
This would happen, as we suggested in section 3.4.4, if a side-participant reaches the same level
understanding as speaker and addressee, in which case the claim that multi-party dialogue is
comprised of a series of pair-wise discussions might be misleading, if not wrong.
Let’s now turn to how turn-taking patterns and hence grounding might be affected by group
size, and status differences among the participants.
3.7.4 Effect of Group Size on Turn-taking/Grounding
We see above that as group size increases the likelihood of dyadic patterns of turn-taking drops.
Floor-states do not arise as often in large groups. Dyads have less momentum. In a more re-
cent study, Fay, Garrod, and Carletta (2000) show that in small 5-person groups, the discussion
exhibits dialogic properties, where the participants’ opinions about what went on in the discus-
sion are most influenced by the people with whom they interacted most. Indeed if small groups
behaved like dialogue, this is what grounding theory would predict (mutual understanding is
established among those who have interacted with each other and not others). In contrast, in
large 10-person groups, opinions are most primarily affected by who spoke the most - the dom-
inant speaker, i.e. large groups exhibit more monologic characteristics. Larger groups are thus,
more likely to behave like monologue where communication takes place between a sender and
a receiver who process language signals autonomously, hence the claim that grounding is not at
work in these groups and that instead they behave rather like a series of lectures where the next
lecturer is chosen from the audience. Although as yet unstudied in this respect, one would also
expect a much lower degree of pragmatic cohesiveness (less cross-turn context dependency) in
such discussions. We’ll say more about this issue below.
In cocktail party settings where higher degrees of interactivity and involvement are preferred,
larger groups are systematically avoided. Hare (1952) notices that large unfocused groups of 12
in which people can leave and join the discussion freely tend to split into cliques more often than
groups of 5 with the same property. Also, Homans (1950) observed that groups in such settings
tend to split roughly when they reach a size of five. So it seems generally impossible to maintain
a large group discussion without other social, organisational constraints - where the group ‘have
to’ stay together for a period of time.
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But why is all this happening, one might ask. The reason is mainly the exponentially in-
creasing number of possible pairings as groups get large. Also how people manage turn-taking
in face-to-face dialogue, relies heavily on visual monitoring between the parties. For example,
the participants to whom the gaze of the speaker is directed at the end of a turn are more likely
to speak next (Kalma, 1992). Moreover, there are many speaker behaviours which enable hear-
ers to predict when the speaker is coming to the end of her utterance (Duncan, 1972). All of
these mechanisms and more, become more difficult if not impossible as group size increases. A
person’s attempt to take a turn at talk can easily go unnoticed and this affects group behaviour.
Boden (1994) observes that participants in larger groups produce fewer backchannel utterances
than those in smaller ones.
Following what was said above about the study in Fay et al. (2000), Carletta et al. (2002)
propose that there is in fact a model split in terms of behaviour between groups of size seven
and eight. It is claimed that groups of size seven or fewer “appear to employ a straightforward
extension of the grounding processes that are well understood from previous work on dialogue”.
These discussions are also said to behave like dyadic dialogue with overhearers (though recall
our discussion in section 3.4.3, meaning that the mechanisms employed for grounding remain
the same as dyadic dialogue, where there is process loss because of material which is merely
overheard). Groups of 8 or more on the other hand (like the groups 10 in Fay et al. (2000)),
should behave, according to the paper, like monologue.
This result regarding the split between groups of 7 and 8, comes from observing that the
distribution of the length of turns in groups of 7 or less in the data analysed by Carletta et al.
(2002), are statistically indistinguishable. The same is true of groups of 8 or more, while the
difference between sizes seven and eight was sudden rather than gradual. Turns were suddenly
longer in size 8 groups, where interactive discussions (where utterances can clearly be thought of
as ‘responses’ to other utterances) among pairs were shorter and also a lot less frequent. Hence
the claim: “small and large groups appear to operate according to radically different processes”
(Carletta et al., 2002).
However, the contrast between monologue and dialogue seems unclear. Certainly the degree
of interactivity is the determining factor here. But what does it mean exactly? Is the observation
that utterances are largely broadcast to the whole group and that they are longer, necessarily an
indicator of smaller degrees of interactivity? Perhaps a good measure of interactivity, as men-
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tioned briefly above, is the degree of pragmatic cohesiveness between and across turns. Ellipsis,
co-reference and in general the degree to which the meaning of a speaker’s utterance depends on
others’ utterances - dependence upon some notion of shared-context - could be empirically in-
vestigated in order to shed more light on such results. It would be expected that there should also
be a model split in terms of this latter measure between groups of size seven and eight. Carletta
et al. (2002) however, do not provide any evidence of this form.
3.7.5 Effects of uneven power distribution on turn-taking/grounding
Status2 has long been known to affect communication. Group communications, except perhaps
in small groups, are centralised around group leaders (Hare, 1981). This in turn directly affects
patterns of turn-taking and consequently grounding. Carletta, Garrod, and Fraser-Krauss (1998)
reveal that regardless of whether there is a powerful individual present, small group discussions
are still primarily comprised of a series of pairwise discussions. The difference lies in the pairings
established in each case. When decision making authority is placed upon one individual the same
pairs tend to recur, whereas if authority is placed on the group as a whole, the pairings tend to be
more evenly distributed.
Apart from the group size factor, the study in Carletta et al. (2002) also compares traditional
with autonomous work groups. The former type, contain a powerful individual leading the con-
versation. In the latter, authority is uniformly distributed among the participants. In traditional
work groups, pairings recur due to the presence of the powerful individual. These were shown
to behave like large groups as described in the previous section. Moreover, group size and indi-
vidual status are known to interact. It has long been known that in equal-status, large groups one
person will come to dominate the discussion (Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951).
In other words, even if there isn’t a high-status individual, one will emerge if the group is large
enough.
Thus, even though grounding tools seem to remain the same, the resulting states of under-
standing are skewed and heterogeneous, privileging powerful individuals in terms of understand-
ing and being understood. Autonomous and small work groups are for this reason considered
best if true group collaboration/decision making is to be achieved.
2We are not referring to participant status here, rather social status, e.g. a powerful individual or a
group leader
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3.8 Alignment and priming in multi-party dialogue
We pointed out, in section 3.4, how differences in participant role lead to systematically different
patterns of common ground. But what are the mechanisms that account for these differences?
The grounding model would explain these differences, in terms of the opportunities and obliga-
tions, or the lack thereof, that participants in different roles have to engage in, in the grounding
cycle. On this account, peripheral participants reach a lower level of understanding because they
don’t have grounding as a resource.
What would the Interactive Alignment Model (Pickering & Garrod, 2004) have to say about
these differences? As sketched previously, the interactive alignment model states that success-
ful communication is achieved via automatic and resource-free priming mechanisms at different
linguistic levels. But priming mechanisms, or the coupling of production/comprehension or in-
put/output, should operate independently of participant role, and hence the model would have
difficulty explaining these differences.
However, Carletta et al. (1998) suggest that the same priming mechanisms which operate in
dyadic dialogue are also at work in multi-party dialogue. Their key point is that peripheral par-
ticipants don’t have the opportunity to address problems in interpreting the primary participants’
utterances, and hence will be less coordinated with the primary participants because they are, in
effect, exposed to fewer instances of each input.
Moreover, priming seems to be sensitive to participant role also at a local level. For example,
Branigan, Pickering, and McLean (2005) found that side participants as well as direct addressees
align syntactically with a previous speaker, but to a lesser degree. They found that prior side
participants are less likely to align with the previous speaker than prior addressees. Furthermore,
various socio-linguistic studies have shown that speakers are less sensitive to side-participants
than they are to their addressees, with respect to e.g. lexicon and phonology. In other words, per-
ceived attributes in an addressee’s immediate behaviour have a greater impact upon the speaker’s
subsequent behaviour.
Nevertheless, Healey and Mills (2006) provide evidence of both local and global seman-
tic coordination phenomena that are not captured by priming mechanisms. The paper reports
an experiment that investigates the effects of: a) apparent origin of an utterance (primary vs.
peripheral participants) and b) prior exposure (priming) on the development of inter-speaker se-
mantic coordination (alignment at the level of the situation model). In these experiments, random
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computer-generated probe questions get systematically different answers depending on whether
the apparent origin of the probe was a peripheral (passive, silent but ratified bystanders) or a
primary participant. Therefore differences in participant role - or levels of participation - lead
to different levels of semantic coordination. They argue that these differences are due to the
opportunities that direct interaction creates for addressing differences in interpretation.
Still to be investigated is whether their results would persist if the peripheral participant was
actively involved in the interaction between the other two, and hence was only a side participant
locally, on and off, during certain phases of the dialogue. If it is indeed the imbalance in degrees
of participation/involvement which is causing the differences in levels of coordination, then we
would expect their results not to persist. If so, then we would need to recognise degrees of pe-
ripherality, i.e. we need to distinguish between silent, passive bystanders and active, responsible
side-participants, independently that is, of ratification. But what exactly is the difference here?
This is an issue that we take up in detail in chapter 5.
3.9 Repair in multi-party dialogue
Returning to our discussion of repair from the previous chapter, let’s begin with some questions
in this regard which arise in the context of multi-party dialogues:
1. How do side-participants who have had to stay silent during a stretch of dyadic interaction
between another two participants, signal problems in understanding what they said to each
other, i.e. initiate repair? Is the structure of such repair initiations different from those of
the primary participants themselves?
2. Do side participants perform other-repair upon what the active parties say to one another?
What is the structure of such third person repairs? Under what circumstances can and do
they occur smoothly?
3. Can more than one person initiate repair on the same trouble source turn? Is the response
tailored to the specific participant?
4. Who responds in a multi-party setting to the repair initiation? Is it always the speaker of
the trouble source?
Regarding question 1 above, as mentioned, Clark and Schaefer (1992) states that a side-
participant often has to wait for speaker and addressee to carry out their presentation and ac-
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ceptance phases, before they can interject. Therefore the side participant repair initiation may
be ‘displaced’ from the trouble source, as a result of the third party having to wait for a gap
in the active parties’ talk. If this is true, such repair initiations can’t rely on adjacency of the
trouble source. The question arises therefore, as to whether there is any extra effort that the
side-participant would need to invest, in order to build their repair/repair initiation as ‘next to’
the trouble source turn? Would they need to be less elliptical? This problem ties in more closely
with the more general issue of sequential coherence in multi-party dialogues. We will therefore
defer further discussion until section 3.10.
Concerning question 2, to the author’s knowledge there hasn’t been a systematic study of
such side participant repairs. Suffice it to say that answering it requires an extensive corpus
analysis of side-participant repairs in multi-party dialogues. Intuitively side participant other-
repairs could occur, as a misunderstanding might be revealed to the side participant, which might
have gone unnoticed by the active parties themselves - as a result of higher degrees of alignment
of perspectives between the side participant and one of the primary participants as compared to
that between the primary participants themselves. But they would probably be very rare, as other-
repairs in dyadic dialogue are generally dispreferred. Side-participant other-repairs are likely to
be even more dispreferred, as the side participant isn’t even the addressee of the trouble source.
However, they are conceivable if participants have a very close and less formal relationship, in
which case such repairs would seem less face-threatening.
Egbert (1997), in line with the CA tradition, performs a qualitative analysis of other-initiated
repairs in multi-party conversations. She shows that, with regards to our 3rd question above,
more than one person can initiate repair on a single trouble source turn. However, in all the
transcripts used, the repair initiation only receives one answer, i.e. the speaker does not repair
her utterance more than once for each repair initiator. Egbert argues that such redundancy has a
specific interactional function, namely that of a momentary display of affiliation by the second
repair initiator to the first. In other words this is one way in which parties/collectivities (a notion
discussed at length in chapter 5) can be projected in multi-party conversation, in this case the
collection of people who had a problem understanding the trouble-source.
Nevertheless, we should see that it is conceivable for repair initiations on the same trouble
source, to get different answers from its speaker, owing to the differences between the contexts
shared - common ground - between the speaker and each of the repair initiators.
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Egbert (1997) also shows that it is more often than not the speaker of the trouble source who
responds to repair. However, there are cases where another speaker responds before the speaker
of the trouble source. In such cases the original speaker’s reply is marked, in a way that shows
that such practice is a deviation from the norm, and hence ‘inappropriate’. This shows that, in
multi-party dialogues, the responsibility to address any trouble in others’ understanding of an
utterance, remains with the speaker.
3.10 Structuring of multi-party dialogue
3.10.1 Exchanges
Dyadic dialogue is usually structured into the following hierarchy of units:
• Move: This is the smallest unit, corresponding usually to a monologic speech-act.
• Turn: Turns which are still monologic, are comprised of a number of moves.
• Exchange: Exchanges are defined as the smallest pragmatic units to be produced by at
least two different speakers, comprised of exactly one initiating and one reacting move.
E.g. see Traum (1994) for an analysis of dyadic exchanges in terms of forward-looking
and backward-looking Conversational Acts.
In multi-party dialogue however, the question of the completeness of an exchange is posed
in different terms. Not unlike dyadic dialogue, the initiating move can be comprised of a number
of utterance-events, produced by different participants. However, an exchange in multi-party
dialogue is maximally comprised of one initiating move to which all the addressed and non-
addressed participants (when speaker selection rules are violated) may then react (produce second
pair-parts). Delamotte-Legrand (1995) for example, studies the division of exchanges in multi-
party dialogues between 9 pre-adolescent children and found that exchanges with 3-5 and 4-8
moves were dominant.
To illustrate the point, a question can get a number of different answers from different hear-
ers in different roles, or an assertion can be accepted or rejected by all the ratified participants.
Moreover, all this can be done elliptically as long as the antecedent of the ellipsis is ‘still salient’
in context. Consider the following example:
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(3.7)
(1) A: Have you done your home works?
(2) B: Yes
(3) C: Yes
(4) D: No
The above is an example of a 4-move exchange. The reason why D can produce a ‘No’ as he
does, is because the question is still salient at that point. We are still ‘within’ the same exchange.
D’s answer is as local to A’s question as B’s. Now suppose that B had said something to move the
conversation on such that the exchange would be cut short, truncated. It seems, then, that C or D
would not be able to produce such elliptical responses to the question, since what would then be
salient is B’s extended move as initiating a new exchange while truncating the previous one. But
what are the criteria for truncation? E.g. how is it that an elliptical response from B above does
not truncate the exchange whereas an extended utterance might?
Such cases give rise to problems of distance and context locality, since ellipses - at least el-
liptical answers and grounding acts - are presumed to have local antecedents. But what should
the notion of locality be here considering that it should not distinguish between D’s and B’s utter-
ances? As we pointed out in section 3.2.5, this cannot be number of turns or time elapsed since
the antecedent. An alternative notion of locality/saliency is developed and tested experimentally
in chapters 6 and 7.
3.10.2 Multiplicity of Conditionally Relevant Contributions
Consider dialogue 3.7 again. Suppose that D’s utterance is this time addressed at C instead of
A. Then we’d be strongly inclined to take D’s utterance as a rejection of C’s. In other words D’s
utterance ‘picks’ a different antecedent. The ellipsis is then resolved in the two cases respectively
as follows: “No, I haven’t done my homework” and “No, you [C] haven’t done your homework”.
Put in Conversational Analytic terms, we would say that at the end of C’s utterance, an answer
to A’s question and a rejection of C’s answer to A’s question, are BOTH conditionally relevant.
The adjacency pairing structure - according to which the antecedents of ellipses are determined -
is contingent upon what exchanges are currently salient, local and active, and therefore selectable
as a first pair-part to the current contribution.
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So, every utterance initiates a new exchange and is therefore a potential antecedent for sub-
sequent ellipsis. Ambiguity arises when we’re still within another non-truncated, salient prior
exchange, as with A’s question in 3.7.
3.10.3 Context re-raising
Moreover, it appears as though questions of context saliency/locality are really only relevant
if we are to determine when and where a certain form of ellipsis is licensed or felicitous. In
contrast, utterances which aren’t elliptical seem to be possible at any point within a conversation
and indeed even if the conversation has been terminated in the sense put forward in Goffman’s
definition given previously.
Although most turns respond to the immediately preceding talk, speakers can con-
struct turns to address much earlier talk . . . as what their ensuing talk is built as “next
to”. (Schegloff, 1992)
This is done via re-raising relevant parts of the context - avoiding highly elliptical expressions
or in the case of anaphora and definite references, giving further descriptions of the discourse
entities referred to - that the speaker already shares with his interlocutor, in order to make the
desired contribution - the second pair part to a first which is too far back for elliptical access.
But what form do these re-raisings take? What parts of the context need to be re-raised and what
parts can be safely referred to anaphorically? We will see immediately below how this issue is
also directly relevant to the intuition that side-participants are distinguished from addressees in
terms of initiative and accessibility of the floor.
As mentioned previously, there is a strong intuition that SP’s are different from the primary
participants as to how they can access the common ground built up between the primary partici-
pants. “they [side-participants] have to be satisfied with clearing up misunderstanding in natural
breaks in their [speaker and addressee] talk” Clark and Schaefer (1992). A side-participant often
needs to wait for them to carry out their presentation and acceptance phases - and possibly resolve
all the subquestions therein - before they can interject. This is even more the case, where there is
an uneven power distribution among the members of the group, e.g. if the side-participant has a
lower social status and less confidence with respect to what the primary parties are talking about.
Thus, anecdotally, it seems that side-participants frequently use techniques for re-raising context
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in order to access the prior context, which is at this point ‘too far back’ for elliptical access. So,
on this account, side-participant utterances should be overall less elliptical.
Existing empirical evidence for context re-raising, comes from Purver (2004)’s corpus study
of CRs (Clarification Requests or repair initiations). Having produced a taxonomy of the forms
that CR’s can get, he goes on to show that the further a CR is from its antecedent or trouble-
source, the less elliptical its form will be; such that at long distances, CR’s take the form of
full-blown clarification questions where all that is asked about is contained wholly within the CR
itself.
A similar issue arises regarding the interpretability of elliptical utterances relative to topic
changes. Do ‘new’ questions/topics - which do not count as sub-questions of ones introduced
previously within a dyadic exchange - make the ones introduced and resolved before, inaccessible
as possible antecedents? If so, this situation too necessitates context re-raising. We should
already see that this is really the same problem as the one outlined above regarding the truncation
of exchanges.
3.11 Transformations to Ginzburg’s KoS: A short review
of the empirical benchmarks
In the previous chapter we sketched Ginzburg’s model of dialogue context. In this section we will
review the empirical benchmarks on which the proposed transformations to the model to handle
multi-party dialogue, are based. We will not, however, expand here on the the transformations
themselves.
The transformations carried out on the original model, proposed by Ginzburg and Fernandez
(2005), are based on two empirical benchmarks derived from a study of the distance between
Non-Sentential Utterances (NSU) and their antecedents. NSU’s are fragments which are mean-
ingless without the background of the conversation, such as a Short Answer which could be a
one-word reply to a question (for a taxonomy of these, see Fernandez and Ginzburg (2002)). The
antecedent is the utterance from which the meaning of the NSU is recovered, e.g. the question
to which a Short Answer is a reply. The distance between the two is measured here in terms of
turn/sentence numbers.
The study shows that (1): NSUs used for grounding, namely acknowledgements/acceptances
and clarification ellipses have a distance of at most 1 from their antecedents, i.e. the antecedents
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are immediately prior to the NSUs. And that (2): long distance short answers were shown to be
primarily an effect produced in and by multi-party situations. The corresponding benchmarks
developed from these results are:
• Multilogue Long Distance short answers (MLDSA): querying protocols for multilogue
must license short answers an unbounded number of turns from the original query.
• Multilogue adjacency of grounding/acceptance (MAG): assertion and grounding protocols
for multilogue should license grounding/clarification/acceptance moves only adjacently to
their antecedent utterance.
The model is then transformed such that the result satisfies both of these benchmarks. Let’s
explore them in turn.
Recall our discussion in the previous section, of completeness of exchanges in multi-party
dialogues. The first benchmark is along the same lines. It is perfectly intuitive, since a ques-
tion in multi-party settings, can have more than one direct addressee, which means that the last
participants to take a turn will have produced long distance short answers.
The second benchmark is satisfied by protocols in which communal acceptance is enforced.
Under this assumption, an utterance is both grounded and accepted by all the ratified partici-
pants, as soon as one of them signals acceptance. Intuitively, this is quite curious, as multi-party
dialogues of the following sort seem natural:
• Grounding at distance: It is perfectly natural for a number (> 1) of direct addressees to
consecutively signal their understanding. Also, in multi-party dialogues, it may be that
(elliptical) clarification requests can be posed smoothly by side participants at distances of
more than 1. Dealing with such instances would require a distributive grounding protocol.
Although the authors do note that this may be a problem they do not address it.
• Discussion at distance: We need to consider the possibility of long distance rejections
or discussion. Again, it is not inconceivable that a side participant should signal their
disagreement, at distance, after the primary participants have finished talking about the
issue under discussion.
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What would go wrong in the model in these cases, is that a question would be popped off
QUD ‘too early’, i.e. while a side-participant could felicitously acknowledge/accept/reject/clarify
at turn distances of more than 1, she cannot do so under the induced protocol. Again Ginzburg
and Fernandez (2005) do note briefly that such cases would involve some sort of backtracking
(both at the level of acceptance and identification/understanding) but don’t give any ideas as to
what this might involve.
The second benchmark therefore bears closer empirical/corpus examination. This will be
carried out in chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Collective states of understanding
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 3, Goffman (1981) introduced the distinction between ratified partici-
pants and overhearers in a conversation. The former category is further decomposed into direct
addressees (DA) and side participants (SP) of an utterance. The ratified participants are those
who hold certain responsibilities towards each other for ensuring mutual-understanding:
Principle of Responsibility: In a conversation, the parties to it are each responsible for keep-
ing track of what is said, and for enabling the other parties to keep track of what is said. (Clark
& Schaefer, 1992)
As we saw in detail in Chapter 2, in dyadic interactions, mutual-understanding or ‘grounding’
is achieved through direct collaboration between the speaker and addressee. The speaker expects
the addressee to provide evidence that he is understanding the speaker’s utterance “to criteria
sufficient for current purposes” (Clark & Schaefer, 1989). In multi-party conversations on the
other hand, the situation is more complex.
For example, if A makes an anaphoric reference to some entity, while addressing B with C
present as a side-participant, he intends both B AND C to resolve the reference. However, by
definition, the speaker does not collaborate as actively with side-participants. They “have to be
satisfied with clearing up misunderstandings in natural breaks in their talk”(Clark & Schaefer,
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1992). A SP will normally wait until speaker and addressee have carried out their presentation
and acceptance phases, before attempting to rectify any possible misalignment with the speaker.
On this account grounding between speaker and direct addressee always takes precedence.
By definition, then, SPs and DAs give different evidence of grounding of a speaker’s ut-
terances; DAs respond overtly and directly but SPs provide weaker evidence of grounding –
primarily continued attention and withholding of repair. Consequently, if we understand level of
grounding as being directly contingent upon the level of ‘evidence of acceptance’ provided then
we expect differences in the relative accessibility of the common ground for the different pairs
of participants; roughly, Speaker & DA > Speaker & SP > SP & DA.
In a review article Branigan (2006) points out that there isn’t yet any empirical evidence that
DAs and SPs differ in the accumulation of common ground. Furthermore, as we discussed in
section 3.4.3, although the Tangram experiments carried out by Clark and colleagues (Wilkes-
Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Schober & Clark, 1989) show clearly that SPs and DAs reach a higher
level of grounding than overhearers, they do not provide direct empirical evidence as regards the
relative status of SPs and DAs with respect to the accumulation of common ground in the same
conversation. This is because the two task phases in these experiments effectively break the
interaction into two consecutive, separate conversations where a comparison between the level
of understanding of DAs and SPs, in the same conversation, at the level of the utterance-event, is
not made.
4.1.1 Group discussion as dyadic dialogue with overhearers?
groups . . . behave like pairs of speakers with overhearers . . . dialogue participants try
to mutually understand each other, establishing common ground among all mem-
bers of a group . . . so that small group discussions can be seen as [dyadic] dialogue
with process loss due to the difficulties of fully understanding material which is
merely overheard. (Carletta et al., 2002)
Nevertheless, as discussed in section 3.4.4, Carletta et al. (2002)’s experimental conditions
were forcing the participants to establish common ground among all the members. We also
pointed out situations, unlike those studied in that paper and like those studied here, in which
it would be highly unlikely that the dialogue participants attempt to negotiate common ground
among all the members, while at the same time there wouldn’t really be any ‘overhearing’ in-
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volved. The SPs reach as high a level of grounding as the dyad actively engaged in talk (speaker
and addressee), without any direct exchange of evidence of understanding, between the SP and
the active dyad.
In this chapter, we provide empirical evidence for this claim. Namely that, at least in the
dialogues studied here, the common ground is, in fact, equally accessible to SPs and DAs, while
the active parties themselves, assume that despite the SP’s lack of overt feedback, she is under-
standing what is being said. We argue that this is evidence for collective states of understanding
that are not reducible to their component dyadic interactions.
It appears that in modelling multi-party dialogue in such cases, we need to account for the
possibility that one participant can stand proxy, in terms of grounding, for another (ratified)
participant. We will take up this latter issue in detail in the next chapter, where we explore
experimentally, the mutual responsibilities between DAs and SPs that ‘Grounding by Proxy’ as
such, amounts to.
4.2 Method
Before describing the analysis in more detail we first introduce the corpus used.
4.2.1 The AMI Corpus
The AMI Meeting Corpus (Carletta, 2006) forming the basis for this analysis, is a multi-modal
(video, audio and text) set of 100 hours of recorded meetings. These consist of a set of naturally
occurring and a set of scenario-based meetings, the former being the focus of this investigation.
AMI is fully encoded in XML. The software provides various means for browsing and displaying
the different parts of the corpus, including video, audio and dialogue transcripts. The video
part of the corpus consists of close-up cameras for each dialogue participant in addition to two
other cameras providing views from overhead and the corner of the room. The close-up cameras
provide the means to determine states of mutual gaze among the participants. As for audio, we
have used only the headset-mix wave files provided for each meeting.
In this chapter, 10 of the naturally occurring meetings - a total of 10 hours of conversation -
have been analysed.
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4.2.2 Side Participants to Strips of Dyadic Talk
For reasons which will become clear, in order to make claims about a speaker’s assumptions
regarding SP understanding, we extracted all strips of dyadic talk from each meeting. These are
segments during which there is no explicit feedback (except ’continued attention’) from partici-
pants other than speaker and addressee. This provides identifiable SPs and DAs for each dyadic
segment. Based on the turn taking model in (Sacks et al., 1974) (see section 3.7.1), these dyadic
segments of talk end in one of two ways:
1. Self-selected side participant (SP): a SP wins the floor by exploiting a gap in the dyadic
talk, or she interrupts the talk mid-utterance.
2. Nominated by Last Speaker (LS): Last speaker hands the floor over to a SP, by directly
addressing her.
It is in general a current speaker’s paralinguistic behaviour (gaze and body orientation) and/or
the content of her utterance (e.g. use of personal pronouns accompanied by gaze) which together
determine whom she is directly addressing. When a SP is directly nominated (addressed) at the
end of a segment, it’s the same information which signals a change in the speaker’s set of DAs.
Note that the DA is determined through reference exclusively to the speaker’s behaviour. Also we
take into account that the speaker might be ‘addressing’ the other participant in the dyad while
making a SP the intended recipient as when the SP is the ‘butt’ of a speaker’s joke (Levinson,
1988).
4.3 Analysis of Ellipsis
At the end of a dyadic segment the participants hold certain assumptions about each other’s level
of understanding. One way these assumptions are made manifest is in the context-dependent
expressions employed by the speaker. These are generally taken to cover both ellipses and
anaphora.
Ellipsis is a phenomenon both in monologue and dialogue whereby single or multiple sen-
tence constituents are omitted, presumably to enhance efficiency of communication (recall the
principle of Least Collaborative Effort, section 2.3.6, which might be used to justify the use of
elliptical expressions). The fully resolved content of such elliptical expressions can be recovered
by reference to an earlier part of a sentence, a first conjunct or a previous utterance/sentence,
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which are said to be immediately present in the local context. Examples of ellipsis include all
Non-Sentential Utterances in dialogue (Fernandez & Ginzburg, 2002), VP-ellipsis, bare argu-
ment ellipsis, gapping, sluicing etc.
On the other hand there are anaphoric expressions which are said to ‘stand in’ for some ref-
erent, salient either in the discourse context, mentally or in the immediate physical environment
of the participants. These include pronouns and definite descriptions.
Arguably, anaphora and ellipses require different notions of context for their resolution. In-
deed, even if we consider any one of them alone, still neither of them would constitute a unitary
concept. For example, some types of ellipsis are taken to have syntactic explanations (to do
with the omission of words or constituents and hence in the remit of syntax), some semantic
(their resolution requires reference to the denotations of the words omitted) and some pragmatic.
As for anaphora, for example, some consider deictic (indexical) uses of pronouns as anaphoric
while others disagree (see (Cann, Kempson, & Gregoromichelaki, 2009), chapters 5 and 7 for a
discussion of these problems).
We should however note that none of this will really affect our arguments in this chapter, as
we are appealing to anaphora and ellipses merely as an empirical measure or index of access to
context, whatever notion of context that may be. The claims developed here remain only at an
informal, empirical level, thus not requiring, at least at this stage, an articulation of exactly what
notion of context is being appealed to.
Such context-dependent expressions are central to this analysis since they index the extent
to which the meaning of an utterance depends directly on the context of the preceding dyadic
exchange, i.e. the extent to which participants assume that the common ground established during
the dyadic exchange is accessible to each other. More specifically, at the point when the dyadic
exchange ends, we have the opportunity to compare a) the pattern of use of context-dependent
expressions by the last speaker (LS) to the side-participant (SP) with b) the pattern used by the
side-participant to the last speaker.
If the LS addresses the SP elliptically they are demonstrating their assumption that the SP
grounded the antecedent referents (in case of anaphora) or utterances (in case of ellipsis) during
the prior dyadic conversation. Conversely when the SP self-selects (interrupts), the use of such
expressions demonstrates the extent to which the SPs can directly access the common ground or
the context collaboratively built up by the other participants.
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Our first level classification distinguishes four categories:
• CD (context-dependent): Utterance contains Ellipsis or Anaphora (including Definite
References).
• CT (continuation of talk): In terms of semantic content, the utterance could intuitively
be thought of as the continuation of the talk in the segment, i.e. utterance does not have
a coherent meaning without the background of the dyadic talk. These do not contain any
surface, explicit forms of context-dependency.
• BC (backchannel): Having been ‘silent’ throughout the dyadic segment, the SP merely
starts to backchannel again.
• NC (new context): Introduction of a new context/topic.
This scheme yields the following segment types: LSCD, LSCT , LSBC, LSNC, SPCD, SPCT , SPBC,
SPNC.
For a second, more fine-grained level of analysis that takes the kind of ellipsis into account
we needed to further decompose the CD category. In order to do this, a coding protocol for such
expressions was developed.
4.4 Quantifying Ellipsis
In this section we present a coding protocol that allows naive users to annotate dialogue tran-
scripts for the different explicit/surface forms of context dependency including anaphora and
ellipsis1. This protocol was developed in order to provide a reliable measure of the surface forms
of context dependency. As noted, this is used here to quantify the mutual accessibility of con-
text, that is, the extent to which participants assume that their contributions are accessible to
each other. However, there has not been a reliable method for doing this. The ellipsis protocol
presented here provides a useful step in this direction. It provides a standardised coding scheme
that can quantify the extent to which speakers can directly access the constituents of each other’s
turns.
1The protocol presented here has been published in the proceedings of the SIGdial workshop: (Colman,
Eshghi, & Healey, 2008)
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Previous work has attempted to identify a taxonomy of Non Sentential Utterances (NSUs),
e.g. (Fernandez & Ginzburg, 2002; Fernandez, Ginzburg, & Lappin, 2007; Schlangen & Las-
carides, 2003). These are, as we have noted previously, fragmentary but intuitively complete
utterances, exclusive to dialogue that are not sentential in their outward form.
The NSU taxonomy developed by Fernandez and Ginzburg (2002) has greatly influenced and
guided our choice of ellipsis categories here. However, one issue with these previous approaches
is the lack of reliability data; a statistic such as Cohen’s kappa (see e.g. (Carletta, 1996)) is
needed in order to demonstrate that a taxonomy or coding scheme can be reliably applied between
independent coders. The approach presented here provides a reliable coding scheme that has been
designed to be used without any specific prior knowledge of linguistics being required.
In order to simplify coding and increase reliability, some of the categories suggested by
Fernandez and Ginzburg (2002) have been collapsed into broader ones. It should be pointed out
that we are not aiming to produce an accurate or definitive analysis of ellipsis. The protocol
is rather the product of contending with the compromise between robust coding categories and
linguistic accuracy.
4.4.1 The Coding Protocol
As can be seen from Figures 1-4, the protocol consists of four binary branching decision trees
that are applied to each contribution in an interaction. The categories presented here (in boldface)
are generally ordered in terms of frequency of occurrence in order to assist the coder. Note that
a contribution to dialogue may indeed contain several instances from these categories. Thus,
contributions are not assigned to one category alone. Rather, coders should use the protocol
iteratively on each contribution to label any part of a contribution that is elliptical, while each
time ignoring the section of the contribution that was already coded. This means that the protocol
has another advantage: there’s no need to specify in advance what ‘units’ are to be coded. Rather,
the units are those that the protocol itself picks out via repeated application on the same utterance.
4.4.2 Inter-rater Reliability
In order to demonstrate reliability between coders, two coders (one computer scientist, one psy-
chologist) applied the ellipsis protocol to a sample of task oriented dialogue. This was taken from
the HCRC Map Task corpus (Anderson et al, 1991); a series of dialogues in which one participant
attempts to describe a route on a fictional map to another. The longest of these dialogues was
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Figure 4.1: Anaphora Decision Chart Figure 4.2: Answers Decision Chart
chosen to be coded (transcript Q1NC1) which consisted of 446 turns and 5533 words. Cohen’s
kappa was calculated using the procedure outlined in (Howell, 1997); see (Carletta, 1996) for a
discussion of the use of kappa in dialogue coding. Kappa in this instance was .81, which shows
very high reliability, even by conservative standards (Krippendorff, 1980).
4.5 Ellipsis Taxonomy
1. Non-Sentential Utterances (NSU): These have been coded for, using the protocol devel-
oped in the previous section. We have further collapsed the categories according to their
role/function in conversation, into the following more general ones:
• Direct Answers (DA): Fragments used as answers to questions. Includes Polar An-
swers, Prompted NSU Answer and Unprompted NSU Answer.
• Clarification Requests (CR): Fragments in question form, used to request clarification
or further elaboration of a previous utterance. Includes Clarification Ellipses and
Sluices.
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Figure 4.3: Questions Decision Chart Figure 4.4: Statements Decision Chart
• Modifiers (MOD): In their fully resolved form, these are statements somehow mod-
ifying a previous utterance in conversation. They include Modifiers and Continua-
tions.
2. Sentential Ellipsis: These are contained in utterances which are sentential, but seman-
tically incomplete as a result of either the full omission of a syntactic constituent or its
replacement by a bare auxiliary. These are captured at the very end of the protocol, that is,
at the end of the Statements Decision Chart (Figure 4.4). In the case of stand-alone uses of
propositional attitude verbs (know, see, believe etc.), the whole of the antecedent utterance
can get elided. Note that this latter kind of ellipsis is what is commonly referred to as
Sentential Ellipsis in the linguistic community. So our usage here is different and broader
in that it is used in contradistinction to Non-Sentential Utterances, where the elliptical ut-
terance is sentential in its outward form. Hence the term Sentential Ellipsis as used here
includes, but is not exhausted by the usage common in the linguistic literature. Here’s an
example of a typical form of sentential ellipsis:
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Verb Phrase (VP) Ellipsis:
A: Will you please go to the market tomorrow?
B: I already told you I will. [Resolved Content: “I already told you I will go to the market
tomorrow”]
Since the protocol developed does not determine what kind of Sentential Ellipsis is being
used, we have developed an ad hoc taxonomy analogous to that for NSU’s, based on the
role/function of the utterance containing the ellipsis. Bear in mind that the taxonomy is
being used merely to compare what SPs and DAs can ‘do’ elliptically.
• Direct Answers (DA): Utterance containing the ellipsis is an answer to a question,
like the above example.
• Request for confirmation (RC): Partly redundant, these are tag questions used to re-
quest confirmation or initiate dispute. “A: I got an A in Biology. B: Did you? A: Yes.
I got the results today.”
• Statement (ST): General category containing all statements, excluding Direct An-
swers.
• Query: All elliptical questions excluding Requests for Confirmation.
3. Anaphora (Anaph): These were also coded according to the protocol developed in the
last chapter.
4. Definite/Nominal Reference (DR)
To provide a baseline comparison of ellipsis types in natural dialogue we also coded 10
peoples conversations from the British National Corpus (BNC).
4.6 Results and Discussion
Table 4.1 shows dyadic segment type counts, for 10 AMI meetings.
4.6.1 Segments of type LSCD: Assumptions about SPs
All such segments indicate that the last speaker, in producing elliptical utterances addressing
a SP, is tacitly making the assumption that the SP would be able to resolve the ellipses em-
ployed, which in turn depends directly on the SP having grounded the antecedent utterance(s)
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CD CT NC BC
LS 20 4 3 4
SP 100 33 1 0
Table 4.1: Dyadic Segment Type Counts
of the ellipsis contained within the segment, for which the SP did not produce any explicit feed-
back. Note that ‘Continued attention’ by the SP(s) is very frequently not monitored by any of the
participants in the dyad. Eye contact is more or less exclusively maintained between the two of
them. Nevertheless the SP is ‘expected’ by the last speaker to have grounded the antecedent utter-
ance(s). Furthermore, none of these segments were followed by any form of Repair/Clarification
by the SP. In all of them the SP seems to be coping perfectly well with the elliptical utterance,
and the conversation goes on smoothly. This evidence seems to support the claim in (Branigan,
2006) that speakers have very similar assumptions about the level of grounding achieved by SPs
compared to that by DAs. Nevertheless Branigan also proposes that speakers often have weaker
expectations from SPs.
The following are excerpts from AMI, showing the different kinds of ellipsis employed by
the last speakers:
Anaphoric chains: distant antecedent recognised by SP
(4.1)
(1) B: Yeah. But that still won’t tell you. well howmany tangrams are
there that they’re using? Fifteen or something.
(2) C: Uh no, not even that. They’ve of this relevant type . . . .
(3) B: Uh-huh. So that’s not gonna so that’s not gonna tell you anything
about their relative complexity. . . You still need some kinda
scale for these things. Ca uh if you look at’em, do you just know
(4) C: Mm no. [laugh] Well I don’t. I’m not .
(5) B: No. I wouldn’t either. What about him? I if Mister Geometry. I
mean, you know. Can you tell just by looking at these how hard
people find them?
(6) A: No, I’m afraid not. I wouldn’t know.
In the above excerpt, also note how similar C’s (the DA) last utterance is to A’s (the SP) : VP
ellipsis in C’s versus whole sentence ellipsis in A’s utterance.
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The whole segment as antecedent
(4.2)
(1) B: [. . 6 utterances so far exchanged between B and C] Data I think
we should keep in.
(2) C: OK. [laugh]
(3) B: Because it’s would be the same as feature.
(4) B: Or spec spectrum. I think data’s the same as spectrum . . .
(5) C: I do I still don’t think that goes in. But .
(6) C: yeah, I still don’t like it. But
(7) B: Final view, Bob?
(8) A: I don’t have passionate feelings.
Here, B’s last utterance explicitly addressing A, is highly elliptical with no particular utter-
ance as antecedent, i.e. the resolved content of the utterance depends on the whole segment
between B and C. B expects A (Bob) to have grasped the issue under discussion. One would
expect A here to initiate clarification if he really didn’t know what B was asking.
We think that the speaker’s assumptions about SPs are, amongst other things, strongly medi-
ated by the speaker’s prior beliefs (before the conversation) about the SP and his relevant knowl-
edge. In the meeting from which the above was extracted, A is a supervisor with whom the rest
of the participants check their results as they go along. So, firstly if cooperative, he should be
‘paying attention’ to the dyadic interactions in which he is not directly involved (most of the
meeting). Secondly, the rest of the participants believe to begin with, that he would understand
such technical issues under discussion. So perhaps it is some notion of the well known ‘lab coat
effect’ that could justify such high expectations.
4.6.2 Segments of type SPCD: Side participant access to ‘communal’ common ground
In this section we will argue that SPs have the same kind of access through the same techniques,
to the ‘communal’ common ground, as the participants directly involved in collaboratively secur-
ing it (speaker and addressee). These segments, which comprise the largest class in this analysis,
end when a SP interjects producing an elliptical and hence context-dependent utterance. Again
here, the antecedents of the ellipses, lie within the dyadic segments.
Table 4.2 below shows the ellipses identified in these SP utterances. They have been clas-
sified according to the taxonomy described in section 4.5. In order to assess whether there is a
difference between the use of ellipsis types by SPs and the baseline - typical frequency of use in-
dependent of both the number of participants in the conversation and the status of the participant
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Non-Sentential Sentential Other
DA(NSU) CR MOD ST DA Query RC DR Anaph Tot
AMI 14 9 12 10 0 4 6 11 58 124
Baseline (BNC) 154 73 46 46 21 12 20 not coded 303 675
Table 4.2: Ellipses employed by SPs terminating SPCD segments compared to the baseline (BNC)
upon employing the ellipsis - used in ordinary dialogue, we compared the frequency of ellipses
of each type with that found in the BNC. Taking into consideration all categories in Table 4.2
(merging Sentential and non-Sentential DAs and ignoring DR since it wasn’t coded for in the
BNC) there is a reliable difference (Chi26 = 14.6, p = 0.02). However, as Table 2 indicates the
main difference is in the relative frequency of direct answers which account for 26% of instances
in the BNC but only 12% of instances in AMI. If this category is ignored we find no reliable
difference between SPs and the baseline (Chi25 = 4.33, p = 0.50).
The difference in frequency of use of direct answers is essentially an artefact of our coding
scheme. As noted above the SP ellipses are those where they have nominated themselves as
next speaker by interjecting. Consequently, direct answers by SPs to questions - which are by
definition not directed at SPs - are much rarer. Subject to this caveat, we can conclude that the
pattern of use of different ellipsis types by SPs is not in fact distinguishable from the pattern of
use typical of participants in ordinary dialogue.
What now follows is a discussion over a set of examples from AMI comparing the kinds of
access to context through various elliptical phenomena, possible by SPs to those by DAs.
Anaphora with distant whole utterance as antecedent
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(4.3)
(1) B: Um so this person didn’t ha um the obviously didn’t know about
capitalisation. So just about every utterance needs to be capi-
talised and and needs the end punctuation.
(2) D: Mm-hmm
(3) D: You know, when you get like um someone’s talking and there’s
they sort of pause in the middle of a sentence that’s long
enough for it to put a break in,
(4) B: Yeah
(5) D: but they’re actually sort of carrying on the sentence, do you
have to capitalise each time you transcribe a bit of it’s mid
(6) B: Um, no no no.
(7) D: No no no no. Yeah.
(8) B: Whatever um makes sense to you.
(9) D: Okay.
(10) B: Um [cough] but no, it it can continue into the next segment and
that’s perfectly fine. the hyphen and then.
(11) C: Yeah.
(12) C: I think that’s actually the only case where you don’t
(13) C: or where you’re not supposed to capitalise, right?
Utterances 1 to 12 above form a segment of type SPCD which is terminated by C. The
anaphora ‘that’ in 13 can only be resolved with 3 as an antecedent. An issue is here raised
initially by B to which D responds by asking a question (utterance 3). All the way down to utter-
ance 12 the question is under discussion exclusively between B and D. C then produces utterance
13 which can intuitively be thought of as a negative answer to or a rejection of D’s initial ques-
tion. In other words it could have been produced by B (the DA) adjacently to the initial question.
Note here that C has had to re-raise the context in order to make her contribution. I.e. a sim-
ple “No” (a Negative Polar Answer) like B’s initial response, or even the less elliptical “I think
that’s actually the only case where you don’t.”, would most probably be infelicitous (the other
party would be very likely to initiate clarification). But this seems to be the effect of antecedent
distance alone, since all of the NSU classes are possible by SPs at the end of the segments in
question, but clearly not at such high antecedent distances.
Non-Sentential Utterances (NSU)
Factual Modifier
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(4.4)
(1) C: When I did my masters um I took uh SP1 and SP2 with Simon
King.
(2) A: You survived SP1 and SP2.[laugh]
(3) C: Yes. And actually I’ve done quite well in SP1, I’ve done it a bit
worse in SP2 because it was a l a lot more challenging.
(4) A: We have two new teachers for SP2.
(5) B: Too many. [laugh]
The excerpt above shows an instance of a SP Factual Modifier (boldfaced in the excerpt)
produced by B adjacently to its antecendent. The same utterance “Too many.” by the DA (C here)
would have been perfectly felicitous (implies in this case, equivalence of SP and DA access to
context).
Among the NSU classes in (Fernandez & Ginzburg, 2002), Clarification Ellipsis (CE) has
a special status, since it is known to be a common technique used in dyadic dialogue to ground
utterances which weren’t sufficiently understood by the recipient. There were very few CEs
identified in this analysis. However, we do know that SPs can and do in fact initiate elliptical
clarification, by exploiting gaps in dyadic talk:
Clarification Ellipsis (CE)
(4.5)
(1) C: What does cutest spelling mean?
(2) B: oh, she spelled cutest um with an I ,
(3) C: oh, okay.
(4) B: so that that’s just something I pointed out.
(5) D: oh yeah.
(6) A: Cutest? [Gazing at D. Direct Addressee is D here.]
(7) D: E S T
(8) A: Thank you. [laugh]
D and A above are both SPs to the dyadic segment between B and C. The CE produced by
A is interestingly addressed at D who is also a SP to what’s being clarified, which shows that in
multi-party dialogue all the ratified participants have responsibilities towards one another.
This example also indicates clearly that there can be varying levels of understanding among
the SPs themselves. However, note that we are not claiming by any means that in multi-party
situations, the participants always reach a collective state of understanding. The claim is rather
that such collective states do exist, and that they’re often assumed by the parties involved.
Furthermore, it’s interesting to see that had it been B (the DA of the antecedent utterance)
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who didn’t understand, she would have produced the CE locally (as opposed to at a distance of
5 here) as is generally expected in dyadic dialogue. This example has important implications for
models of dialogue context, discussed briefly in section 4.6.4 below, and taken up again in the
last chapter this thesis.
VP ellipsis
The taxonomy described in section 4.5 has been used to classify these.
local VP ellipsis by SP
(4.6)
(1) B: [5 utterances exchanged between B and C so far in the segment]
but I I I do know the type of scenario you’re describing. I just it’s
just hard to answer that without hearing something. Mm.
(2) C: Mm-hmm. The um should be capitalised.
(3) B: yeah, they should all. I stopped marking them, ’cause there are
just too many.
(4) C: yeah
(5) A: Should it? ’Cause the loose uh is continuing from one sentence
isn’t it?
Note also the chain of anaphora referring to the ‘um’ (indicated in italics), and how it car-
ries on across to the SP’s (A’s) utterance. This phenomenon is very frequent in SP utterances
terminating SPCD segments.
4.6.3 Segments of type SPNC: Implications for our claims
The analysis indicates that the introduction of new contexts/topics by SPs interrupting a dyadic
segment, is extremely unlikely. Consequently if a SP is to interrupt, she has to ‘stick to the topic’
already under discussion in the segment. This further supports our claims, in that even if a SP
is not using ellipsis as direct access to the ‘communal’ common ground, she makes use of the
information in there, to produce a relevant utterance. An utterance thus produced, semantically
depends on and is incoherent without the background of the ‘shared knowledge’ established
between the speaker and addressee in the dyad.
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4.6.4 Context locality/saliency
Recall that in section 3.11, we pointed out that the transformations proposed in (Ginzburg &
Fernandez, 2005), to handle multi-party dialogues, are based on 2 empirical benchmarks. One of
these was the adjacency of grounding and acceptance acts to their first pair-parts. We argued that
this benchmark bears closer inspection. Among the examples given above, we can find at least
2 which contradict this benchmark, and hence render the corresponding transformations unfit to
handle such cases:
• Grounding/Clarification at Distance: The Clarification Ellipsis in the example given above
(Excerpt 4.5), has an antecedent distance of 5, that is, it is non-adjacent to its antecedent.
• Discussion/Rejection at Distance: Excerpt 4.3 is a case of non-adjacent rejection at a dis-
tance of 10 turns.
We will not discuss the exact nature of the problems these examples create for Ginzburg’s
model here, but will come back to them in the last chapter of this thesis, where a solution will be
sketched.
For now, note that in excerpt 4.5 A’s CE is, in effect, just as local to C’s question utterance
as B’s adjacent response. What this and similar examples make clear is that locality or saliency
of an antecedent cannot be a simple function of time or turns elapsed. An alternative notion
of saliency/locality is developed in chapter 6, where this same example is used to motivate our
experimental hypothesis.
4.7 Conclusion
The evidence from this analysis shows that, with respect to common ground, side-participants in
the AMI corpus do not appear to be different in any substantive respect from direct-addressees.
Speakers assume that SPs reach the same level of understanding as the addressees. Additionally,
SPs were shown to use elliptical techniques to access the shared-context, in generally the same
way as DAs do. All things being equal, this is strong evidence for collective states of understand-
ing that could not be predicted from considering the component dyadic interactions alone since,
prima facie, the SPs don’t ground to the same level and don’t go through the same grounding
cycle as DAs with the speaker.
As mentioned in the introduction, the corpus evidence presented here indicates that direct
addressees can act as proxy for side-participants in providing evidence of understanding or more
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broadly in carrying the conversation forward. Grounding by proxy, as such, will be explored
experimentally in the next chapter, where we also present conditions under which it is expected
to hold. As we will see, it will turn out that this entails a set of mutual responsibilities between
direct addressees and side-participants.
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Chapter 5
Parties in Conversation: Grounding by Proxy
5.1 Introduction
As sketched in chapter 2, in dyadic dialogue, conversational responsibilities take the form of
moment by moment collaboration and exchange of evidence of understanding between speaker
and addressee. The systematics of the grounding process as such, are relatively well understood
and spelt out in considerable detail by the work of Clark and colleagues.
In multi-party dialogues on the other hand, the grounding process is more complex and un-
derstood less well. The participants may, at any moment, occupy different roles depending on the
relation that they stand in, to an utterance: speaker vs. side-participant vs. direct addressee vs.
overhearer. We pointed out, in section 3.2.9, that such differences are consequential for the par-
ticipants’ (expected) behaviour in conversation, as incumbents of those roles (see e.g. Goodwin
(1984); Levinson (1988)). We also discussed in section, 3.4, how such differences in role lead to
systematically different patterns of common ground being established between the participants
(Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992; Schober & Clark, 1989).
The studies alluded to above, of patterns of grounding in multi-party dialogues, all relate to
the difference between ratified participants and overhearers in conversations. However, being a
side-participant is clearly also different from being an addressee of an utterance, in that “some
answer is . . . anticipated from them [addressees], more so than from other ratified participants
[side-participants]” (Goffman, 1981), meaning that side-participants have ‘weaker’ responsibili-
ties as to providing moment by moment evidence of understanding for the speaker.
Nevertheless, in the previous chapter, we showed that despite this imbalance between the
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levels of feed-back provided by side participants and direct addressees, side participants may still
reach a level of understanding comparable to direct addressees. In other words, withholding of
negative feedback from side participants is taken as positive evidence of understanding. The side-
participants were being treated as equivalent to direct addressees in the level of understanding
they were assumed to have reached. We concluded that such dialogues lead to collective states
of understanding that are not reducible to their component dyadic interactions.
We should point out here that the results from the previous chapter are in conflict with those
of Healey and Mills (2006) sketched in section 3.8. They showed that differences in status even
amongst the ratified participants (side-participant vs. speaker and addressee), can be consequen-
tial for the levels of semantic coordination achieved by them. Healey and Mills (2006) show that
within one and the same local conversational context, people distinguish between primary (those
actively contributing) and peripheral participants (those who aren’t actively engaged in the inter-
action but are nevertheless ratified): the same question receives systematically different answers
depending on whether the apparent source of the question was a peripheral or a primary partici-
pant. They suggest that this is due to the opportunities that interaction creates for the participants
to address differences in interpretation, and, as a consequence, those passive, peripheral partici-
pants who do not actively contribute - that is to say they do not actively provide feedback - are
treated differently. In other words, it is the imbalance between participants’ level of participation
which is leading to differences in levels of semantic coordination.
But note that the dialogues from the AMI corpus used in the previous chapter were of a
special type: they were meetings in which all the participants were expected in advance to sus-
tain a more or less balanced level of participation or involvement in the dialogues. This is the
crucial difference between the Healey and Mills (2006) peripheral participants and the AMI
side-participants. But what exactly is the difference here in terms of grounding behaviour? What
‘extra’ responsibilities do these ‘active’ side participants have? - that is sufficient for them to
be treated as ‘present’ in the current conversational context and hence the conversation moving
forward and common ground accumulating for them in the same way as it does for the others?
Below, we suggest one possible answer.
5.1.1 Grounding by proxy
So how should these collective states be modelled? I.e. what grounding responsibilities, if
any, does being an ‘active’ side-participant to an utterance in such dialogues entail? Recall the
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Principle of Responsibility:
In a conversation, the parties to it are each responsible for keeping track of what
is said, and for enabling the other parties to keep track of what is said. (Clark &
Schaefer, 1992)
We pointed out, in section 3.5, how this principle, is really just a normative description of
how ratified participants should behave with respect to grounding what is said, and that in multi-
party dialogues, particularly as regards side-participants, it does not provide an account of how
such responsibilities are to be fulfilled at a local level. In this chapter the aim is to operationalise
this principle and, as we will see, Schegloff’s notion of ‘parties’, in conversations of the type
studied in the previous chapter.
Results from the previous chapter suggest that we may need to account for the possibil-
ity that a currently engaged/active (ratified) participant (the current speaker or addressee) may
stand proxy for side-participants of the moment, with respect to grounding what is said or more
broadly in carrying the conversation forward, while these side-participants are, in withholding of
repair/rejection, assumed to have understood/accepted what was said.
As such, Grounding by Proxy, if operative, does indeed entail a set of responsibilities, borne
by the side-participant of the moment, with respect to something uttered by the speaker or ad-
dressee (as also implicit in the principle of responsibility above). Namely, if a speaker/addressee
stands proxy for a side-participant in carrying the conversation forward, then if for any reason
(s)he fails to carry the conversation forward, thus not satisfying the requirements imposed by
the current context of the conversation (e.g. providing the second pair part implicated by a first
already uttered), then the side-participant should compensate by interjecting in order to satisfy
those requirements. Such failure on the part of the current speaker, can be manifest as signs of
mis/non-understanding, hedgings, pauses, inconsistencies and falsities, as seen from the side-
participant’s point of view. Such speaker/addressee failures may also get manifest, as explicit
elicitations of help by them from the side-participant.
For a simple, initial example, consider the dialogue below:
(5.1)
(1) Alice: What time is it guys?
(2) Alan: errrr . . [looking around to find a clock]
(3) Brian: Its five thirty.
(4) Alice: Oh Thanks.
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Alan’s failure above to address the obligation imposed by Alice’s question - namely to an-
swer - promptly, is followed by Brian’s fulfilment of it. We will explore below the different
configurations of the participation framework in which this may occur.
5.1.2 When is grounding by proxy expected to hold?
Surely, such mutual responsibilities, are not always operative. In particular, there are dialogues
- or stretches of talk or topics therein - during which one or more of the ratified participants, do
not have any incentive of their own to move the conversation forward or contribute. They may
well be indifferent to what’s being said at the moment. They may occupy a totally passive role
(recall e.g. the peripheral participants in Healey and Mills (2006)).
Instead, we’d expect the responsibilities entailed by grounding by proxy to be in effect, in
case the side participant of the moment has similar degrees of incentive to understand/ground/respond,
as the person who already holds the floor. So we might say that grounding by proxy holds when
two or more participants, form a single ‘party’, or ‘collectivity’ with respect to the current, lo-
cal communication task at hand. Let’s explore in more detail what consequences such ‘party’
formations might have for the organisation of subsequent talk/grounding.
5.1.3 Parties in conversation
Schegloff (1995) introduced the notion of a Party1 in multi-party dialogues, as comprised of more
than one person. He suggests that the simplest systematics of turn-taking proposed by Sacks et
al. (1974), summarised in section 3.7.1, operates not in the first instance between individuals but
between parties:
But on some occasions, or for a particular phase or topic or sequence [locally] within
some occasion of talk-in-interaction, the aggregate of persons who are as Erving
Goffman called them ratified participants are organised into parties . . . by virtue of
interaction specific contingencies and conduct. (Schegloff, 1995)
The idea is that certain topics or phases during the course of the conversation, i.e. the current
conversational context, may project or make relevant, the coalition of a group of individuals. In
other words, the context can be such that a certain subset of the participants are in alignment
1Note that in other places, including work by Clark and colleagues and the previous chapters of this
thesis, this word has been used exclusively to designate a single individual. But we will hereafter use this
word to refer to a subgroup of the ratified participants (possibly a single individual), a notion which is
central to this thesis and explicated further in this chapter.
5.1. Introduction 115
against the background of that context, e.g. when two couples are discussing plans to meet
at some later time, in which case the discussion is taking place between two parties (in this
case two couples) rather than 4 individuals. So the members of the party are equally expected
to have something to say in the current context. Empirical support for this, comes from the
observation that often all of the simultaneous talk in conversation is between members of one
party, as the members compete for the floor to make a contribution to carry the conversation
forward (Schegloff, 1995). They are as responsible for satisfying the constraints imposed by the
current context as the other members of that party. In such circumstances, we may say that one
person in such a coalition may speak on behalf of the rest of the members. The competition for
the floor in such cases indicates that if one of them somehow fails to address the issue at hand,
then the others would compensate, so that the party is responsible as a whole to address that
issue; hence grounding by proxy.
When parties are contextually relevant, an utterance from one party member, as already
noted, could, in withholding of negative feedback from other party members, be understood
to stand proxy for what they would have said. One can, in this manner, ‘speak on behalf’ of a co-
present group. Rom Harre’s (1999) concept of ‘positioning’ in intergroup relations is particularly
relevant here. Tan and Moghaddam (1999) use this concept to make a distinction between actions
which are ‘positioned’ as belonging to an individual and those that are positioned as belonging
to a collective:
In such instances, and particularly when one’s status as having ‘the right to speak
on behalf of’ is formally recognised, a person’s utterances are likely to be taken
as a group commitment, rather than as an individual undertaking. The illocutionary
effect of what is said extends to the group on whose behalf the representative speaks.
(Tan & Moghaddam, 1999)
Thus, the commitments brought about by something uttered by the speaker of the moment,
could, in withholding of dissent from the (possibly side-participant) party co-members, affect the
party as a whole. This chapter is an experimental investigation of the situations in which this
may occur, and of the consequences this may have, for the organisation and structuring of talk,
grounding and the interactional patterns within a group, as implied by the notion of grounding
by proxy.
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5.1.4 Projection of parties and Corresponding Configurations of the
Participation Framework
Lerner (1993) expanded on Schegloff’s notion of parties. He distinguished four ways in which
parties may be projected or made relevant in interaction, depending on whether the speaker or
the recipients are members of the prospective party:
1. Collective Addressing (e.g. ‘you guys’): Speaking to/addressing more than one person as
a party.
2. Collective Speaking (e.g. ‘we’): Speaking for and as a party.
3. Conferring among the members: One member speaking to another member of a party,
concerning the party.
4. Speaking by someone outside a party about the party, addressed to another person outside
the party (e.g. ‘they’).
Since we are, as noted, here mainly concerned with the consequences of party formations
for the organisation and structuring of talk and grounding, we can assume that it is already es-
tablished and relevant. This may have been via the above or something that extends beyond the
specific talk taking place or an ‘extra interactional tie’ as Schegloff (1995) would say (e.g. a
couple, where the couple as a whole is contextually relevant). In any case, the above serve as
guidelines as to the different configurations of the participation framework, determined by an
utterance with respect to which certain obligations need to be fulfilled collectively by the party
as a whole.
In case 1, the party is being addressed by an outsider with a sequence initiating utterance, or
a first pair part (e.g. a question). Here, the party act together to satisfy the obligations imposed
by this first pair part. The producer of the second pair part thus stands proxy for the rest in satis-
fying the obligations imposed by the first pair part. So this case relates to the mutual grounding
responsibilities holding between non-speakers of the moment with respect to something uttered
by the speaker. Note that in this case, a collective address (implicit or explicit) in the sequence
initiating first pair-part is not necessary. The speaker of the sequence initiating utterance may be
addressing a single member or all the members of a party, while the party remains relevant as a
whole. This gives rise to the following sub-cases:
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• 1a: The sequence initiating utterance is addressed to the party as a whole: in this case a
direct addressee self-selects (in terms of turn-taking) and stands proxy for the rest of the
addressees in responding. E.g. dialogue 5.1 above. Note that depending on the content of
the first pair part, it may well be that a response is required from every member.
• 1b: The sequence initiating utterance is addressed to a single member of a party: in this
case the direct addressee stands proxy for the rest - side participants in this case - in
responding.
In case 2 above, one member of the party speaks on behalf of other members of the party.
This can be achieved by the use of the plural first-person pronoun ‘we’ or tacitly via semantic
content. To such an utterance, the rest of the members are side-participants. On this occasion,
this one member, stands proxy for the rest in speaking.
In case 4, analogously to case 1, talk is expected from the party as a whole, where the mem-
bers are at that point all indirect recipients, i.e. a side-participant expected to respond, e.g. when
the side-participant is the butt of a speaker’s joke.
So we are dealing with 4 configurations of the participation framework, with respect to the
utterance which gives rise to the local conversational obligations to be collectively fulfilled.
These are 1a, 1b, 2 and 4. The mutual obligations holding among the members of the party are
between: Addressee/Addressee, Side-participant/Addressee, Side-participant/Speaker and Side-
participant/Side-participant respectively.
If grounding by proxy, as sketched in the previous section is in effect, then in all of the
four cases above, the co-members, are responsible to ‘assist’ or ‘compensate’ in carrying the
conversation forward, if anything goes wrong. Such assistance can either be elicited by the
speaker (a member of the party) holding the floor, or a co-member can interject. The former
certainly gives rise to what Lerner (1993) has called ‘Conferring’ (case 3 above). The latter can
also give rise to conferring among the members but need not (recall dialogue 5.1 above where a
second addressee interjects to answer the question directly without any form of conference with
the co-member). So, case 3 above, apart from being one way in which parties are projected, is
one of the important ways in which grounding by proxy could operate.
But, what experimental evidence is there that grounding by proxy as described above operates
among the members of a party? Or whether such party formations do not fail to have an impact
on the grounding behaviour of its members? In this chapter we will attempt to provide causal
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evidence for the practical reality of parties, expressed as the mutual responsibilities entailed by
our notion of grounding by proxy, that we will show, hold between the members.
Before we can do that however, we need to have some idea about what sorts of contribution
the assistance/compensation on the part of a co-member described above, amounts to. Therefore,
some instances of what we expect these to be, are now in point. At least the last 4 cases below
are instances of ‘conferring’ (case 3 above). The first may or may not be:
• Collaborative Completions or Split Utterances: These are anticipatory completions of
another’s turn/sentence. (cf. Lerner (1991)); in our case by a co-member of a party. Here,
we have 2 sub-cases:
– Both parts of the completed turn may be addressed to an outsider, pertaining specifi-
cally to case 2 above, like the following example:
(5.2)
(1) Dad: we take care of all of our business but any time we go contrary to
any of the rules, here errm [pause]
(2) Carl: ih [we] take a unanimous vote
Adapted from (Lerner, 1993)
– The first part addressed to an outsider, but the second addressed back at the producer
of the first. Here, we would expect the second part to be a check question:
(5.3)
(1) A: So we both had errrm [addressed to an outsider]
(2) B: curry? [addressed to A]
(3) A: oh yeah curry
(4) C: ooo I love curry
• Turn Assignments: These are explicit speaker selections, which here, are either addressed
by the current speaker at a co-member, thereby eliciting help, or addressed by the co-
member at the speaker, thereby reminding them that they need to say more. E.g. ‘John?’
• Other-initiated repair: These are repair initiations addressed by the co-member at the
current speaker, in case they don’t understand what is being said.
• Other-repair: These are repairs done by the co-member on the current speaker’s turn.
This may in fact be one environment where other-repairs may not be dispreferred or at
least less so than in dyadic dialogue, as the current speaker is speaking also on behalf of
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the co-member and hence has the right to modify it directly. But this certainly needs a
separate analysis to be confirmed.
• General discussion/rejection: Similar to other-repairs these are addressed to the cur-
rent speaker by a co-member, thereby initiating discussion/disagreement about what the
speaker is telling a third person outside the party.
5.1.5 Ramifications of Grounding by Proxy for Participant Role Distinctions
Note that if conversational responsibilities are to be indexed to participant status at the level of
the utterance (which is roughly the idea entertained by Clark and Schaefer (1992)), then ground-
ing by proxy if operative at any level, would mean that we need to distinguish between the
status of those who fall outside a party and those inside. In other words, we need to distinguish
between currently ‘active’ vs.. ‘passive’ side participants and hence recognise degrees of pe-
ripherality. This is because a person outside a party has a different stance (as Goffman would
say) to the current utterance. The (grounding) behaviour expected from them would be differ-
ent. Moreover and crucially for models of multi-party dialogue context, this should determine
the assumptions made by the currently active participants (speaker/addressee) about the level of
understanding achieved by the side-participants; viz. whereas withholding of repair/rejection
from an ‘active’/‘concerned’ side-participant would be taken by others as positive evidence of
understanding/acceptance, for passive bystanders (e.g. the Healey and Mills (2006) peripheral
participants) this isn’t necessarily so.
In this chapter, the aim is to test the idea of grounding by proxy experimentally, in order to
see whether such mutual responsibilities are actually in effect between co-members of a party.
We therefore attempt to create experimentally a situation where a party is projected via the goals
of the task. As will become apparent shortly, our experimental manipulations are such that the
members of the party will be faced with situations corresponding at least to cases 1a and 1b
above. Hence our experiment counts as a test of whether non-speakers of the moment - who are
members of one party - are responsible as a whole to satisfy the constraints/obligations imposed
by the speaker’s first pair-part; i.e. whether one non-speaker can stand proxy for another, in
responding to or grounding something uttered by the speaker.
Note that the local, utterance-level compensatory devices described above, aren’t what we’re
solely concerned with. It may well be that failures by one party member to address a contex-
tual obligation at hand leads to a global effect, at the conversational level, in other co-members’
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behaviours. For example, such failures by A might reduce other co-members’ confidence in A’s
ability to address the issues under discussion, thus causing a change in the overall balance of these
others’ participation in the dialogue. As such, this analysis is not limited to the mutual responsi-
bilities holding among the party members at a local level, but more broadly that of the effect of
one member’s difficulty to ground, on the conversational context in general and accordingly on
the subsequent behaviour of others.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Task and Materials
The experiment reported here, uses an on-line 3-person variant of the Maze Task used in studies
of semantic coordination (e.g. (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Healey & Mills, 2006)).
The Maze Task
The original task involves a pair of participants who go through a sequence of 12 mazes, one
pair of mazes at a time (one maze for each participant). The mazes are based on a 7x7 grid of
nodes/locations, but with different configurations of these nodes for each instance of the maze
(see e.g. Figure 5.3). For each maze, some points on the grid are instantiated as nodes while
some remain empty. Each node is potentially connected to an adjacent node via a path which
in turn may be blocked by a gate. Some nodes are coloured in grey which designates them as
switches. On each maze, theres a unique finish point marked by a red X. A cursor indicates
to each participant where (s)he currently is on the maze. They can move around on the maze
using the arrow keys. The mazes in each pair, received by the two participants at each stage,
are identical in shape, i.e. they have the same configuration of nodes. However, the positions
of switches, gates and the finish point are different on the two mazes. Furthermore, nothing
on a participant’s maze indicates where the other participant is. Each pair of mazes is solved
when both participants reach their finish points. In order to get there, they need to open the
gates at various stages to pass through. The gates on participant 1’s maze will open if participant
2 goes on participant 1’s switch and vice versa. But recall that the position of switches are
different on the two mazes. So participant 1 needs to communicate the position of his switches
to participant 2 and vice versa. This creates the recurrent need for the participants to collaborate
and communicate maze locations to one another in order to navigate through the mazes.
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Our variant
The experiments reported here use an online 3-person variant of the maze task just described.
Two of the participants are randomly assigned to the Duo role. This means that they are in the
same ‘team’, as the mazes that they receive at each stage are absolutely identical in all respects
(see Figures 5.1, 5.2); viz. they have identical shapes, the same switch, gate and finish positions.
The third participant is assigned to the Solo role. The Solo receives the same maze - in terms
of shape - but with different switch, gate and finish positions (see Figure 5.3). The gates on the
Duos’ mazes will all open if the Solo goes on any of their switches. The gates on the Solo’s maze
will open if the Duo are both on one of his switches at the same time. The task thus ensures that
the Duo must co-ordinate their actions with each other as well as with the Solo to be successful.
Each maze is solved if all three reach their finish points. Communication between the participants
is via the DiET Toolkit described below.
5.2.2 The DiET Experimental Toolkit
This is a custom built Java application which allows 2 or more participants to communicate via a
shared chat window similar to proprietary instant messaging systems2. The display is split into an
upper window, a status bar and a lower window (see e.g. Figure 5.4 below). The upper window
displays the ongoing conversation, and the lower window is used for typing. All keys pressed
are recorded and relayed to the server where they are time-stamped and stored. The status bar, a
prominent single line of text that is controlled by the server indicates whether other participants
are currently typing.
Everything that the participants say to each other, passes through the DiET server. The
server stores all the relevant details about the utterances sent, including timing and structural
information (the turns can be parsed in real-time on the server). The server provides fine-grained,
character by character control over what each participant can see on their chat window. Different
experimental manipulations or interventions can be programmed, as appropriate, into the server.
These range from changing the apparent origin or the content of a real turn sent by a participant,
to sending fake probe questions to a participant which appear to originate from another and
capturing the participant’s response. All of this can be carried out without being noticed by the
participants (see Healey, Purver, King, Ginzburg, and Mills (2003) for a detailed description of
this technique). Moreover, like the maze game described above, different experimental tasks can
2http://www.dcs.qmul.ac.uk/resrarch/imc/diet/index.php
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Figure 5.1: Duo 1 Maze Figure 5.2: Duo 2 Maze
be programmed into the server. This allows task-level events to be detected and used to trigger
interventions.
The DiET toolkit has been used successfully in a number of experimental studies of semantic
coordination in dialogue including Healey and Mills (2006); Mills and Healey (2006).
Figure 5.3: Solo Maze
5.2.3 Experimental Design
The experiments were run in 2 conditions: Normal and Downgrade. For each round of the
experiment, the 3 participants were assigned to one of these conditions at random, resulting in a
between-subjects design.
In the Normal condition there were no manipulations or interventions by the server. So all
the participants saw the dialogue turns exactly as they were originally typed.
In the downgrade condition on the other hand, each dialogue turn sent by a member of the
Duo team, is analysed in real-time by a module on the DiET server, checking if it contains any
strong grounding cues such as ‘ok’, ‘yes’, ‘yeah’, ‘yep’ etc. In every other turn from the Duo
detected thus, the cue is ‘downgraded’ to a provisional form of acceptance such as ‘erm’, ‘err’,
5.2. Method 123
Figure 5.4: Duo 1 Chat Client Figure 5.5: Duo 2 Chat Client
‘uurrm’ etc: the grounding cue is replaced by any one of these provisional acceptances at random,
while the rest of the turn remains the same. The resulting turn is then sent to the other member
of the Duo team instead of the original utterance. The Solo sees each turn as it is, unchanged; i.e.
he isnt exposed to any of the downgrades (see Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6).
Figure 5.6: Solo Chat Client
The design of the experiment as described, is such that from the outset, the Duo are in a team,
by virtue of the fact that they have identical mazes in all respects, and the same objectives locally
and globally. At different stages, they need to describe their switch positions to the Solo (they
have the same switches) and when they’re at the receiving end, they both need to understand the
location descriptions given by the Solo and act accordingly (they both need to go on his switch
simultaneously to open the gates on the Solo’s Maze). The duo thus have the opportunity to act
for each other in their interactions with the Solo because they share some information (e.g. both
know whether their gates are open or closed, both know where their switch points are). This also
means that if one of them fails to do this, the others local objective (namely to open the gates for
the Solo) is also compromised, and hence should (by hypothesis) try to repair the problem. The
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downgrades of the strong grounding cues by the Duos create a situation where one Duo falsely
believes that the other is having problems understanding or acting on what was just said by the
Solo. As noted in the introduction, this creates a situation where a non-speaker of the moment
(one of the Duos) is faced with the false belief that another (the other Duo), could not satisfy
- via producing an appropriate response - the obligations imposed by the speaker’s (the Solo)
utterance.
5.2.4 Participants
84 participants were recruited from among undergraduate and postgraduate students from var-
ious disciplines at Queen Mary, University of London. 45 were male, 39 were female. The
experiments took approximately 60 minutes to complete and each was paid 7 pounds for taking
part.
5.2.5 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Duo and Solo roles. They were given written and oral
instructions about the task together and had an opportunity to ask questions about the procedure.
They were then seated in separate rooms, each at a desk with a PC displaying the appropriate task
window (Figure 5.3 for the Solo and Figures 5.1, 5.2 for the Duos) and the chat client window
(e.g. Figure 5.6). They solved as many mazes as they could in one hour and were then debriefed
about the experimental manipulations together.
5.3 Hypotheses and Coding
The principal question for this analysis is whether the downgrades (‘errm’ etc.) of the strong
grounding cues coming from one Duo (henceforth downgraded-duo) as seen by the other (hence-
forth non-downgraded-duo), have had any effect:
1. locally? Does the non-downgraded-duo do anything immediately to compensate for the
apparent trouble the downgraded-duo is having in responding appropriately to what was
just said? If so, what form does this compensation take? i.e. what are the devices used?
2. and globally? How do the downgrades impact the behaviour of the participants overall?
This will be revealed through a comparison of the frequency of different phenomena in the
normal and the downgrade conditions.
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As noted, the duo have the opportunity to act for each other in their interactions with the Solo
because they share some information (e.g. both know whether their gates are open or closed, both
know where their switch points are). By hypothesis, if they are acting as a party, responses by
one member of the Duo ought, all things being equal, be considered to stand proxy for responses
by the other member of the Duo.
5.3.1 Initial Predictions
Before the experiment was carried out, the following predictions were made as to what the effects
of the downgrades would be:
1. If one member of the Duo (apparently) downgrades their level of grounding this ought to
degrade grounding for the Duo as a whole (note that only the other member of the Duo
is exposed to the downgrade. The Solo receives the original, unaltered turn.). In other
words we’d expect the downgrades (‘errm’, ‘err’ etc.) to be taken as collective by the non-
downgraded-duo. The uncertainty created by the downgrade should, all things being equal,
lead to fewer explicit acknowledgements by the Duo team in the downgrade condition, as
the Duo would go on to repair the problem instead of producing an acknowledgement.
2. The Duos will, in order to deal with the uncertainty created by the downgrade, do more
clarification interaction and ask more questions in the downgrade condition.
3. If we take a turn by a Duo to stand proxy for the other, then we expect that when grounding
is apparently downgraded, the other Duo will compensate by producing a turn that he
would not have otherwise. Therefore, we’d expect an overall increase in the number of
turns by the Duos in the downgrade condition.
5.3.2 Post-hoc Analyses/predictions
In order to provide more support for the hypothesis and to rule out alternative explanations, after
the experiment was concluded and the data analysis carried out with respect to the predicted
patterns just mentioned, the following predictions were also made. The results of all the analyses
(initial and post-hoc) will be reported together in the next section.
1. As discussed, grounding by proxy, if operative, entails that if one party member fails to
ground a contribution, this would, in many instances, lead to direct interaction between or
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‘conferring’ among the party members, in order to repair the problem. Thus, we’d expect
the downgrades to lead to ‘extra’ direct interactions, or conferring among the Duo team
in the downgrade condition, which means that we would expect more cases of explicit
address by a Duo to the other Duo in the downgrade condition.
2. Recall case 2, in the introduction, of the ways in which, Lerner (1993) argues, parties
may be projected: the use of the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’ where the scope of the
pronoun is the members of the party. If the Duo are acting and see themselves as a party,
we would expect more frequent uses of this pronoun by the Duo than the Solo overall, i.e.
we’d expect an effect of task role on the frequency of use of this pronoun.
Importantly, in order to show that the Duo are acting as a party, we also need to show that
the Duo behave differently overall, and that the effect of the downgrades on the Duos’ behaviour
is different from that on the Solo’s; specifically that the Duo compensate differently and more
than the Solo in downgrade condition, in terms of the above. Note that Solos weren’t directly
exposed to the downgrade. We would nonetheless expect the downgrades to have an effect on
their behaviour too, as the Solo will be exposed to the change in the behaviour of the Duo caused
by the downgrade.
5.3.3 Coding
In line with the above predictions, each turn in the dialogue transcript was coded for the following
dialogue phenomena:
• Explicit Address: Turns were coded for whether they contained explicit address cues
(names of the participants). In particular if the turn contained an address cue, it was coded
for whether the turn was addressed to the Solo or to a Duo.
• Explicit Acknowledgements/Grounding Cues: Turns were coded for whether they con-
tained such cues. These were essentially the same cues that were downgraded.
• Question Marks: Turns were coded as to whether they contained any question marks (mul-
tiple question marks in the same turn count as 1).
• Clarification Requests (CR): Turns were also coded for whether they were explicitly asking
a clarification question about a previous turn.
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• The use of the first-person plural pronoun ‘we’: All turns were coded as to whether they
contained this pronoun. In addition, the uses of the pronoun were coded for scope, i.e. who
they were referring to. This was almost always quite clear from either the content of the
turn being considered, or from the preceding or following turns, as the structure of the task
and the arrangements of the Mazes were also known at the time of analysis. For example,
the ‘we’ in “we need you to open our gates first”, cannot be referring to all 3 but refers to
the Duo exclusively. In ambiguous cases, as noted, the turns that preceded the use of the
pronoun and those that followed it, revealed what the participants had taken the scope of
the pronoun to be. The uses of this pronoun had generally 2 scopes:
– Duo Scope: ‘we’ used by a member of the Duo to refer to both of them, e.g. “we
[the Duo] need you [the Solo] to open our gates now”
– Triadic Scope: Used both by the Solo and the Duo to refer to all 3 of them, e.g. “we
have to come up with a system”
5.4 Results
There were a total of 28 Triads: 14 in the downgrade condition and 14 in the normal. Two triads
were removed from the analysis. Triad 4 was cut off mid-experiment as the participants had to
leave. Triad 17 required additional instruction and clearly didn’t understand the task. They are
therefore ignored. This left 26 triads, 13 in each condition.
Exact probabilities are reported but in all cases a criterion level of p < 0.05 was adopted.
5.4.1 Local Compensatory Devices: Some Examples
There were a few instances of the downgrades which had explicit, observable local effects. In
particular, the downgrades had an explicit local effect if the downgraded acknowledgement was
stand-alone, that is, when the whole turn was just an acknowledgement. This is expected, since
turns which contain acknowledgements followed by something else, say a description, were ac-
tually ‘doing the work’ even when the acknowledgement contained within the turn was down-
graded. For example: “Ok go to your goal now.” would become “errr go to your goal now”,
which still doesn’t really manifest an acute problem. So the other Duo who sees the turn as
downgraded would be unlikely to do much about it.
Below are some examples of the explicit, local compensatory devices employed by the non-
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downgraded-duo, in ‘assisting’ the downgraded-duo in collectively carrying the conversation
forward.
Clarification
(5.4)
(1) Pak (Solo): Im constrained to the top
(2) Dan (Duo): Ok. [Bhups sees this as uuh]
(3) Bhups (Duo): What? [to Dan]
Paraphrase
(5.5)
(1) Zee (Solo): You gotta tell me where your other switch is. Open my gate so
I can go find another switch. Because the other switch might be
inside my gate.
(2) Sukh (Duo): Ok. [Sim sees this as errm . . .]
(3) Sim (Duo): Sukh, I think we have to tell Zee where our second switch is
Repeat/Emphasis
(5.6)
(1) Bhups (Duo): Dan, shall we go to goal
(2) Pak (Solo): wheres dan
(3) Pak (Solo): go to goal now
(4) Dan (Duo): yes [Bhups sees this as errr]
(5) Bhups (Duo): dan, Im going to the goal
Elliptical turn assignment
(5.7)
(1) Milanista: ilhaam are yuour gates row 5 C3, and R4 C3?
(2) Illy: Ye [Malinista sees this as errr . .]
(3) Milanista: not gates sworry, switches
(4) Milanista: grey boxes
(5) Andz: erm... mine are
(6) Milanista: ilhaam??
(7) Illy: I said ye if you read
As is evident, all of the above are instances of pair-wise direct interactions between the Duos.
As we will see below, this is in fact a systematic effect of the downgrades.
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Before we present the statistics, some terms need defining:
A Maze Move is a task-level event, referring to the successful moving of the cursor - indi-
cating the participant’s current position on the maze - by a participant, using the arrow keys on
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Normal Condition Downgrade Condition
Total Number of Maze Moves 11686 9745
Total Number of Turns 5986 6179
Average Number of Mazes Attempted 9.31 7.38
Average Turns per Maze 49.45 64.4
Average Moves per Maze 96.55 101.57
Average Moves per Turn 1.95 1.58
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics
the keyboard, from one square on the maze to another adjacent one, e.g. moving the cursor two
squares to the left and one up counts as three Maze Moves.
A (dialogue) Turn is a sequence of characters typed, followed by the return key, at which
point the turn is packaged and sent to the server for processing (usually dispatched immediately
to the rest of the participants).
Table 5.1 shows the overall descriptive statistics for the basic performance and task measures.
Not included in that table is, relevant to our 3rd initial prediction above, that there was a 3%
increase in the total number of turns produced by the Duos in the downgrade condition, while
there was a 3% drop in the number of turns by the Solos in the downgrade condition. But as
we will see shortly, this difference is not statistically significant because of the high variability of
number of turns across different triads and mazes. Nevertheless, it is a trend in the right direction,
suggesting that the Duos work harder than the Solo to compensate for the uncertainty created as
a result of the downgrades.
5.4.3 Basic Contrasts of Normal and Downgrade Conditions
Performance and Task Measures
For the parametric tests of task performance triad 57 were also excluded as an outlier on the
basis that the total number of moves they made was more than two standard deviations from the
mean thus significantly reducing the statistical power of the parametric tests. Note that they are
included for the non-parametric tests on response types reported below.
Inspection of the frequency distribution of average moves per maze by each participant
showed a positively skewed distribution (Skewness = 1.68). To reduce any distortion from this
effect log10 of moves per maze (Skewness = 0.47) were used for inferential analysis. This showed
a main effect of Condition (F(1,71) = 9.41, p = 0.00) but no main effect of Role (F(1,71) = 0.00,
p = 0.96) and no Role × Condition interaction (F(1,71) = 0.00, p = 0.95). Participants in the
Downgrade condition made on average 17 moves per maze (SD = 14.7) whereas participants in
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None Grounding Cues Totals
Downgrade Condition 5349 830 6179
Normal Condition 5026 960 5986
Total 10375 1790 12165
Table 5.2: Explicit Acknowledgements/Grounding Cues
the Normal condition made on average 7.1 moves per maze (SD = 4.13).
The number of turns used by each individual on each maze was averaged and entered in a two
factor analysis of variance with Condition (Downgrade vs. Normal) and Role (Duo vs. Solo) as
between-subjects factors. This showed a main effect of condition (F(1,71) = 9.37, p = 0.00) but
no main effect of Role ( F(1,71) = 0.78, p = 0.38) and no interaction ( F(1,71) = 0.00, p = 0.97). In
the Downgrade condition participants used on average 22.5 turns per maze (SD = 13.6) whereas
in the Normal condition participants used on average 16.76 turns per maze (SD = 9.13).
Frequency of Explicit Grounding Cues in Normal Vs. Downgrade Conditions (Table
5.2):
The overall frequency of explicit grounding cues in turns in the Downgrade condition was
slightly lower (13% of turns) than in the Normal condition (16%). This difference was reliable
(Chi2(1) = 16.44, p(two− tailed) = 0.00).
Frequency of Use of Question Marks in Normal vs. Downgrade Conditions:
As noted, turns were coded for whether they contained one or more question marks (multiple
instances were scored as 1). There is no reliable difference in the overall frequency of use of ques-
tion marks in turns in the Normal and Downgrade conditions (Chi2(1) = 0.69, p(two− tailed) =
0.79, but see below for the frequency of use of question marks across different roles).
Frequency of Use of Clarification Requests (CR) in Normal Vs. Downgrade Conditions:
No reliable difference was found in the use of CRs in Normal vs. Downgrade conditions
(Chi2(1) = 4.10, p(two− tailed) = 0.52).
5.4. Results 131
No Address Address Totals
Downgrade Condition 5420 759 6179
Normal Condition 5374 612 5986
Total 10794 1371 12165
Table 5.3: Frequency of Explicit Address
Frequency of Use of Explicit Address in Normal vs. Downgrade Conditions (Table 5.3):
As noted, inspection of the dialogues also led to a post-hoc hypothesis that there would be
more frequent use of explicit address in the downgrade condition as participants work to re-
establish common ground by making it explicit who their turns are addressed to. The frequency
of use of explicit forms of address in the Downgrade condition was slightly higher (12% of
turns) than in the Normal Condition (10% of turns). This difference was reliable (Chi2(1) = 12.89,
p(two− tailed) = 0.00).
Overall, in the Downgrade condition there are fewer explicit grounding cues, no differences
in use of question marks and slightly more frequent use of explicit address. These results show
that the manipulation had an overall effect. However, in order to test the grounding by proxy
hypothesis we need to look at the specific effects of the manipulation on the different roles.
5.4.4 Comparing the Effects of Roles
Several additional analyses were carried out to test whether the the downgrade manipulation had
a different impact on the Duo and Solo roles.
Frequency of Use of Explicit Grounding Cues by Duo and Solo in Normal vs. Down-
grade Conditions (Table 5.4):
In the normal condition, each of the three participants produces roughly the same number
of explicit acknowledgements or grounding cues, e.g. ‘ok’, ‘yes’, ‘yeah’ etc. In the Downgrade
condition this distribution changes. Solos continue to produce essentially the same number of
grounding cues (321 vs. 324) but the members of the Duo produce significantly fewer (639 vs.
506, Chi2(1) = 6.05, p(two− tailed) = 0.02). There is thus a significant drop in the frequency of
explicit acknowledgements / grounding signals by participants in the Duo role, in the downgrade
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Duo Solo Totals
Downgrade Condition 506 324 830
Normal Condition 639 321 960
Total 1145 645 1790
Table 5.4: Explicit Acknowledgements/Grounding Cues
Duo Solo Totals
Downgrade Condition 345 324 669
Normal Condition 450 207 657
Total 795 531 1326
Table 5.5: Use of Question Marks
condtition.
Frequency of Use of Question Marks by Duo and Solo in Normal vs. Downgrade Con-
ditions (Table 5.5):
In the normal condition all three participants use roughly equal numbers of question marks.
However, in the Downgrade condition the balance changes with Duo participants producing reli-
ably fewer explicit questions and the Solo participants producing more (Chi2(1) = 39.54, p(two−
tailed) = 0.00).
Frequency of CRs: There is no reliable difference in the frequency of CRs produced by Duo
or Solo in the two conditions (Chi2(1) = 0.06, p(two− tailed) = 0.81).
Frequency of Use of Explicit Address Cues Taking into account who the turn is ad-
dressed to:
Post-hoc comparison of the frequency of use of explicit forms of address by the Duo and So-
los in the two conditions reveals no significant difference (Chi2(1) = 2.93, p(two−tailed) = 0.09).
This means that the overall increase in the use of explicit address in the downgrade condition is
evenly distributed across the Duo and the Solo Roles.
However, we have not so far considered who the addressee of the turns containing the ad-
dress cues are. Table 5.6 shows the distribution of address cues across conditions, according
to whether they were produced by the Duo or the Solo and whom (what role) they were ad-
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Duo Solo Totals
Downgrade Condition 295 366 661
Normal Condition 203 310 513
Totals 498 676 1174
Table 5.6: Explicit Addressees By Role
dressed to. An additional post-hoc analysis shows that there are reliably more Duo to Duo ad-
dress cues in the downgrade condition although this is a more marginal effect (Fisher’s exact test,
p(one− tailed) = 0.04).
Note that when the Solo uses an address cue she would always be addressing a (single) Duo.
If we consider this together with the increase in the Duo to Duo address cues in the downgrade
condition, we can infer that the downgrades result in more direct interaction between the three
individual participants.
Frequency of Use of the Plural First-Person Pronoun ‘we’ by Duos vs. Solo:
To test whether Duo participants produce more instances of ‘we’ than Solo participants a
Mann-Whitney within-subjects test of the frequency of use of ‘we’ by each participant was car-
ried out. This showed a significant effect (Mann-Whitney U = 151, p = 0.00). Each Duo par-
ticipant produced an average of 7.23 uses of ’we’ (SD = 4.3) in contrast each Solo participant
produced and average of only 2.1 uses of ‘we’ (SD = 1.3).
To test whether the Duo participants use more ‘we’s with scope over only the Duos vs. ‘we’s
with triadic scope over a within-subjects Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was performed on the num-
ber of times each participant’s produced a ‘we’ of each kind. This showed a reliable difference
(Z = -5.19, p = 0.00). Duo participants produce on average 5.7 (SD = 4.0) ‘we’s that refer to the
Duo and 1.7 (SD = 1.7) that refer to the triad as a whole.
To sum up then, the post-hoc analysis of the use of the plural first-person pronoun, shows
a large and reliable predominance in the use of ‘we’ by Duo participants compared to Solo
participants. Moreover, there’s also a large and reliable predominance of ‘Duo Scope’ over
‘Triadic Scope’ ‘we’s by the Duos.
5.5 Discussion
There seems to be clear evidence that the downgrades affect the behaviour of participants in both
the Duo and the Solo roles.
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Measures of task performance show that overall, the participants performed worse in the
downgrade condition than in the normal condition. In the downgrade condition, participants in
both the Duo and Solo roles, made significantly more maze moves on each maze attempted.
They also produced significantly more dialogue turns during each maze. This suggests that the
net effect of the downgrades was to make the participants work harder to complete each maze.
There was, however, no Role × Condition interaction, meaning that the participants in Duo and
Solo roles, were equally affected by the downgrades.
On the measure of number of turns and maze moves, then, there is no difference in how the
downgrades affect the participants’ behaviour in Duo and Solo roles. This is not inconsistent
with the grounding by proxy hypothesis, as the differences between the behaviour of participants
in these roles, are reflected in the types of turn produced by Duos and the Solo, rather than merely
the number of turns produced.
5.5.1 Failure to Ground by One Duo Depresses the Level of Grounding by
the Duo Team as a Whole
Duo participants follow the predicted pattern. The drop in use of explicit grounding cues in the
downgrade condition is exclusively due to changes in the behaviour of the members of the Duo.
If one member of the Duo appears to ground less this has the effect of depressing the level of
grounding by the Duo as a whole. The behaviour of the Solo is, on this measure, unaffected. This
provides evidence that if one member of the Duo displays apparently weaker levels of grounding
then the other member does too. The downgrades are taken by the Duos as collective.3
In effect, the uncertainty created about one participant’s grounding level by the downgrades
manipulation becomes shared by the other (Duo) participant. But, even though this is then trans-
mitted to the Solo (although they arent exposed to the downgrades, they are exposed to the overall
reduction in grounding cues they cause) this does not affect the Solos use of explicit grounding
cues.
As noted, this reduction in level of grounding does not, as we might intuitively expect, lead
to an increase in explicit queries and checks of position by Duo participants (as indexed by Ques-
tion marks). These turn types are, in fact, less frequent for Duo participants. In addition, there is
no difference in their frequency of use of clarification requests, either in the downgrade condition
3Note that the opposite could be true - they could compensate by taking the initiative more, asking
more questions, doing more explicit grounding.
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overall nor by the Duo participants relative to the Solo participants in the downgrade condition.
This suggests that where grounding appears to become uncertain for one of the Duo participants
the other participant does not try to compensate for this through more explicit repair. This sug-
gests either a reliance on more ‘indirect’ mechanisms for dealing with, or possibly avoiding these
problems. One possible explanation for this unexpected effect is this: the ‘extra’ coordination
between the Duo provoked by the downgrades means that potential questions and coordination
problems which in the normal condition arise later on between the Duos, never arise explicitly in
the downgrade condition, as they are addressed/answered as a result of the downgrades, earlier
from the outset without having been raised/asked explicitly; hence fewer questions by the Duo in
the downgrade condition.
5.5.2 Patterns of Direct Interaction
The tendency to use explicit forms of address is not different for the Duo or Solo participants.
The overall increase in explicit address in the downgrade condition is therefore evenly distributed
across the task roles. However, if we take into account the addressees of these turns, then we
find, as predicted, that in the downgrade condition, the Duos address one another explicitly more
frequently than in the normal condition. The Solo, too, addresses each individual Duo more
frequently in the downgrade condition. This means, as noted, that the downgrades result in more
direct pair-wise interactions between the three individuals.
This suggests that under ‘normal’ circumstances, that is, in the absence of grounding fail-
ures, a Duo can ground on behalf of the other. However, all things being equal, as grounding
is degraded for one of them, this temporarily breaks the Duo team apart such that both the Solo
and Duo participants treat each Duo as a single individual rather than the two of them as a
party, leading to more pair-wise grounding between the Duos. As the uncertainty created by the
downgrades becomes shared by the Duos and subsequently revealed to the Solo, leads to more
pair-wise grounding between the Solo and each Duo separately. The Duos try to re-establish
intra-party grounding, as predicted, via extra ‘conferring’ or direct interactions between them-
selves; and the Solo tries to re-establish grounding between himself and each Duo separately and
individually. This supports the grounding by proxy hypothesis, in that in the absence of negative
feedback from ‘the proxy’, grounding seems to operate between the party as a whole and those
outside with whom the party is interacting. Failures to ground by a member however, lead to
more pair-wise grounding between the party members themselves and between each individual
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member and those with whom the party is interacting. The party is ‘broken apart’ temporarily,
as a result of the downgrades, both from the perspective of the party members themselves (the
Duos) and those outside (the Solo).
Note that all the local examples except the first one, presented above, also contain Duo to
Duo address cues.
Considered together, there is evidence that one important configuration of the participation
framework, in which the mutual grounding responsibilities between the members of a party are
made manifest, is, as predicted, through such ‘extra’ conferring or direct intra-party interactions
or grounding among the members.
5.5.3 The Duo Act and See Themselves as a Party
As noted in the introduction, one of the ways in which parties are projected is via the use of the
plural first-person pronoun, with scope exclusively over the party members. We hypothesised
that this should also be one of the ways in which parties already projected and relevant are made
manifest.
The significant difference between the frequency of use of the plural first-person ‘we’ by the
Duo and Solo, together with the predominance of Duo scope ‘we’s by the Duos in both condi-
tions, clearly shows that the Duo are seeing themselves and acting as a single party. On many
occasions, an utterance by a Duo, in which this pronoun (or the possessive/objective counter-
parts, namely, ‘our’/‘us’) is used, is not repeated by the other Duo (proxy in speaking as per the
introduction). The relevant information is already conveyed through one utterance alone. That
is, these utterances stand proxy for whatever the other Duo has to say (e.g. “our switch is on the
top left”). Also, where such utterances are produced in response to an utterance by the Solo, this
is also taken to stand proxy for the other Duo’s response (e.g. “Solo: Did your gates open? Duo
1: no. we’re still stuck.”, proxy in response). Often, the other Duo would not say anything as
it would clearly be redundant. Note also, that since the Duo are publicly known by all to have
always exactly the same maze and the same maze/gate status, the use of any form of this pronoun
is often not even necessary; for example: “Solo: Did your gates open? Duo 1: no still closed”.
The other Duo in this case would often not repeat this, as the utterance equally applies to her
maze.
This result supports the hypothesis that the Duos act as a unified aggregate, or a party, such
that an utterance from one member, whether in response to a Solo’s first pair-part, or as a first
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pair-part itself, can stand proxy for what the other Duo has to say.
5.5.4 Solo’s Compensation: Irreducible Collective States
The Solo participants’ grounding behaviour, in terms of explicit grounding cues, doesn’t appear
to change in the downgrade condition. However, it is clear that they are sensitive to the ma-
nipulation since their use of question marks reliably increases. This is a situation in which the
effect of the downgrades is propagated, such that the Solo is affected indirectly, partly as he loses
‘confidence’ in the Duo as a team, because of their ‘extra’ coordination problems, lack of explicit
grounding, indecision and conferring (which, unlike the downgrades themselves, are visible to
the Solo). Moreover, the downgrades affect the way the Solo treats the Duo. Whereas in the
normal condition he seems to treat them as a party, interacting with them as a whole, in the
downgrade condition, he treats them more as individuals, thus addressing them individually.
If such dialogues resulted in states of understanding, reducible to their component dyadic
interactions, we would expect the Solo not to be affected at all as he is not directly exposed to
the downgrades. This shows that such multi-party dialogues result in dialogue contexts that are
more than can be predicted by considering the prior dyadic interactions alone, thus providing
experimental support for our conclusion about the resulting irreducible collective contexts or
states of understanding in the previous chapter.
Considered together, these findings strongly support the grounding by proxy hypothesis,
namely that the Duo act as a party and that the ‘principal axis’ of the dialogue is between the
Solo and the Duo as a whole rather than between the three individual participants; i.e. the re-
sults indicate that grounding, like turn-taking, could, modulo grounding ‘failures’ by ‘the proxy’,
operate not between individuals but between parties as higher order entities. These results also
constitute causal evidence, hitherto absent from the literature on multi-party dialogues, for the
practical reality of parties.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter constitutes an attempt to operationalise the Principle of Responsibility coupled with
Schegloff’s notion of parties in multi-party conversations. We proposed that in conversations
where 2 or more participants form a party with respect to the local communication task at hand,
the party as a whole is responsible to carry the conversation forward, and that its members act
as a unified aggregate in doing this. In this manner, one member can stand proxy for the other
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members in grounding/carrying the conversation forward, while the rest of the (momentarily
silent) members are at no disadvantage in terms of grounding: Grounding by Proxy. Accordingly,
the contextual increments arising from a dialogue move/action by one party member, can, in the
absence of negative feedback from other members, affect the party as a whole.
We provided causal, experimental evidence for the practical reality of parties, characterised
via the notion of Grounding by Proxy. We showed experimentally that this entails a set of mutual
grounding responsibilities between the members of a party. Namely, that on the occasion that
one of the members fails to satisfy the constraints imposed locally by the current context of the
conversation, then the others will compensate in doing this as this failure to ground becomes
shared by the party as a whole. The conversation cannot move forward until the issue is resolved
among the party members. This is done either through more direct pair-wise grounding among
the party members or through direct pair-wise interactions between those with whom the party
is interacting and each individual party member. We highlighted a set of devices that the party
members might use to re-establish intra-party grounding and the corresponding configurations of
the participation framework in which this may occur.
Furthermore, our conclusion from the previous chapter, namely that such dialogues lead
to collective states of understanding not reducible to their component dyadic interactions, was
supported experimentally.
Importantly, the results presented here suggest that if conversational responsibilities are to
be indexed to participatory status in multi-party dialogues, we need to distinguish between the
status of the (ratified) participants who fall inside and those who fall outside of the parties lo-
cally projected, active and interacting, and that this should determine the level of understand-
ing/acceptance that these participants, in withholding of feedback, are assumed to have reached.
Let’s call these primary and peripheral participants respectively. We will have occasion to refer
to them as such in the rest of this thesis.
But note that in normal, everyday conversation, the parties determined thus, are in a constant
state of flux as the conversation moves forward, since party formation seems to be strongly tied to
topic and every topic is potentially different. In the grounding criterion: “. . . to a degree sufficient
for current purposes” (Clark & Schaefer, 1989), the ‘degree’ is therefore in a constant state of
flux, in terms (at least) of who needs to give evidence of understanding/respond. Whether party
formations are really tied to topic as suggested, is one of the themes of subsequent chapters. We
will not dwell any more on this here.
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Note that what we’ve argued in this chapter does not really answer the question of what is
constitutive of parties. What are the necessary relations that should hold between the information
states of a set of participants, and a given topic for them to be regarded as belonging to a single
party with respect to that topic? This is an important open question that has not been addressed
here. We have not, in other words, defined parties, but have assumed rather that they are projected
and relevant, and have analysed the effects or manifestations rather than the reasons or causes of
party formations.
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Chapter 6
Distinguishing Dialogue Contexts
6.1 Introduction
Theories of human interaction use the notion of ‘conversation’ as a basic building block. It is sup-
posed to group together the sets of people, utterances, gestures or other communicative signals
which are considered together in an analysis. In the case of two-person, dyadic interactions this
choice is relatively unproblematic. However, in gatherings of three or more people the bound-
aries between conversations become both more important for understanding the structure of the
unfolding interaction and more difficult to track.
In section 3.2.4, we elaborated on how the methodological difficulty of characterising the
boundaries of conversation as a unit, has lead researchers to focus on what Goffman (1963) has
called ‘focused interactions’. Conversation as a unit has been equated with focused interaction
(e.g. (Goodwin, 1981)), and delineated typically in terms of physical criteria that are intended to
capture who the ratified participants are. In this regard, we highlighted Goffman (1981)’s defini-
tion of conversation in terms of physical orientation, movement and the use of ‘ritual brackets’,
which can mark the boundaries of interaction. Furthermore, we alluded in several places to
Kendon (1990)’s descriptions of more subtle ways in which people use body position and ori-
entation to maintain interactional units or ‘F-formations’. An F-formation is also, effectively, a
ratificational device (recall the discussion of ratification in section 3.2.8).
Nevertheless, as exemplified in section 3.2.4, the characterisations of conversation as a unit
in terms of the set of ratified participants, alluded to above, are contradicted in discontinuous
strands of interaction when conversational contexts are ‘left open’ - questions left unresolved -
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and taken up later on; in the sense that what you say later on, counts as ‘pragmatically next’ or
a second pair part, to what was said before the conversation was ‘broken’, e.g. in multi-focus
gatherings where one person may be a participant in more than one parallel conversation. This
will become clearer shortly below when we look at some more corpus examples.
In this chapter, we present experimental evidence that even within a single, focused multi-
party conversation, more than one dialogue context can emerge as a result of fluctuations in
different participants’ levels of involvement. These contexts, we propose, are more fine-grained
than any ‘interactional unit’ defined solely in terms of who the ratified participants are and are
also independent of topic.
As we will discuss in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis, our findings here, have
important ramifications for formal and computational theories of discourse and dialogue that
aim to characterise syntactic and semantic dependencies across multiple turns and resolve the
meaning of elliptical expressions accordingly (e.g. Ginzburg’s KoS sketched in section 2.7.1).
In order to achieve this, it is critical for these theories to be able to specify what constitutes the
shared context for a conversation.
6.1.1 Ellipsis as window on shared context
As we showed in chapter 4, ellipsis provides an interesting and more fine-grained window - than
participants’ physical orientation to one another as for example expanded by (Kendon, 1990) -
on when/whether context is shared for the parties to an interaction. In dialogue this context is
often another turn/utterance: the Antecedent. Interpretability of elliptical utterances - as manifest
in the relevant response to them - demonstrates therefore that the context required to recover the
missing bits (the antecedent) is sufficiently Salient or one might say pragmatically ‘close’ or ‘in
focus’, for the responder.
In dyadic dialogue, the antecedent of an ellipsis is almost always found in the immediately
preceding turn (Purver, 2004) e.g. A: Where did you go yesterday evening? B: Cinema. In
multi-party dialogues however, the situation is more complex. Consider dialogue 1 from the
AMI corpus below:
6.1. Introduction 142
(6.1)
(1) C: What does cutest spelling mean?
(2) B: oh, she spelled cutest um with an I ,
(3) C: oh, okay
(4) B: so that that’s just something I pointed out
(5) D: oh yeah
(6) A: Cutest? [Clarification Ellipsis, Antecedent Distance of 5]
(7) D: E S T
(8) A: Thank you
Dialogue 1: From the AMI corpus (Carletta, 2006)
In the above example, A’s elliptical request for clarification (turn 6) is, in effect, just as lo-
cal to C’s utterance as B’s (at turn 2). As highlighted in section 3.10, the adjacency structure
of multi-party dialogues is thus generally more complex than dyadic dialogues. In dyadic dia-
logues, exchanges (adjacency pairs) are comprised of one initiating and one reacting move (e.g.
question/answer or assertion/acceptance). In multi-party dialogues on the other hand, after the
initiation of any move, multiple non-speakers could react to it elliptically without necessarily
causing any trouble in understanding. What this means is that adjacency structure in multi-party
dialogues is not linear, but instead looks more like a tree: Given any utterance, there can be more
than one subsequent turn, constructed as ‘pragmatically next’ to that utterance.
We can also find examples in which multiple conversational strands, with overlapping groups
of participants, are interleaved. Consider Dialogue 2 below which comes from a corpus of on-
line chat community interactions in an environment called Walford (described by (Healey, White,
Eshghi, Reeves, & Light, 2007)). The residents of Walford interact using a single text chat screen
on which all the messages they send and receive are displayed. In Walford, people can conduct
multiple concurrent conversations with different, potentially overlapping, groups of individuals
and they routinely take advantage of this fact. These conversations all take place in the same chat
window with no visual cues to help distinguish the different conversational strands or groups of
participants. Dialogue 2 shows a sequence of turns seen by ‘ Naomi’. Note that we have used
indentation to indicates the separate conversational tracks but in the actual chat window there is
no indentation:
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(6.2)
(1) Sonia: Hopws you?
(2) Naomi: tired
(3) Naomi: you?
(4) Sonia: Just got in from work
(5) Naomi: ahh I see, kinda sick and a bit pissed [Antecedent of CE]
(6) Naomi: heya hun
(7) Naomi: Logged in from home?
(8) Frank: ok, Im off
(9) Garry: yep, just about to start my studying
(10) Frank: Yeah Yeah Yeah
(11) Sonia: Drunk pissed? [Clarification Ellipsis(CE), distance of 6]
(12) Naomi: Angry pissed.
Dialogue 2: From the Walford Corpus
Naomi is conducting a dyadic exchange with Sonia, a second dyadic exchange with Garry -
which Sonia does not see - in parallel with a third, broadcast ‘group’ interaction with Frank that
is seen by everyone. Despite this mixture of turns and participants it is clear that the clarification
ellipsis at turn 11 has its antecedent in turn 5. It is as if the conversation/shared-context between
Naomi and Sonia is ‘suspended’ for the duration of turns 6-10, the intervening sub-dialogue.
Sonia’s subsequent CE is then successfully understood by Naomi as referring back to turn 11.
6.1.2 Accessibility of the Antecedent
What these examples make clear is that the accessibility of an antecedent is not a simple function
of time elapsed, turns elapsed, nor recency in memory. They suggest rather that people track
different conversational contexts that may be maintained in parallel over surprisingly long periods
especially in discontinuous strands of interaction where there is an ‘open state of talk’ (Goffman,
1981). An initial generalisation suggested by these examples is that distinct dialogue contexts
may be distinguished in terms of the set of primary participants, i.e. those actively making
contributions (jointly or individually). This leads to the prediction that an elliptical turn that is
separated from its antecedent by a different dialogue context, i.e. when there’s been a change
in primary participants, should be more easily resolved than one which is separated by the same
number of turns from the same dialogue context.
In this chapter, we report an experimental test of this prediction by looking at the relative
ease with which participants are able to resolve elliptical clarification questions within or across
dialogue contexts, distinguished here, in terms of the set of primary participants.
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Task and Materials
The experiment uses a variation on the ‘Tangram’ (Chinese abstract figures) tasks used in various
experimental studies of the common ground (e.g. (Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992)). In these
studies, a Director has a sequence of pictures of these figures in a fixed order in front of him.
The director describes these one by one to a Matcher. The matcher has the same figures, but
unordered, which he needs to put into the same order as the director. They cannot see one
another’s cards, but they can talk as much as they like about them.
3-Way Tangram Task
We use an on-line, 3-person variant of the same task. The task involves 2 directors and 1 matcher
(D1, D2 and M). The directors share a set of 12 Tangram images in a single target order but half
are assigned to one director and half to the other. At the start of the task all the figures are hidden
from the directors but they can see which items in the sequence they will deal with and which
ones the other director will deal with (see figure 6.1). The matcher, by contrast, can see all the
figures but, as with the original task, does not know the target order they will have to put them in
(see figure 6.2).
The directors proceed through the sequence of figures one at a time by clicking, as appropri-
ate, in the window. For each figure the ‘active’ director provides a description so that the matcher
can identify it and drag and drop it into the appropriate slot (see figure 6.2). The ‘passive’ di-
rector does not see the image and therefore has no direct involvement in describing it. They
are, however, a fully ratified side-participant in the exchange. In this manner, for each round of
Tangrams, we gather a sequence of interactions between D1 and M, and some between D2 and
M with the sequence of participants controlled experimentally.
Figure 6.1: Directors’ view
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Figure 6.2: Matcher’s view
In order to enable the insertion of the experimental probe clarification questions all interaction
between the directors and matcher is via the DiET Chat Tool, described in section 5.2.2.
Figure 6.3: Chat Display
In this experiment, we parse utterances on the fly, in order to identify possible fragments
from the directors turns that can serve as target sources/antecedents for for long-distance Reprise
Fragments (RF, a special class of Clarification Ellipsis. E.g. A: Did Mary show up last night? B:
Mary?[RF]). The criteria for selecting a potential target in this experiment were that it should be a
noun phrase, verb phrase or prepositional phrase, that is not subsequently repeated prior to its use
in a spoof RF (in order to factor out the element of ambiguity with respect to the current figure).
Given a suitable target, the server can then generate a spoof clarification question that appears
to originate from the Matcher, but is not relayed to the Matcher’s screen. Both directors see the
RF and either may respond. The response is trapped by the server and the dialogue resumes (see
Dialogue 3 for an example).
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(6.3)
(1) D1: the big fat lady. [Antecedent of RF]
(2) M: ok got it.
(3) D2: ok my one now.
(4) D2: camel with the triangular back.
(5) M: ye got it
(6) M: sorry err fat lady? [Fake server probe (RF). ]
(7) D1: yeh that was number 2 [Trapped Response]
Dialogue 3: Example from the Experimental Corpus
This whole process can be carried out without disrupting the dialogue and without being
detected by any of the participants. For a more detailed description of this technique see (Healey
et al., 2003).
The probe RF interventions are triggered when the Matcher places a figure in the appropriate
slot, and just before everybody moves on to discuss the next figure. The target antecedent of the
RF is always from the last-but-one item, i.e. the fragment queries something said previously by
one of the directors about the penultimate figure described so far.
6.2.2 Experimental Design
As noted, in the experiment reported here the probe spoof RF is always generated on an an-
tecedent (target) expression that has been used to describe the previous Tangram figure in the
sequence. The experimental contrast is between a same dialogue context condition where the
current Director also described the last-but-one item (i.e. there has been no change in the pri-
mary participants over the two items) and a different dialogue context condition where the other
Director described the last-but-one item (i.e. there has been a switch in primary participants over
the two items). This created a situation in which probe RF’s occurred, on average, at equivalent
distances from their targets in terms of time and turns elapsed but at different distances in terms
of dialogue context boundaries (within dialogue context in the former condition and across sub-
dialogues in the latter). Exactly 4 RF’s (2 in each condition) were sent to the directors per round
of 12 Tangrams resulting in a within-subjects manipulation.
6.2.3 Participants
60 participants were recruited from among undergraduate and postgraduate students from var-
ious disciplines at Queen Mary, University of London. 33 were male, 27 were female. The
experiments took approximately 60 minutes to complete and each was paid 7 pounds for taking
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part.
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Director and Matcher roles. They were given written
and verbal instructions about the task together and had an opportunity to ask questions about the
procedure. They were then seated in separate rooms, each at a desk with a PC displaying the
appropriate task window (Figure 6.1 for the Directors and Figure 6.2 for the Matcher) and the
chat client window (Figure 6.3). They did as many rounds of tangrams that they could in 1 hour
and were then debriefed about the experimental manipulations together.
6.3 Results
The principal question for our analysis is whether the dialogue context manipulation affects the
responses Directors give to the spoof RF probe questions from the matcher. In particular, our
prediction is that the distant antecedents should be more accessible/salient - and hence the RF,
easier to interpret - when they are from a different dialogue context - because they are pragmati-
cally ‘nearer’ for the Director who produced them - than when they are from the same dialogue
context i.e. were produced by the director who is describing the current item. In contrast to this,
if accessibility is solely a matter of recency or total amount of intervening turns then there should
be no difference between these conditions.
Because both Directors saw each RF probe question both had the opportunity to respond
regardless of who actually produced the target antecedent. Responses were therefore classified
according to who responded: Owner (of the target expression), Not Owner (i.e. the other director)
and None where nobody responded. As Figure 6.4 shows, the distribution of responses was
different in the two dialogue context conditions. The probe question was equally likely to receive
no response in the two dialogue context conditions but where the target crosses the dialogue
context boundaries (‘different dialogue context’ condition) the owner was less likely to respond
than the current speaker (this is construed as Momentum of Dyads in the discussion below). A
multinomial regression analysis confirmed the reliability of this pattern Chi2(2) = 46.41, p =0.00.
Where a response was given, it was also classified as to whether it displayed a Local (i.e.
incorrect) or Distant (correct) interpretation, or no interpretation at all (the response itself was a
request for clarification). This was possible, because the figures being described and the order in
which they were described by the directors, were known at the time of analysis. In addition, the
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of responses across conditions
whole dialogue between Directors and Matcher prior to the sending of the RFs, was recorded. So
the response often revealed clearly, whether the Director had taken the RF as clarifying something
about the current figure (Local/incorrect), or the previous one (Distant/correct). In particular, the
responses were coded as Distant, if:
• part of the original distant antecedent from which the RF was taken, was repeated by the
Director.
• there was reference in the response to the previous item e.g. “D1: yea that was number 2”.
Otherwise, the responses were coded as displaying a Local interpretation.
The responses were equally likely to receive no interpretation at all in the 2 conditions. But,
as Figure 6.5 and Table 6.1 show, where the responses did reveal either a distant or a local inter-
pretation, the pattern of interpretations was systematically different in the two dialogue context
conditions. If the owner responds then a distant interpretation is only favoured where the an-
tecedent was in a different dialogue context. If the owner responds and the antecedent comes
from the same dialogue context, i.e. was produced by the person who also produced the most re-
cent description they strongly favour a local (incorrect) interpretation. This pattern is confirmed
by a multinomial regression analysis which shows a main effect of both dialogue context condi-
tion Chi2(1) = 18.26, p = 0.00 and of who responds Chi
2
(1) = 21.25, p = 0.00 on the likelihood of
a distant (correct) interpretation.
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Figure 6.5: Distribution of the Directors’ Interpretation of Probe Reprise Fragments Across Con-
ditions
Dialogue Context
Same Different
Local Distant Local Distant
Owners’ Interpretations 28 11 1 12
Non-Owners’s Interpretations 1 0 16 3
Table 6.1: Distribution of the Directors’ Interpretation of Probe Reprise Fragments Across Con-
ditions
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Strong tendency to interpret a fragment against local context
The most obvious pattern in the results of this experiment is that there is a strong preference for
local antecedents for ellipses. Even where the owner of the distant antecedent responds to the
probe RF they frequently interpret it as being about the current item and not the (distant) target.
This is despite the fact that the fragment used in the probe question has not been repeated since.
This suggests that, all things being equal, there is a strong presumption that ellipses will have
local antecedents.
6.4.2 Momentum of dyads
In the ‘same dialogue context’ condition the current speaker coincides with the owner of the dis-
tant antecedent (the 2 consecutive figures were described by the same director). In the ‘different
dialogue context’ condition, the current speaker would be different from the owner of the dis-
tant antecedent. As figure 4 indicates, there’s a strong preference for the non owner (coincident
with the current speaker) to respond in the ‘different dialogue context’ condition. In both con-
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ditions then, the current speaker is more likely to respond. Therefore, a possible generalisation
here is that all things being equal, by default, in the absence of any address cues, utterances are
taken to be addressed at the last speaker; dyads therefore have momentum. This is consistent
with the results found in (Parker, 1988). The significant finding in that study is that a random
utterance in a small focused group discussion is most likely (by a large margin) to be within a
dyadic turn-taking pattern (A-B-A). Even when this pattern is broken, a new one is quickly es-
tablished and sustained for an extended period. This means that even interactions with a small
set of fully ratified participants, tend to lapse into stretches of dyadic talk during which the rest
of the participants take on secondary roles. We argue below, that it is exactly such imbalance in
the participants’ level of participation, which results in the emergence of more than one distinct
dialogue context; hence the need to index shared-context to specific sets of participants.
6.4.3 Emergence of distinct dialogue contexts
Importantly for our purposes, the results show that dialogue context structure, understood here
in terms of changes in primary participants, has a significant effect on the accessibility of the
antecedent of an ellipsis, prior to the change of primary participants. As predicted from the
corpus examples, the long distance antecedents are more easily accessed where they are from a
different dialogue context. It’s crucial here to see that it is not just any change in the primary
participants across the sub-dialogues, that makes the distant antecedent more accessible. For the
change in the primary participants to have such an effect, it is essential that:
1. The participant producing the elliptical turn, say A, and the owner/producer of the an-
tecedent, say B, are primary participants in the antecedent containing, distant dialogue
context i.e. they have grounded the antecedent.
2. Either A or B is NOT a primary participant in the intervening dialogue context.
Support for 1 above, comes from the result that the preference for the incorrect local interpre-
tation was strongest when the non owner responded. This seems to be because the non owner is
never a primary participant in the distant dialogue context containing the antecedent, and there-
fore has not grounded the antecedent to a level that would allow him to interpret the ellipsis as
distant. So we may say here that the context that A shares with B prior to the intervening dia-
logue context (they are both primary participants in it), is ‘suspended’ as a result of either A’s or
B’s lack of active participation in the intervening dialogue context, so that subsequent to it, that
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context/antecedent is still sufficiently salient. And this is despite the fact that A or B may be a
ratified side-participant to the intervening exchange.
Why is this happening one might ask? Despite the RFs containing often unambiguous cues,
pointing to the distant context, the primary participants still show a tendency to interpret the RFs
as local. There’s therefore a contention between the contexts (local and distant) against which
the primary participants assess these fragments. This shows that for the primary participants the
local context or topic has priority, as providing the antecedents against which elliptical utterances
addressed at them are resolved.
In contrast, this contention seems to disappear almost completely for peripheral participants.
We suggest that this is because all the ratified participants mutually know that the peripheral
participant of the moment, does not have any concern or responsibility with respect to what is
being locally discussed and as noted that he doesn’t say anything about the current referent. This
means that in contrast to the locally primary participants who are strongly attached to the local
context which they’re collaboratively building up, the peripheral participants are only weakly
attached to it. We might therefore say that the peripheral participants’ level access to the distant
context is high, because the local context is unavailable to them. As noted, their view of the
dialogue context has not ‘moved forward’, while the primary participants’ has.
All this supports the idea that multi-party dialogues can lead to conversational contexts that
have a tree like structure. As a result utterances that are placed on either side of a sub-dialogue
(corresponding to a single dialogue context in our sense) can be understood as pragmatically
‘next’ to each other. The experimental approach has allowed us to factor out from this effect the
possible influence of number of turns, topics (in terms of Tangrams described) and the amount of
time elapsed between the ellipsis and its antecedent. This provides a very useful notion of context
locality/saliency as indexed to specific participants - contingent upon their level of participation
- which accounts for the adjacency structure of turns, not only in multi-focus, discontinuous
situations (such as Dialogue 2 above) but also focused gatherings with sets of fully ratified par-
ticipants.
6.5 Conclusion
The experimental results presented here show that even within small groups of fully ratified
conversational participants distinct dialogue contexts can emerge as a result of changes in the
primary participants, and hence they are, as indexed by ellipses, anaphora and other context sen-
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sitive expressions, more fine-grained than ‘interactional unit’s, such as an f-formation (Kendon,
1990), defined solely in terms of who the ratified participants are. Moreover, we have argued
for the need to index these contexts to specific sets of participants and provided conditions, in
terms of the participants’ statuses (peripheral vs. primary) during and with respect to a stretch of
talk/sub-dialogue (corresponding to a single dialogue context), under which utterances on either
side of that sub-dialogue, may be regarded as ‘pragmatically next’ to each other.
As we will see in more detail in later chapters, the results presented here imply that one
and the same utterance can give rise to divergent contextual updates on the information states
of primary vs. peripheral participants, and hence that the respective contextual update rules
responsible for the utterance by utterance transitions of these participants’ view of the context of
the dialogue, need to be distinct.
In any attempt to scale-up computational or formal models of dyadic dialogue, to multi-party
dialogue, the patterns observed here need to be taken into account, so as to track and update as
the conversation moves forward, what is salient for whom at any given point, and to evaluate the
meaning of elliptical expressions accordingly.
In the final chapter of this thesis, we will sketch how the empirical results presented here may
be construed within Ginzburg’s model of dialogue context, and present some tentative ideas as to
how the model could be transformed so as to capture these results.
153
Chapter 7
Collective Vs. Dyadic Contexts
7.1 Introduction
Recall that in chapter 4, we showed that despite the locally unbalanced levels of feedback be-
tween the ratified participants (addressee vs. side-participant), common ground can accumulate
evenly, in the same way, for all of them. Chapter 5 was an attempt to characterise the systematics
of grounding in such conversations; that is, at least, those conversations in which some of the
participants are organised into parties, in virtue of the relations holding between the participants’
publicly known collective responsibilities, concerns and goals, and the local conversational topic.
We proposed that ratified participants which, at various points, fall inside and outside such parties
need to be distinguished, in terms of grounding responsibilities and correspondingly the level of
understanding/acceptance that, in withholding of feedback, they are assumed to have reached.
In the previous chapter on the other hand, we presented experimental evidence that in a single
multi-party conversation, under the same local conversational context, in terms of dyadic context
boundaries, there’s a systematic conflict between participants’ interpretations of similar Reprise
Fragments. This was owing to the distinctness of the contexts against which they were being
assessed. This was the sense which the more fine-grained dyadic shared-contexts may or may
not ‘move forward’ for specific pairs of participants, expressed there, in terms of the saliency of
distant contexts/antecedents.
In this chapter, we will be addressing the question of how/whether in similar terms, a partic-
ipant who falls outside a party for a stretch of talk, is distinguished from one who falls inside.
In other words we’ll be addressing the question, posed in identical terms as the previous chapter,
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of the effects of collective vs. dyadic participation, on the saliency of the contexts immediately
prior to when the new party was established and the old one suspended. Let’s make this more
specific.
In the previous chapter, we showed that the saliency of a prior context/antecedent/question
among participants A and B is, independently of distance in terms of turns/time or topic, contin-
gent upon whether they have, together, participated in the stretch of talk, since that antecedent
was produced. This is the sense in which the {A,B} shared-context does or doesn’t move forward,
as a result of the pair’s joint participation and presumed responsibility, or lack thereof, since the
distant antecedent/context.
Nevertheless, in the previous chapter the dialogue contexts were always dyadic. Therefore,
questions as regards the effect of intervening collective contexts on the accessibility of distant
antecedents prior to it, remain unaddressed, i.e. what if our previously peripheral, silent side-
participants in the intervening contexts, were also to be an active, responsible, primary partici-
pant? What if, in other words, 2 or more participants were to act as a party in the intervening
context? Wouldn’t we be inclined, given the results from chapters 5 and 6, to say that the con-
texts that each member of a party shares with the participants outside - with whom the party as
a whole is interacting - move forward together, evenly? If so, in light of the results from the
previous chapter, this would entail that collective participation, in the stretch of talk that inter-
venes between a distant context/antecedent, prior to when a new party was established and the old
suspended, should make that antecedent equally less salient/accessible for each member of the
newly established party, as compared to those who are outside the newly established party, but
who nevertheless grounded the antecedent (i.e. were a primary participant (a member of the old
party) in the antecedent containing context). This is, partly, what we aim to show experimentally
in this chapter.
Recall that in the conclusions to chapter 5, we pointed out that it is as yet unclear whether
party formations are really tied to topic. This is another issue that will be addressed here. In
particular, we will show experimentally that upon topic shifts new parties may be established
and the old ones suspended or destroyed, i.e. that the participants’ arrangements in the active,
interacting parties could change upon topic shifts (see below for a further discussion of what is
meant here by topic and how it relates to the participants and context).
As will become apparent shortly, the dialogue contexts that we claimed can emerge in the
last chapter, can also be understood to emerge as a result of one participant falling outside a party
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- and hence becoming an inactive/indifferent peripheral participant - for a stretch of talk. Our ex-
perimental results indicate, in line with those of the previous chapter, that this locally peripheral
participant is very weakly attached to the local context, which is being collaboratively built up
by the locally active party members. This results in the higher accessibility of the prior distant
context - before the new party was projected/formed - for this locally peripheral participant -
who was a member of the old party which has been suspended or destroyed in the local context
- as compared with the locally primary participants. Thus, as noted above, another way in which
the participants outside and inside the interacting parties are distinguished is in terms of the con-
texts/antecedents that others’ elliptical utterances received by them get assessed/resolved against.
This, we will argue, is evidence that those who fall outside all the interacting parties and those
inside, that is, peripheral and primary participants respectively, effect systematically divergent
contextual increments/updates, as a result of one and the same utterance. This gives rise to the
systematic emergence of distinct dialogue contexts, which, all things being equal, were caused
by changes in the arrangements of the participants in the active, interacting parties. As noted,
this is, in turn, caused by topic shifts, whereby the new topic projects or makes relevant different
parties than the old ones.
7.1.1 ‘Topic’ as indexed to the participants?
In the experiment to be described, analogously to that in the previous chapter, the participants will
be required to make a series of references (Tangrams). The shift from describing one referent to
the other is essentially what we’ve described as ‘topic shift’. In the previous chapter, we claimed
that the dialogue contexts that we showed emerge are independent of topic (Tangrams). With the
notion of topic being under-explicated in general, and in particular that of topic shift as yet to a
great deal underspecified and problematic in the literature (nobody really knows what constitutes
a topic shift), such parallel between a shift in the referent being described and a shift in topic may
seem contentious.
Nevertheless, the claims that have been made are not about the effect of topic shift per se,
but that of the level of involvement of those present and hence their participant statuses as de-
termined by the relations holding between them and what is being talked about (topic). In other
words, what we have been and are concerned with here is the effect of shifting parties, group
structures and presumed conversational responsibilities, on the evolution of dialogue contexts.
The way such a shift in group structures can be forced experimentally, as we have done in the
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previous experiment, is via assigning to the participants the task-level objective of describing
only the Tangrams which they can see, so as to force a controllable imbalance in their levels
of involvement in identifiable segments of the conversation. It should be emphasised that the
results both in this chapter and the previous one, as regards the disparity between the salience
of antecedents for peripheral and primary participants, are independent of topic (all the elliptical
fragments and their antecedents are separated by talk about one Tangram exactly). The claim,
in other words, is that peripheral and primary participants do not have equal access to the local
context, which is constituted by a set of utterances ‘about’ the current Tangram being described,
hence within descriptions of the current Tangram.
Arguably, the direct counterpart of this situation in normal everyday conversation - where
making a reference precisely may not be the point - is topic shift, whereupon a third participant
suddenly becomes a peripheral participant or an overhearer semantically, e.g. A, B and C are
talking about a meeting they had yesterday; A and B then move on to discuss a joint project
to which C is not privy; C has at this point changed status. What we have argued is that if it
is indeed the case that C does not actively participate within the current topic (say because of
considerations of politeness) then her context will diverge from A’s and B’s.
Moreover, none of this is to claim that topic has no role to play in how contexts are distin-
guished. It certainly does (e.g. within Ginzburg’s model of context summarised in section 2.7.1,
a topic, modelled as a question under discussion, is the context or at least its most important fea-
ture): in dyadic conversation, going back to a prior topic requires the extra effort of reinstating
that topic, via re-raising of the relevant parts of the utterance in that prior segment to which one
wants to return and this is also often marked (by cues such as ‘anyway’). So, topic shifts certainly
affect whether elliptical utterances or anaphora are licensed, and this is certainly worth a separate
study. But in the current studies, these effects have been factored out. Thus, if contexts can be
said to be indexed to or distinguishable by topic, then our claim is that they’re also indexed to the
participants.
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Task and Materials
Basically, in the experiments carried out here, we use the same task and materials as those in the
previous experiment (henceforth the Same-Different experiment). Namely, we use the online 3-
person variant of the Tangram task with 2 Directors and 1 Matcher; D1, D2 and M. The Directors
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proceed through the sequence of 12 figures one at a time by clicking, as appropriate, in the
window (figures 7.1 and 7.2). They describe the items one by one to the Matcher so that she, in
turn, can identify them and drag and drop them into the appropriate slot. The Matcher’s interface
is identical in this experiment to the Same-Different experiment.
In the previous Tangram experiment, for every Tangram/item it was either D1 or D2 - never
both - which could see and were responsible for describing the Tangram to the M; i.e. we gathered
a sequence of dyadic interactions between D1 and M and some between D2 and M.
The crucial difference - and this is the only difference - between this experiment and the
Same-Different experiment is that some of the items are collective/collaborative; i.e. the item
is shared between the Directors such that they can both see it and are told that for these items
they are to collaborate in describing the item to the M. The collective items, are tagged with the
word ‘shared’ below the item number (see figures 7.1 and 7.2), so that before one of the directors
clicks the item to reveal/turn it over, they both know that the item is a collaborative one. The
first Director to click the item to turn it over will also, automatically, reveal the card for the other
Director.
Figure 7.1: Director 1’s view
Figure 7.2: Director 2’s view
In this manner, for each set of 12 Tangrams, we gather a sequence of interaction between
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D1 and M, D2 and M, and unlike the Same-Different experiment, some between all 3, with the
sequence controlled experimentally.
In order to enable the insertion of probe clarification questions, all interactions between the
Directors and Matcher pass through the DiET Server (described in section 5.2.2).
7.2.2 Probe Reprise Fragments
In this experiment, as in the Same-Different experiment, we parse the Directors’ utterances in
real-time on the DiET server, in order to identify target antecedents for probe RFs (Reprise
Fragments). The criteria used to identify these were identical to those in the Same-Different
experiment, viz. that they should be a noun phrase, verb phrase or prepositional phrase, that is
not subsequently repeated prior to its use in a spoof RF (in order to factor out the element of
ambiguity with respect to the current figure). Given a suitable target, the server can then generate
a spoof clarification question that appears to originate from the Matcher, but is not relayed to the
Matcher’s screen. Both directors see the RF and either may respond. The response is trapped by
the server (such that the Matcher does not see the response) and the dialogue resumes.
Note that since the criteria for choosing an utterance as the target antecedent for the RFs
were identical to the Same-Different experiment, we can compare our results here with those of
the previous one. In other words, we can assume safely that any difference between the patterns
observed here and those in the Same-Different experiment are not an artefact of the RFs per se.
The probe RF interventions are, as before, triggered when the Matcher places a figure in
the appropriate slot, and just before everybody moves on to discuss the next figure. The target
antecedent of the RF is always from the previous item, i.e. the fragment queries something said
previously by one of the directors about the penultimate figure described so far.
7.2.3 Experimental Design
As noted, in the experiment reported here the probe spoof RF is always generated on an an-
tecedent (target) expression that has been used to describe the previous Tangram figure in the
sequence. This created a situation in which probe RF’s occurred, on average, at equivalent dis-
tances from their targets in terms of time and turns elapsed. This allows us to factor out the effect
of distance in number of turn or time elapsed.
This experiment uses a factorial design with 2 factors, each with 2 levels/values:
• Antecedent Context: whether the distant context/item, from which the target antecedent
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RF is chosen (corresponding to the penultimate figure described so far) was:
– Collective
– Dyadic
• Intervening Context: whether the intervening context (corresponding to the current, local
item intervening between antecedent and RF) was:
– Collective
– Dyadic
This results in 4 possible conditions; viz. Collective Antecednet Context/Collective Interven-
ing Context (hereafter C/C), Collective Antecedent Context/Dyadic Intervening Context (here-
after C/D), Dyadic Antecedent Context/Collective Intervening Context hereafter D/C) and Dyadic
Antecedent Context/Dyadic Intervening Context (hereafter D/D).
Exactly 4 RF’s (1 in each condition) are sent to the directors per round of 12 Tangrams,
resulting in a within-subjects manipulation.
7.2.4 Participants
96 participants (32 triads) were recruited from among undergraduate and postgraduate students
from various disciplines at Queen Mary, University of London. The experiments took approxi-
mately 60 minutes to complete and each was paid 7 pounds for taking part.
7.2.5 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the Director and Matcher roles. They were given written
and verbal instructions about the task together and had the opportunity to ask questions about
the procedure. They were then seated in separate rooms, each at a desk with a PC displaying the
appropriate task window (Figure 7.2 for the Directors and Figure 6.2 for the Matcher) and the
chat client window (Figure 6.3). They did as many rounds of tangrams that they could in 1 hour
and were then debriefed about the experimental manipulations together.
7.3 Results
As highlighted in the introduction, the principal question for this analysis is whether collective
intervening contexts would have an effect on the accessibility of the target antecedent, when
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compared to the conditions in which the intervening context is dyadic. More specifically, we
need to contrast the level of attachment to the local context, of the locally peripheral participants,
that is, those participants who are non-members in the locally active, interacting parties, with that
of primary participants, i.e. those who for the local stretch of talk are members of the interacting
parties.
Seen in the light of the results from the Same-Different experiment, we would predict that a
distant antecedent, regardless of whether it was produced in a collective or dyadic context, should
be more accessible when the owner of the antecedent has not participated in the intervening
context, i.e. that antecedents should be more accessible - and hence the RF more likely to be
interpreted as distant - when the local, intervening context is dyadic, namely in the C/D and D/D
conditions.
Like the Same-Different experiment, the RFs didn’t contain any address cues and they were
sent to both directors, so either could respond. When a response was given by either director,
following the same protocol as in the Same-Different experiment, it was classified as to whether
it displayed a Local (i.e. incorrect) or Distant (correct) interpretation, or no interpretation at all
(None, when the response itself was a request for clarification).
7.3.1 Effects of Antecedent and Intervening Context on who responds
The owner of the target antecedent answers the probe RF in 43% of cases. The other, non-owner
director provides an answer to only 21% of cases. However, there is relatively little overlap.
There are only 12 cases in which both provide an answer to the same RF (i.e. there are two inter-
pretations, one by each director). Taking this into account, overall, 60% of the probe questions
receive answers from at least one of the directors.
A Multinomial Regression analysis was performed to test for whether Intervening Context
(Collective vs. Dyadic) or Antecedent Context (Collective vs. Dyadic) had an effect on who
responds. This showed no reliable effects for either factor (Intervening context: Chi2(1) = 0.07,
p(two-tailed) = 0.79; (Antecedent Context: Chi2(1) = 0.48, p(two-tailed) = 0.48).
As noted however, the antecedent owner was much more likely to respond than the other
director (Figure 7.3). This was despite the fact that some of the antecedents were produced on
collective items.
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Figure 7.3: Distribution of All Responses
7.3.2 Effects of Antecedent and Intervening Context on Accessibility of Antecedents
To test whether the context of the most recent item (Collective or Dyadic) or the context of the
target antecedent (Collective or Dyadic) had an effect on the directors’ interpretations of the
RFs (local, distant or none), a Multinomial regression analysis was performed on interpretations
with two factors (Intervening Context and Antecedent Context). This showed no main effect
of Intervening Context (Chi2(2) = 1.58, p(two-tailed) = 0.45) and no main effect of Antecedent
Context (Chi2(2) = 1.49, p(two-tailed) = 0.47), on interpretations.
A second Multinomial regression was performed on Owner responses only to check that the
failure to find any effect was not due to noise added by the non-owner’s responses. This showed
the same pattern with no main effect of Intervening Context (Chi2(2) = 2.13, p(two-tailed) = 0.34)
and no main effect of Antecedent Context (Chi2(2) = 0.27, p(two-tailed) = 0.87).
In order to test whether Owners produced a different distribution of responses to Non-owners,
a multinomial regression analysis was carried out with the source of the answer (Owner vs. Non-
owner) as a single factor and response types (Local, Distant or None) as the dependent variables.
This showed a significant main effect of source (Chi2(2) = 13.16, p(two-tailed) = 0.00). Non-
owners were less likely to provide a distant interpretation (B = -1.83 p = 0.00) than owners but
there was no difference in their likelihood of finding a local interpretation (B = -0.65, p = 0.21).
Overall, this shows that Owners are more likely to correctly identify the antecedent.
Overall the results show no simple effect of Intervening Context nor of Antecedent Context
on the accessibility of the target antecedent (but see below). The owners are more likely to
correctly identify the antecedent and more likely to respond but this is not affected by either of
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Local Distant
Owner Answer 37 50
Non-Owner Answer 20 8
Table 7.1: Distribution of Interpretations by Owners and Non-owners
the context factors.
7.3.3 Activity Levels of Participants over Collective Vs. Dyadic Items
To test whether there were different patterns of contributions for the collective or dyadic items
an Analysis of Variance was performed with Items (Collective vs Dyadic) as a between-subjects
factor and average number of words, turns and time taken as dependent measures. This showed
no effect of Item on average number of turns (F(1,61) = 9.4, p = 0.23: Collective Mean Turns =
13.18, SD = 6.9; Dyadic Mean Turns = 12.4, SD = 5.9), no effect on average number of words
(F(1,61) = 0.02, p = 0.88: Collective Mean Words = 51.9, SD = 29.6; Dyadic Mean Words = 53.2,
SD = 32.9), and no effect on average time take (F(1,61) = 2.40, p = 0.13: Collective Mean Time =
84.8 seconds, SD = 42.6; Dyadic Mean Time = 103.5 seconds, SD = 52.8).
This analysis however, takes all participants’ contributions (including the matcher) into ac-
count. In order to see the distribution of the directors’ contributions over dyadic vs. collective
items, the average number of Turns and Words produced by each of the directors for each Item
was entered in an Analysis of Variance with Item Type (Collective vs. Dyadic) as a between-
subjects factor. This showed an effect of Item Type on Turns (F(1,157) = 4.55, p = 0.03) with more
turns on average for Collective Items (mean = 4.7, SD = 2.8) than Dyadic Items (mean = 3.9, SD
= 2.2). The parallel analysis for number of Words produced by each director however, showed
no effect of Item Type (F(1,157) = 0.14, p = 0.71). Mean number of words for Collective Items
was 19.0 (SD = 11.0), and Mean number of words for Dyadic Items was 18.3 (SD = 11.3).
Below, in the discussion section, we will use the evidence here, to argue that the directors act
as a party on collective items.
7.3.4 Comparison with the Same-Different Experiment
The fact that there was no main effect of Intervening Context (Collective vs. Dyadic) on inter-
pretations, casts a little doubt on the results that we obtained in the previous chapter. We had
predicted that Dyadic Intervening Contexts should make the antecedents more accessible and
hence make distant interpretations more likely. A subset of the data was therefore inspected, to
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see if this experiment (henceforth the Collective-Dyadic experiment) replicated the results of the
Same-Different experiment:
In order to test whether the Collective-Dyadic experiment replicated the results from the
Same-Different experiment, we looked at the subset of conditions in the Collective-Dyadic ex-
periment that reproduced conditions in the Same-Different experiment. There were two cases.
The most directly comparable cases in the present experiment were those in which the Antecedent
Context and the Intervening Context were both dyadic. In this case there is a direct parallel with
the previous experiment in terms of whether the person producing the target antecedent for the
RF also describes the intervening item (Dyadic-Same) or not (Dyadic-Different). In addition, for
cases in which the Antecedent was collective but the Intervening item was dyadic we could also
code whether the person who actually produced the target antecedent of the RF also described the
intervening dyadic item. This gave us a total of 31 cases, 11 involving a switch and 20 involving
no switch of speaker between Antecedent and Intervening item.
From this analysis, two cases were excluded because they involved a sub-dialogue between
the matcher and the non-owner of the intervening item, immediately prior to the probe RF, about
another, unrelated, previous item (not the item from which the RF was taken).1
A Chi square analysis on the frequency of Local and Distant interpretations in these recoded
Dyadic-Same / Dyadic-Different cases showed a reliable effect (Chi2(1) = 4.97, p(two-tailed) =
0.03, Fisher’s Exact Test: p (two-tailed) = 0.03 ). This showed that the present results are consis-
tent with the Same-Different experiment.
The lack of effect of the Intervening Context on the antecedent owners’ interpretations seems
therefore to be due to the antecedent owner, also describing the local, current intervening item
(the Dyadic-Same cases, corresponding to the ‘same dialogue context’ condition in the Same-
Different experiment, in which we would predict high frequencies of local interpretations). These
comprised nearly half of our data points in the Dyadic Intervening Context condition, and hence
caused the lack of effect of this factor on interpretations. As we will see below, if we exclude
these cases from the Dyadic Intervening Context condition, in the contrast between Collective vs.
Dyadic Intervening Context conditions we get a strong indication of the higher accessibility, for
1Recall in this regard, that whether contexts are dyadic or collective, was coded according to whether
both directors could see an item or not. In these two cases, the item was indeed dyadic in this sense.
However, in both cases, the director who is supposedly an inactive, peripheral participant because she
couldn’t see the intervening item, was in fact locally active/involved, because she was having a dyadic
conversation with the Matcher about some previous item mistakenly placed. Note that we inspected the
stretches of talk immediately prior to all the probe RFs involved in this analysis to exclude such cases.
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the antecedent owners, of the antecedents in the reduced Dyadic Intervening Context condition
than in the Collective Intervening Context condition.
Local Distant
Same Participant 8 12
Different Participant 0 9
Table 7.2: Distribution of Interpretations when the Owner of Intervening Item is the Same as or
Different from the Antecedent Owner
Nevertheless, there are rather puzzling differences between the Collective-Dyadic and the
Same-Different experiments. In the Collective-Dyadic experiment, out of all possible responses
from the directors (Number of Probes * 2), 32% were actually produced by the directors. In the
Same-Different experiment, of all possible responses, 34% were produced. Table 7.3 shows the
distribution of all response types received in the two experiments.
As one might intuitively expect, there should be significantly more responses in the Collective-
Dyadic than the Same-Different experiment, as some of the items were collective. This has not
come about.
Moreover, the distribution of response types indicates that in the Collective-Dyadic exper-
iment the directors are more likely than in the Same-Different experiment to identify the an-
tecedents correctly. But since some of the items are collective and hence jointly described by the
directors, we’d expect the opposite. Directors’ collaboration on such items, should, overall, cause
the directors to be more attached to the local context and hence reduce the overall accessibility
of the distant antecedents.
The locally peripheral participants - over dyadic items - do not seem to behave differently
in the two experiments. They almost never interpret the fragments locally. These correspond
roughly to the ‘different dialogue context’ condition in the Same-Different experiment and to the
re-coded Dyadic-Different cases above, in the Collective-Dyadic experiment.
This difference in the relative frequency of distant interpretations across the two experiments,
is due to the locally primary participants, being generally more able in the Collective-Dyadic ex-
periment to identify the antecedents. Note that this is not because some of the antecedents are
collective, tempting one to explain this by saying that two directors who have collaborated over
an item are more likely to identify an antecedent than one director alone. If we consider the an-
tecedent owner’s responses alone, the difference between the two experiments still persists: 50%
of all the responses received from the owner displayed distant interpretations in the Collective-
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Local Distant None
Same-Different 46/90 (51%) 26/90 (29%) 18/90 (20%)
Collective-Dyadic 52/135 (39%) 54/135 (40%) 29/135 (21%)
Table 7.3: Distribution of Local and Distant interpretations in All the responses received in the 2
experiments
Dyadic experiment, while in the Same-Different experiment, only 30% of owner responses were
distant.
These differences seem to be important and indeed puzzling, and do cast some doubt on the
account that we would like to have been directly supported, which is given below in the discussion
section. Unfortunately, we have not be able to find an explanation for these differences.
It is notable that these differences don’t appear to be explainable by different patterns of in-
volvement and contribution of the participants in the two experiments. If anything, it might be the
case that in the Collective-Dyadic experiment the participants were overall more involved, that is,
the non-owners of the dyadic items in the Collective-Dyadic experiment were more involved than
those of the Same-Different experiment. This would only make things more puzzling. It would
further support the intuition that because of the higher levels of involvement in the Collective-
Dyadic than the Same-Different experiment, the directors should be more strongly attached to
the local context (because of active participation), and hence that the distant antecedents should
be less accessible overall in the Collective-Dyadic experiment, not more. We have, nevertheless,
carried out a number analyses comparing the patterns of contribution of the participants in the
two experiments.
Patterns of Contribution in the Collective-Dyadic vs. Same-Different experiments
In both experiments participants had 1 hour to complete as many trials as possible.
The average number of turns, number of words and time taken for each item, by each triad,
in the Same-Different experiment and the Collective-Dyadic were combined into an Analysis of
Variance with Experiment (Same-Different vs. Collective-Dyadic) as a between-subjects factor.
This showed neither a reliable difference for Mean number of Turns per Item (F(1,46) = 0.23, p
= 0.63, Mean Turns per Item Same-Different = 11.9, SD = 6.8, Mean Turns per Item Collective-
Dyadic = 12.8, SD = 5.7), nor Mean number of Words per Item (F(1,46) = 0.05, p = 0.83, Mean
Words per Item Same-Different = 52.5, SD = 24.4, Mean Words per Item Collective-Dyadic =
54.4, SD = 32.6), nor Mean Time per Item (F(1,46) = 1.71, p = 0.19, Mean Time per Item Same-
Different = 115.9 seconds, SD = 50.4, Mean Time per Item Collective-Dyadic = 99.6, SD =
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50.8).
To test whether the number of items completed by triads was different in the two experiments
the total number of items per triad was compared with experiment as a between-subjects factor.
This showed no reliable difference (Mann Whitney U = 249.0, p (two-tailed) = 0.87). In the
Collective-Dyadic Experiment triads completed an average of 25.8 items (SD = 12.1) in the
Same-Different Experiment the average was 26.2 (SD = 6.9).
So, overall there is no difference in the average number of turns or words used per item by
directors or matchers in the two experiments. There is, however, a difference in the patterns of
contribution.
In the Same-Different experiment the number of directors’ turns were negatively correlated
i.e. the more one director contributes on an item the less the other does (Kendalls Tau = -0.153, p
= 0.00). This is expected since all the items are dyadic. In the Collective-Dyadic experiment, the
number of director turns is positively correlated (Kendalls Tau = - 0.174, p = 0.00), so the more
one contributes on an item, the more the other does.
However, the positive correlation between the number of directors’ turns in the Collective-
Dyadic experiment, seems to be solely due to the their collaborations over collective items and
not dyadic ones, since the non-owner directors of the dyadic items in this experiment, don’t
appear to behave differently in this experiment and the last. In both cases, they hardly contribute
anything:
To test whether the non-owners contribute more during discussions of Dyadic items in the
Collective-Dyadic experiment than in the Same-Different experiment, an Analysis of variance
with Experiment as a between subjects factor was carried out on the average number of words
and turns produced by non-owners. This showed no reliable difference for the Mean number
of Turns per item (F(1,47) = 0.43, p = 0.51 (Collective-Dyadic Mean Turns = 2.13, SD = 1.6,
Same-Different Mean Turns = 1.78, SD = 2.1), or Mean Words per item (F(1,47) = 0.23, p = 0.63
(Collective-Dyadic Mean Words = 8.6, SD = 10.1, Same-Different Mean Words = 7.1 , SD =
10.9)). This shows that in both experiments, on dyadic items, the directors who could not see the
item (the non-owners) hardly contribute anything.
7.3.5 Collective Vs. Dyadic-Different Intervening Contexts
As noted above, the lack of effect of Intervening Context on interpretations seems be due to the
Dyadic-Same cases described above. That is, those cases in which the antecedent owner also de-
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scribed the intervening, local item. Given the results from the previous chapter, we would expect
a higher frequency of local interpretations in such cases, because of the stronger attachment of
the antecedent owner to the local context.
If we exclude these cases from the Dyadic Intervening Context condition, and include only
the Dyadic-Different cases, we get a strong indication of the higher accessibility, for the an-
tecedent owners, of the antecedents in the systematically reduced Dyadic Intervening Contexts
than in Collective Intervening Contexts. In particular, the RFs in the Collective Intervening Con-
text condition seem equally likely to get a distant or local interpretation from the antecedent
owners, whereas in the Dyadic-Different cases, they almost never interpret the fragment locally
(Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4: Interpretations: Collective Vs. ‘Dyadic-Different’ Intervening Context
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 The directors act as a party on collective items
As noted in the introduction, the results from chapter 5 suggest that when 2 or more participants
have similar responsibilities, as publicly presumed by all the ratified participants, with respect to
the current topic of the conversation, they are organised into a party, such that the party acts as a
unified aggregate to carry the conversation forward such that one party member can stand proxy
for others in doing this.
On this basis, it seems that the 2 directors should act as a party in describing the shared,
collective items to the matcher, such that the primary axis of the conversation during these col-
lective items is between the 2 directors as a whole and the matcher rather than between the three
individuals. By contrast, on dyadic items the director who cannot see the item, and thus does not
have any concern/responsibility as to what goes on between the Matcher and the other Director,
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falls outside the interacting parties (single individuals in this case).
What evidence is there that the 2 directors are acting as a party on collective items in the
manner explicated in chapter 5? And moreover, what evidence is there that such party forma-
tions are tied to topic, such that upon topic shifts new parties may be established and old ones
suspended? As we will argue below, there’s strong evidence that the 2 directors act as a party on
collective items.
• There was no difference between the average number of words produced by (both of) the
directors over dyadic vs. collective items.
• The comparison between the patterns of contribution between this experiment and the
last shows that in both, on dyadic items, the directors who do not see the figure, hardly
contribute anything.
• There was a very small but reliable difference between the average number of turns pro-
duced by each director in dyadic vs. collective items (3.9 vs. 4.7).
Taken together, these suggest that the effort put in by one director alone to describe a dyadic
item, becomes, on average, equally shared between the two directors on collective items. That
the number of turns produced by them is slightly higher on collective items, strongly suggests
that, on average, corresponding to each longer turn produced by one director over a collective
item, if there’s another turn by the other director, it would be proportionally shorter. This shorter
turn might be an acknowledgement of the other’s description, or one that is highly elliptical with
the other’s turn as antecedent. This should happen quite rarely though, as otherwise we’d expect
the number of directors’ turns on collective items to be nearly twice as many as those on dyadic
ones. It therefore seems that the directors often follow-up on one another’s descriptions, and
tend not to repeat the same description. There’s little redundancy of descriptions between the
two directors on collective items.
This means that, all things being equal, a description by one director can stand proxy for
the other’s description, and that the primary axis of the dialogue is between the 2 directors as a
whole and the matcher. Thus, on collective items, they seem to be acting as a party in the sense
explicated in chapter 5, whereas on dyadic items, one director becomes an inactive peripheral
participant, i.e. a non-member in the interacting parties.
That the directors act as a party on collective items is, in addition to the above, evidenced by
the patterns of Collaborative Completions or Split Utterances produced by the participants in this
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experiment. Recall that one of the ways in which parties may be projected, or party membership
displayed is according to Lerner (1993), via collaborative completions or split utterances (Lerner,
1991), by a participant of another’s utterance such that both parts of the completed turn are
addressed to someone else. In this manner, the 2 participants display to a third that they are in
alignment with respect to the current topic; and in the absence of negative feedback from the first
participant on the completion by the second, they are equally responsible/committed to what was
jointly uttered. Such split utterances also seem to be one way in which parties already projected
and relevant may become manifest in interaction. In short, split utterances of this sort, provide
an empirical measure of the degree to which participants see themselves and act as members of
a party, in the sense explicated in chapter 5.
We therefore also carried out a post-hoc analysis of some of the conversational transcripts
gathered in this experiment, for split utterances according to the protocol developed by (Purver,
Howes, Healey, & Gregoromichelaki, 2009, to appear). This protocol has been reliably applied
between independent coders. In addition, the split utterances were coded according to who pro-
duced the two parts of the split:
• Within (party): the two directors
• Across (parties): one director and the matcher
• Self: the same participant
As table 7.4 indicates, splits between the directors’ utterances (Within) appear almost exclu-
sively on collective items. Moreover, although explicit address cues are rare in the dialogues, it
is implicit that both parts of these Within splits, produced by the directors are addressed to the
matcher (as the director who is the speaker of the first half of the split never responds to the sec-
ond director’s completion. The matcher does). This indicates, according to what we discussed
above, that the 2 directors act and see themselves as a party only during collective items, while on
dyadic ones, one of them falls outside all the interacting parties (single individuals in this case).
Table 7.4: Distribution of Split Utterances Over Collective vs. Dyadic Items
Within Across Self No Split
Collective Items 24 (3%) 25 (3%) 121 (14%) 672 (80%)
Dyadic Items 1 (0%) 62 (4%) 260 (17%) 1212 (79%)
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Taken together, the above constitute strong evidence that the directors are acting as a party
in the sense explicated in chapter 5, but only on collective items. This therefore shows, in ad-
dition, that party formations are tied to topic, such that upon and in virtue of topic shifts, the
arrangements of the participants into the active, interacting parties could change.
7.4.2 Sensitivity to who said what
We pointed out above, that regardless of whether the antecedent context was collective or dyadic,
the antecedent owner is more likely to respond to an RF than the other director. And when the
other director does respond, she often responds with a local interpretation and not a distant one.
Whenever she does respond with a distant interpretation, except in 1 case, the antecedent context
is collective - as would be expected, since in dyadic antecedent contexts the other director bears
little or no responsibility whatsoever towards what is being said as she does not see the item.
The paucity of distant interpretations in the non-antecedent-owner directors’ responses when
compared to the antecedent owners’, suggests that they have not been able to interpret the RF
relative to the distant antecedent context, even when it was collective. So even when some
participants are organised into parties, a party member, is more sensitive to what she, herself, has
said. She remembers it better than what other co-members have said.
But anecdotally, in normal circumstances, such fragments would have more local antecedents
and therefore be easily interpretable for all the party members. Given the higher likelihood of
responses from the antecedent owners, the responsibility to repair/discuss a previous utterance
seems to remain, at least initially2, with the speaker of that utterance and not the other party
members.
7.4.3 New Parties Established: Divergence of dialogue contexts
As just discussed, there’s strong evidence that the directors act as a party on collective items.
The analysis of the accessibility of antecedents (distribution of local vs. distant interpretations),
however, is not fully conclusive. Nonetheless, it seems to be strongly consistent with the account
that follows:
The distribution of the antecedent owners’ interpretations of the RFs, when the intervening
context is collective, indicates that when a participant is locally a member of the interacting
parties, and hence is a primary participant, there’s a strong contention between the contexts
2‘at least initially’ because we showed in chapter 5 that failure by one member to address an issue, will
lead to some sort of compensation, by the other members
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against which, a RF with a distant antecedent, sent to them at that point, is assessed. There’s a
considerable tendency on the part of primary participants (party members) in this experiment to
interpret the fragment not against this distant context, but the local one (this tendency, however,
is reduced from the previous experiment). As mentioned above, the antecedent owner seems
equally likely to get a local or distant interpretation, when the intervening context is collective.
This is despite the fact that all these fragments have their antecedents in a prior, distant context
and have not been repeated since, and hence contain often unambiguous semantic cues as to the
context against which they are to be assessed, indicating that the local context has priority for the
active, party members.
By contrast, when the antecedent owner is a peripheral participant with respect to the cur-
rent Tangam (topic), this contention seems to disappear almost completely. The most striking
generalisation across the two experiments, is that the local conversational context is a lot less
available to a participant who is locally uninvolved, as compared with the party members who
are actively contributing, i.e. the peripheral participants are only weakly attached to the local
context. This, as briefly noted in the previous chapter, seems to be because of the publicly held
assumption among the ratified participants, that the peripheral participant has no concern, goal
or responsibility with respect to the current topic/context: “Why would anyone ask me about the
current Tangram? They know I don’t see it and I haven’t said anything about it”. Peripheral
participants, then, are more likely to interpret an elliptical utterance against the last context in
which they were a primary participant. Here, this is the distant context in which they produced
the antecedent.
Peripheral participants then, as those who, in virtue of a new topic, fall outside the new parties
(comprised of single individuals in this experiment) projected or made relevant by that topic, are
distinguished from the members of these parties, in that the dialogue context is ‘suspended’ for
the peripheral participants, while it ‘moves forward’ for the members of the locally interacting
parties. The local context, that is, the set of utterances being currently exchanged in the interac-
tion between the current parties is a lot less available to the peripheral participant as antecedents
of elliptical utterances. For such peripheral participants, the (distant) questions or topics with
respect to which they were last a primary participant, remain more salient as the background
against which elliptical utterances, addressed to them, get resolved. Therefore, at topic junctures
where the arrangement of the participants in the active, interacting parties changes, dialogue
contexts diverge systematically according to who is and isn’t a member of the newly established
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parties.
If the account given above is correct, what this experiment adds to what we found in the previ-
ous chapter, is that a side-participant party member, independently and in spite of her temporary
lack of overt feedback, will be more strongly attached to the local context, than a peripheral side-
participant who in virtue of the current topic is not a member of any of the interacting parties and
is only weakly attached to the local context. The primary side-participant’s view of the dialogue
context ‘moves forward’, evenly, with the speaker or addressee co-member. In the previous ex-
periment on the other hand, the primary participants were always speakers or addressees, and
therefore questions as regard the divergence of dialogue contexts for party members and non-
members weren’t addressed.
In short, the results from this chapter indicate that one and the same utterance can give rise
to systematically divergent contextual increments on the information states of party members vs.
non-members, resulting in the systematic divergence of the context of the dialogue for these par-
ticipants, manifested in the disparity between the interpretations assigned to similar RFs received
by them.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we provided experimental evidence that party formations are tied to topic, such
that at topic junctures new parties may be established and old ones suspended.
The analysis of the accessibility of distant contexts/antecedents, shows that at topic junctures,
when a participant is removed in virtue of the new topic from a previously projected party, and
thus becomes a peripheral participant, the context that she shared as a primary participant (party
member) with other primary participants before the new party was established, is ‘suspended’.
All the while, the shared context between those who ‘carried on’ as primary participants for the
duration of the new topic ‘moves forward’. This is consistent with the results from the previous
chapter, in that a locally uninvolved and indifferent peripheral participant is only very weakly
attached to the local context (the current topic and the set of sub-topics thereof) and hence very
likely to interpret an elliptical utterance addressed to them, against the background of a distant
context in which they were last a primary participant.
Particular to this chapter is the experimental evidence, indicating that party members and
non-members effect systematically divergent contextual increments/updates. This gives rise to
the systematic emergence of distinct dialogue contexts in conversations where the organisation
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of participants into parties is, in virtue of topic shifts, dynamic. This is a characteristic which is
likely to hold of a considerable proportion of naturally occurring dialogue.
Moreover, the results indicate that the responsibility for (initial) repair and discussion re-
mains with the speaker of an utterance, even when the utterance is produced by a member of a
party. In other words, the participant who produces an utterance is much more likely to address
any problems in others’ understanding or discussion regarding that utterance, even when this
participant is a member of a party.
In the next chapter we will explore the likely implications that the patterns observed in this
chapter and the previous two could have for formal/computational models of dialogue context.
In particular we will discuss how these findings may be construed within Ginzburg’s question
based approach to tracking contextual change, and present some tentative ideas as to how the
model could be transformed to capture these patterns.
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Chapter 8
Concluding Discussions: Ramifications for models of
dialogue and future work
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will first summarise the empirical findings and the overall argument of this
thesis. We will then try to explore the likely implications that these findings have for Ginzburg’s
question based approach to modelling the dynamics of dialogue context. It should be pointed
out at the outset that we will not delve into the formal details of Ginzburg’s model, and indeed
that the details of the choices to be made, of interaction protocols and corresponding contextual
update rules in the model are, partly, underdetermined by the empirical phenomena observed
here. Nonetheless, these phenomena do seem to create significant challenges for the existing
approaches and these will be highlighted.
8.2 Empirical Findings
8.2.1 Parties in conversation
We have shown that multi-party dialogues can lead to collective states of understanding or shared
contexts that, unlike those in dyadic dialogue, are not reducible to the individual, pair-wise in-
teractions that gave rise to them. I.e. contexts that are equally shared between and accessible to
the participants, in spite of the local/temporary differences in their participant statuses and hence
their levels of overt interaction/feedback. We argued that these collective contexts are the result,
at least, of those dialogues or segments therein, during which proper subsets of the ratified partic-
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ipants are organised into parties. The essence of a party thus formed, is that a dialogue act/move
from one of its members is taken to be associated not with that particular individual alone, but
with the party as a whole, via a process that we dubbed grounding by proxy. In this manner, one
member can stand proxy for other members, in performing the action that satisfies the constraints
imposed by the current context of the conversation, whatever they may be (e.g. answering a ques-
tion, signalling acknowledgement/acceptance etc). All the while, the rest of the silent/inactive
members are taken to have effected the same contextual updates as the individual member - the
proxy - that provided the overt feedback and thus built up the resulting communal/collective con-
text. We provided causal, experimental evidence for the practical reality of parties characterised
via grounding by proxy, in the form of local and global compensations on the part of other mem-
bers for the (apparent) failure of the proxy to ground, i.e. others’ compensations for her failure
to satisfy the constraints imposed by the current conversational context.
Recall that Schegloff (1995) proposes that the rules of the turn taking system operate in the
first instance between parties - as higher order entities than individuals - in such a way that turn
taking across individuals in dyadic dialogue becomes a special case of turn taking across parties
- comprised of single individuals in this case. What we say above, opens up the possibility of
a pragmatic equivalent of the same idea. Accordingly, grounding could also operate in the first
instance between parties rather than individuals. So the contextual updates incurred as a result
- or the pragmatic force - of a dialogue move from one party member, are - in the absence of
negative feedback from other members - applied to the party as a whole (same for all the rest
of the members of that party). As we’ll discuss in more detail below, contextual update rules
akin to those in Larsson (2002), could remain the same as in dyadic dialogue, but instead operate
on/between parties rather than individuals (though see below on what happens when a participant
falls outside all active/interacting parties). Grounding in dyadic dialogue then becomes a special
case of this where the parties in question are comprised of single individuals.
Parties also become manifest in participants’ patterns of non-verbal behaviour
Another important point is that party formations seem also be manifested in how the participants’
non-verbal behaviour is organised. For instance, Healey and Battersby (2009) present an example
where, arguably, the three persons in interaction are organised into two parties: two of them are
instructors and the other is a learner. This example shows how the gaze of the learner is fixed
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upon one of the instructors, A, while A ‘confers’1 with the other instructor, B, regarding what
he (they) should tell the learner. After this conference episode, what B says in response to A’s
query/elicitation of help from B, is told back to the learner by A. So, arguably, via the organisation
of gaze, the floor between the 2 parties is ‘put on hold’ while the conferring takes place or while,
as discussed above, grounding by proxy has its effect.
It is generally expectable that within what Kendon (1976) has called an F-formation, the non-
verbal behaviour of the participants, viz. mutual orientation, proximity, posture shifts and gaze,
would ‘pick out’ or index subgroups of the participants as parties, owing to patterns unique to
the members of that party possibly in a ‘privileged’ shared-space (say the shared-space that is
between A and B but not accessible to C in the same way). This can be thought of, roughly, as
temporary F-formations within F-formations.
When do participants negotiate common ground among all the members?
It seems we are now also in a position to explain some of the data gathered by Carletta et al.
(2002). As discussed in section 3.4.4, their claim is that small group discussions can be char-
acterised as a series of pair-wise discussions with overhearers, with process loss on the part of
the third silent party (the ‘overhearer’) due to material which is merely overheard. Contrary
to this claim, as summarised above, we have shown that there are dialogues in which a side-
participant can, in the absence of any overt feedback, reach the same level of grounding as the
dyad directly engaged in interaction. So there’s no (grounding) process loss in this case (but
see below about peripheral participants). Support for the claim that small group discussion is
primarily comprised of pair-wise discussions comes from Parker’s (1988) data, which we have
talked about previously. But we should note that, according to the above, it cannot be assumed
that these ‘pair-wise’ discussions are, in fact, dyadic. In other words, via grounding by proxy,
it doesn’t really matter who is doing the talking so long as he is acting as a spokesperson for a
party, including other members who may be silent for the moment. So this claim is potentially
misleading.
Moreover, Carletta et al. (2002) claim that, in small group discussions which require a high
degree of mutual understanding at every stage, common ground is negotiated explicitly among
all group members. We argued that the design of their experimental task was forcing this. We
can, now, say more about this: their experiment involved 2 route-givers and a route-follower. So
1in the sense used by Lerner (1993) and discussed in chapter 5: upon the failure by one of the party
members to ground
8.2. Empirical Findings 177
the two route-givers, on the view developed in chapter 5, interact with the route-follower as a
single party. The fact that the route-givers were explicitly negotiating common ground between
themselves, is predicted by our notion of grounding by proxy. As discussed, this predicts that if
a member of a party fails to ground a contribution, other members should somehow compensate.
We showed in chapter 5, that this compensation often takes the form of ‘conferring’ among the
party members. Given the discrepancies between the two route-givers’ maps, we’d expect one
route-giver to often fail to ground what the other is telling the follower (e.g. when she uses
referents/landmarks absent on the other’s map), leading to direct interactions/conferring among
the party members themselves. This data, in fact, provides indirect support for our claim about
the effects entailed by grounding by proxy. We might say, in general, that grounding by proxy
entails that the less aligned the relevant parts of the information states of party members are to
begin with, the more intra-party conferring there will be.
Given all this, one hypothesis is that the ratified participants who fall inside and outside all
active/interacting parties for a local stretch of talk, dubbed as primary and peripheral participants
respectively, need to be distinguished in terms of grounding responsibilities - entailed by ground-
ing by proxy - and correspondingly the level of grounding (understanding and acceptance) that,
in the absence of overt feedback (i.e. as side-participants), they are assumed to have reached.
8.2.2 Emergence of distinct Dialogue Contexts
Given the above and the additional corpus evidence relating to long-distance resolution possi-
bilities for ellipses discussed in chapter 6, we hypothesised that the locally involved/primary
participants should be strongly attached to the local conversational context (expressed in terms
of the higher saliency of potential antecedents in this context and a strong tendency to interpret
distant fragments incorrectly against them), and should thus have an impaired level of access to
a distant context/antecedent. By contrast, the locally peripheral participants should have no such
attachment to the local context and therefore the distant context, in which they were a primary
participant, should be more salient/accessible for them. We showed experimentally that this is
indeed the case: while it was the utterances in the local conversational context (an overarching
question and a set of sub-questions during which the current parties remain unchanged) that were
available and had priority for the primary participants as antecedents of the (elliptical) utterances
received by them, for a peripheral participant, this context was a ‘distant’ set of utterances, during
which they were last (at some earlier stage of the dialogue) a primary participant. In other words,
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there was a systematic disparity between primary and peripheral participants’ interpretations of
‘equally elliptical’ (on average) Reprise Fragments, received from the same individual, all of
which were separated from their antecedents, by, on average, the same number of turns/topics.
We argued that this is evidence for the systematic emergence of distinct dialogue contexts
within one and the same conversation, as a result of one or more previously primary participants
falling outside the active/interacting parties for a local stretch of talk/topic. As we will argue
further below, at least some of the standard utterance by utterance update mechanisms of the
context that they shared as primary participants with other primary participants, prior to when the
new parties were established, are suspended. All the while, the corresponding parts of the shared
context between those who ‘carried on’ as primary participants ‘moves forward’ (See below for
how this may be construed within Ginzburg’s model). Consequently a single utterance can result
in systematically divergent contextual updates, applied to primary and peripheral participants’
information states/contexts, a phenomenon we dub ‘Pragmatic Pluralism’ in dialogue.
8.3 Two systems of Participant Roles: Party Membership vs.
Goffman’s Participation Framework
Given the above, it seems that in conversation, there are two systems of participant roles, both
dynamic and emergent from the interaction itself, but with distinct grounds on which they are
distinguished.
The first, elaborated at length previously, is Goffman’s (1981) participation framework, con-
stituted by a dynamically assigned set of roles. The ratified roles within the participation frame-
work - which are what we’ve been concerned with throughout this thesis - are determined by
reference to who, locally in an utterance-event is addressed. In other words, the speaker either by
the design of her utterance, or through gaze, posture, gesture and/or the use of another’s proper
name, selects them as next speaker. Those others not selected in this fashion are side-participants
to that utterance. The ratified roles in the participation framework thus determine who should
speak next.
The second system on the other hand, is that of peripheral vs. primary participation. As
mentioned above, the difference between a primary and a peripheral participant seems to be one
of responsibility/concern/commitment, publicly known and assumed by all the (ratified) partici-
pants, with respect to the current conversational topic. These roles can be more persistent, since
often, a single overarching topic can be under discussion throughout a whole conversation or a
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long segment therein.
These systems of roles aren’t totally independent since, as we have discussed in chapter 5,
the participation framework can be exploited to project parties; e.g. via collective addressing,
making the addressees equally responsible for responding to what has been uttered. Nonetheless,
if we assume, as we have done, that a party is established and relevant, then a primary side-
participant, we have shown, has an equal status with respect to grounding/contextual updates to
a primary addressee (except for the fact that the addressee is responsible to speak next and thus
stand proxy for the other (side-participant) members). Moreover, a primary side-participant is
treated differently from a peripheral side-participant in terms of contextual updates (we will try
to express this below in terms of Ginzburg’s QUD-Downdate and FACTS-Incrementation).
The distinction between peripheral and primary participation, thus allows us to abstract away
from the local, utterance-level configurations of the participation framework - which seem to
affect solely who should speak next - in determining what contextual updates should take place
for the participants. Instead of the individual utterance, it is the topic and the relations holding
between a participant’s publicly presumed responsibilities/concerns with respect to that topic,
that determine what kinds of contextual updates should take place for her.
This provides us with a way of clustering these roles where the original (ratified) hearer
roles in the participation framework are used to manage turn-taking obligations while party sta-
tus/membership determines contextual updates for side-participants. Note that some combina-
tions aren’t possible: an addressee is never a peripheral participant. So effectively, this just allows
us to distinguish peripheral from primary side-participants, which in a way, constitutes the whole
of what this thesis is about.
Now recall Clark and Carlson’s (1982) distinction between Addressee Directed and Partici-
pant Directed speech acts (very briefly discussed in section 3.6). The former correspond to the
original speech act types, proposed by Searle (1969) (Request, Promise etc.) and the latter to the
corresponding ‘informative’ acts directed at all the participants. According to this distinction,
whereas the illocutionary force of a speech act affects only the addressees, the side participants
are only ‘informed’ of this, and hence only acquire the belief that such and such speech act
was performed. We may now say, given the notion of party membership, that the Addressee
Directed acts should really be Party Directed Acts. As we have shown, when a party is contex-
tually relevant and already projected, in the absence of negative feedback from a side-participant
co-member, the contextual increments and the commitments brought about as a result of a di-
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alogue move (speech act) from one party member (the proxy), affect the party as a whole. So
the illocutionary force of e.g. a promise from one party member affects the rest of the - possibly
side-participant - members as well as the actual speaker of the promise. Participant Directed
informative acts on the other hand seem applicable to peripheral participants (see below for how
this may be construed within Ginzburg’s model as divergence of the peripheral and primary par-
ticipants’ DGB.FACTS).
Note that we have appealed to the notion of membership of active/interacting parties, to
distinguish peripheral from primary participants, whilst partly characterising the kinds of mutual
grounding responsibilities that hold among the members of a party and the kinds of contextual
update or common ground increments that in the absence of feedback should take place for them.
However, none of this really answers the question of what exactly constitutes a party. What are
the necessary relations that should hold between the information states of a set of participants,
and a given topic (modelled as a question under discussion in Ginzburg’s framework), for them
to be regarded as belonging to a single party with respect to that topic? This is an important open
question that has not been addressed in this thesis. We have not, in other words, defined parties,
but have assumed rather that they are projected and relevant, and have analysed the effects (rather
than reasons/causes) of party formations.
Nevertheless, as we have discussed, parties do seem to be strongly tied to topics/questions.
In what specific arrangement now, the ratified participants are organised into parties, given a
topic/question, seems to be strongly tied to what relations, if any, are presumed publicly (by all
the ratified participants), to hold between each participant’s concerns/goals and that topic. These
relations may be determined in advance, e.g. in formal decision making meetings where the
participants have predetermined roles to play, and in all the experiments carried out here. On the
other hand, they could, as we have noted in chapter 5, be emergent from the interaction itself,
e.g. when two participants create a coalition by adopting the same point of view with regards
to a question under discussion, or as noted above, in specific configurations of the participation
framework with respect to an utterance-event, e.g. collective addressing.
Henceforth, we will in our considerations of the likely implications of our findings for mod-
els of dialogue, be making the simplifying assumption, mostly true in our experiments, that as
a question is raised it is clear to the participants in advance, who is a peripheral and who is
a primary participant: we’ll assume that questions are indexed by or determine the specific ar-
rangement in which the ratified participants are organised into parties; i.e. that questions ‘project’
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parties.
8.4 Ginzburg’s KoS
Ginzburg (2009) states that the basic adequacy criterion of a theory of meaning for dialogue is:
the ability to characterize for any utterance type the update [in context] that emerges
in the aftermath of successful mutual understanding and the full range of possible
clarification requests otherwise.
This presupposes the view proposed in Dynamic Semantics (e.g. (Stalnaker, 1978; Lewis,
1979)) and adopted by Ginzburg. Specifically, utterance meaning is conceived of as ‘context
update potential’. In other words, meaning is explicated as the effects or changes that an utterance
can potentially bring about in the commonly shared contextual resources that conversationalists
are able to track. Conversely, utterances are understood or interpreted against the background
of the already existing context. That is, the content of an utterance emerges as an instantiation,
or ‘contextual anchoring’ of an abstract construct which is the semantics associated with that
particular sequence of words, arising from the Grammar. Meanings can therefore be formalised
as functions from context to content.
Contexts or Information States, on this view, are therefore seen, as a (structured) set of re-
sources enabling the interpretation of utterances and altered by such interpretations.
The model should, on this view:
1. Capture the highly constrained set of follow-up contributions that are coherent/felicitous
at any given point in conversation.
2. For each utterance type it should specify the change/update that the utterance brings about
in context (information states of the participants)
3. facilitate the interpretation/resolution of elliptical utterances: Clarification Ellipsis, Short
Answers, VP-ellipsis and the like.
In section 2.7.1 we sketched how these can be achieved for dyadic dialogue, in Ginzburg’s
model of shared context: the Dialogue Game Board (DGB) structured as having 3 components:
LATEST-MOVE, QUD and FACTS. We discussed how each of these components contribute to
the satisfaction of the above. The dynamics of how each utterance or move, depending on its type
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(e.g. querying vs. assertion) changes the context for the speaker and addressee were discussed.
We also looked at how interaction protocols arise from the the composition of what Larsson
(2002) has called Conversational (update) Rules. Conversational Rules, are mappings from one
DGB state to another. The range of possible next utterance/move types and the updates that they
give rise to is captured by Conversational Rules.
In this section we’ll point out one additional aspect of this theory that is relevant for our later
discussion of what changes may be necessary in the model to handle multi-party dialogue. We
will, afterwards, discuss the implications of our empirical findings for Ginzburg’s approach, with
the above criteria in mind.
8.4.1 Divergence of DGBs
What we haven’t discussed before which is crucial for our subsequent discussion, is that the
speaker and addressee maintain separate views of the context of the conversation, that is, they
maintain separate DGBs, corresponding to the public component of each participant’s context.
The DGB does not however, exhaust a participant’s information state. There are private compo-
nents too (unpublicised plans/beliefs/intentions etc.)2.
Although, in dyadic dialogue, the DGBs of the participants are identical most of the time,
they can, on occasion, be divergent which is why they are relativised to individual participants
in the first place. This happens because: “the speaker is committed to know what his utterance
means, whereas an addressee has no such commitment” (Ginzburg, 2009), and hence occurs
when there’s a misalignment between the information states of speaker and addressee, necessi-
tating meta-communicative clarification interaction. When the addressee realises that she doesn’t
know what the speaker intended to convey, before clarification interaction ensues, the QUD com-
ponents of the participants’ DGBs are distinct. The addressee has pushed the content question
(paraphrasable roughly as “what did the speaker mean?”) on her QUD while the speaker has not
yet done so. We will not go into any more detail here. Suffice it to say that in modelling dyadic
dialogue, distinctness of DGBs draws solely on meta-communicative interaction.
We mention this in order to emphasise that divergence of DGBs is not a systematic occurrence
2The issue of which parts of a participant’s information state are public and which private is still a great
source of contention. It relates, partly, to the contention among psycholinguists as to what extent conver-
sational partners take each other into account during production/comprehension; so whether participants
behave egocentrically or take the unpublicised part of their interlocutor’s information state into account
(via ‘other modelling’). We have discussed this in chapter 2 and will not expand on it any further here (see
also Ginzburg (2009), chapter 4 for a discussion)
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in dyadic dialogue. As noted, it arises as a result of mishearing, misunderstanding or other more
or less ‘random’ mismatches between the speaker and hearer’s points of view. Importantly it
does not arise as a result of standard utterance by utterance DGB update mechanisms.
But, as we will argue below, divergence of DGBs is a systematic effect in multi-party dia-
logues. In fact, it seems that, at least, conversational update rules responsible for the utterance
by utterance transitions of QUD, as tracking the resources available to participants for ellipsis
resolution need to be relativised to participant role (As determined by party status/membership,
discussed above and not in Goffman’s sense which seems to be responsible for tracking turn-
taking obligations).
8.4.2 Conversational Update Rules could operate on parties in the first instance
It seems that the most important choice to be made with respect to scaling up conversational
rules, motivated for dyadic dialogue, is to what extent these rules are to be relativised to par-
ticipant role. Above, we discussed two systems of participant roles: Goffman’s original ratified
roles and primary vs. peripheral participants. As noted, this allows us to abstract away from the
local, utterance level configurations of the participation framework, in determining what contex-
tual update should be effected by each participant. Primary side-participants can reach the same
level of grounding as the co-participant (the proxy) who is either speaking or being addressed.
We therefore propose that update rules should operate in the first instance on parties - as higher
order entities than individuals. This means that the preconditions and the effects of an update
rule will be the same for all the members of a party. This is, in effect, the pragmatic equivalent
of Schegloff’s (1995) remarks about turn-taking rules, operating between parties rather than in-
dividuals. Goffman’s original ratified roles on the other hand will be used to manage turn-taking
obligations. We will discuss this in a little more detail below.
8.4.3 Pragmatic Pluralism in Dialogue: Relativising update rules to participant role
As noted, given the empirical findings summarised above about how peripheral participants are
distinguished from primary ones, it seems that update rules governing QUD downdate/update
and FACTS-incrementation do need to be different for peripheral vs. primary participants. In
particular, as we will argue in more detail below, it seems that when a peripheral participant is
present during/with respect to a question under discussion and the set of sub-questions thereof,
the standard update mechanisms responsible for the transitions of QUD at least, are suspended
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for the peripheral participant, something that we’ve called suspension of shared contexts. This
implies that one and the same utterance will effect different updates on the DGBs of primary
vs. peripheral participants. The DGBs of peripheral and primary participants can thus be sys-
tematically divergent. This leads to ‘Pragmatic Pluralism’ in dialogue. But note that we’re not
completely in a muddle, as there does seem to be some systematicity to these divergent updates.
As noted, this kind of divergence is very different from that arising from temporary, random
mismatches between the participants’ information states in dyadic dialogue, which draws solely
on meta-communicative interaction. Idealising assumptions of perfect communication, identical
semantic ontologies etc. will ensure that the DGBs of the participants in dyadic dialogue are,
at least most of the time, identical. However, the systematic kind of divergence in multi-party
dialogues mentioned above cannot be accounted for in such terms. Although we demonstrate this
divergence using probe Reprise Fragments, it has little to do with miscommunication. Instead
the disparity between the peripheral and primary participants’ interpretations of these Reprise
Fragments points to the distinctness of the questions which are at that point QUD-Maximal for
them, resulting as we’ve argued from the publicly presumed lack of concern, responsibility and
participation on the part of the peripheral participant with respect to the question which is QUD-
Maximal for the primary participants. One cannot therefore account for the pragmatic structuring
of multi-party dialogues - corresponding to all three of the success criteria mentioned above -
without taking this into account.
8.5 Contextual updates for Primary vs. Peripheral participants
8.5.1 The Cautiously Optimistic Grounding Strategy
As sketched in chapter 2, according to Clark and Schaefer (1989), most models of dialogue
before them, had taken an autonomous view on communication, i.e. they tacitly assumed either
that:
• Once something is uttered it is automatically added to the common ground.
• Or once something is uttered it is automatically added to the common ground unless there’s
evidence to the contrary (negative feedback/repair initiation).
They argued, however, that participants necessarily always collaborate before they can reach
the grounding criterion. That is, positive evidence of understanding regarding an utterance -
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whether tacit in the form of a relevant next turn or explicit in the form of an acknowledgement
- should be required before the content of the utterance can be added to the common ground.
They present systematic procedures for doing this. These were later spelt out formally by Traum
(1994), in terms of Collaborative Conversational Acts.
Larsson (2002) suggests that the difference between the tacit grounding assumptions made
by different models is one of degree of optimism. Namely, Clark’s account is pessimistic in that
in the absence of positive feedback it never assumes that something is grounded. Other models
criticised by Clark and Schaefer (1989) are optimistic: they don’t require any feedback and add
the content of an utterance to the common ground as soon as it has been uttered.
Larsson (2002) introduces a third strategy for grounding: the cautiously optimistic. This is,
basically, the same as the optimistic grounding assumption, except that it facilitates backtracking.
So, on this view, by default, a participant can assume an utterance as grounded as soon as it’s
been uttered, but if there’s evidence to the contrary (negative feedback), she should be able to
revise the common ground, easily and, crucially, without recourse to intricate belief revision
mechanisms, so as to reverse all the effects of the erroneous assumption that the utterance was
grounded. Larsson (2002) shows that this can be achieved in the model, by keeping the previous
state of the DGB ‘around’, so as to enable effortless backtracking.
8.5.2 Primary Co-participants and an essentially defeasible Communal Acceptance
In multi-party dialogues, this strategy can indeed be very useful. As we showed in chapter 4, side-
participants can, in withholding of negative feedback, reach a level of understanding comparable
to direct addressees. This makes the cautiously optimistic strategy specially suited for side-
participants. Kronlid (2008) suggests, in this regard, that the only reasonable grounding strategy
for side-participants is the cautiously optimistic.
Along the same lines, as briefly discussed in section 3.11, Ginzburg and Fernandez (2005)
propose the Add Side Participants (ASP) principle, whereby the dyadic interaction protocols
in the model are transformed so as to handle multi-party interaction. This is, of course, one
of the possible transformations which seems particularly relevant here. It enforces communal
acceptance, where an acceptance of an assertion by the first participant to respond counts as
acceptance by all, and hence results in FACTS-Update and QUD-Downdate, for all those who
did not respond. This means that under the protocol induced, once an assertion is accepted by
one participant, there’s no way for others to disagree with the assertion. The authors mention that
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the motivation behind this is the lack of a speaker’s capacity to monitor everyone for acceptance
signals. This seems right, though as we will see below, communal acceptance cannot really be
understood without the opportunity, if not the obligation, for those primary participants who did
not explicitly accept the assertion initially, to dissent from it at distance after it’s been accepted
by a co-participant (the proxy).
Nevertheless, given the results from the previous two chapters, the cautiously optimistic strat-
egy seems only applicable to primary participants (importantly not peripheral ones as discussed
in the next section below), that is, those co-participants in the same party, on behalf of whom the
current speaker (the proxy) does the grounding. As elaborated in chapter 5, the proxy can - on
behalf of other co-participants in the same party - be seen as either:
1. responding to one outside the party, that is, providing a second pair-part to a first already
uttered by somebody outside that party, i.e. proxy in response Or
2. producing a first pair-part addressed at somebody outside the party, i.e. proxy in speaking
The difference between these is the utterance or local context, giving rise to the constraints
to be collectively satisfied, via grounding by proxy, by the next speaker. We will here explore
the first of these two cases, with respect to assertions, since it can prove problematic for in-
teraction protocols which enforce communal acceptance and hence will not allow non-adjacent
clarification interaction or discussion.
Let’s call the person who provides the first pair-part FS and the one who provides the response
NS and those for whom NS stands proxy, SP’s. NS is either chosen directly by FS - when
the addressee-set is a singleton - or she self-selects - if there’s more than one addressee, or no
particular addressee is selected (addressing by attribution (Clark & Carlson, 1982)).
If the notion of grounding by proxy is to be respected, it seems necessary that SP should have
the opportunity, if not the obligation to butt in if, from her point of view, the response from NS
is divergent from what she would have said or if it fails to secure a sufficient response.3 This
divergence can occur on at least two levels of grounding (recall section 2.3.3):
3In a situation where it is clear to all that an an acceptance move from an individual belongs to a
party as a whole, then the commitments brought about by the acceptance move, in the absence of negative
feedback from the other members, also belong to the party as a whole. If one of those who have stayed
silent over the issue and hence was taken to have accepted it, subsequently complains, it seems reasonable
for the proxy to say: “well if you disagreed you should have said so”
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• Identification/Understanding: if SP cannot interpret FS’s utterance while NS has acknowl-
edged it.
• Acceptance: if SP does not agree with FS’s utterance while NS has accepted it or vice
versa.
The first of these would lead to non-adjacent clarification interaction between FS and SP and
the second to non-adjacent rejection/discussion. If communal acceptance is in place, both of
these would require some sort of backtracking at least on FS’s DGB.FACTS. We have presented
corpus examples of both of these cases in chapter 4 (excerpts 4.3 and 4.5).
To accommodate the second of the above cases (divergence on acceptance), Ginzburg and
Fernandez (2005) propose Distributed Acceptance, whereby the acceptance of an assertion does
not necessarily involve the adjacency of the assertion in question. Corresponding QUD-Downdate
and FACTS-Update rules are in this case distinct for the asserter and the audience, such that the
asserter does not downdate her QUD and update her FACTS, unless there’s an acceptance move
from every addressee, whereas an addressee downdates QUD and updates FACTS, as soon as
she herself has made an acceptance move. As a result, an addressee’s DGB is not identical to the
asserter’s until everybody has accepted the assertion. But what if the first addressee accepts and
the next rejects? Doesn’t the asserter need to maintain a separate FACTS for each member of the
audience? What about the audience? A single DGB per participant does not allow any variation
between what a participant takes the others to have accepted. After all, we do seem to remember
after we’ve had a conversation with other people, if they disagreed on an issue and with which
one we agreed. One can come out of a discussion and say: “A and B didn’t in the end agree about
Q. But personally I think I was with A on that one.”. One FACTS per participant does not seem to
allow this. Perhaps the propositions on FACTS need to be indexed to specific participants, which
is not very different from indexing FACTS itself. This seems to be, as we will discuss summarily
at the end of this chapter, motivation for multiple DGBs per participant.
In any case, the Distributed Acceptance protocol seems unrealistic, since often a primary
side-participant or an addressee who does not respond overtly, is taken, as we have shown, to
have grounded the assertion in question. Insofar as parties are publicly established and relevant,
communal acceptance with backtracking seems like a more empirically viable solution.4
4It might be worth noting that since communal acceptance is here taken to be a default, the growth of
DGBs will be non-monotonic.
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The crucial point to be taken in this section is that if any dialogue move by an individual
is to be taken as belonging to a party (which we have shown can be the case), then it is only
fair that the co-participants in the same party should get a reasonable window of opportunity to
dissent from that act. But until when? It seems necessary to allow clarification and discussion at
longer distances, at least until a new unrelated topic has been raised by one of the participants, at
which point the opportunity is lost and the utterances exchanged grounded for all those primary
participants who did not provide any feedback. A question should therefore remain accessible
somewhere on the DGB, until a new unrelated question/topic has been raised. But not on QUD,
as this would allow infelicitous long-distance NSUs:
Non-adjacent discussion/rejection or clarifications seem to be on average less elliptical. For
example, an utterance of a highly elliptical “no” or “what?” almost always attaches itself to the
immediately prior utterance, whereas in these cases it is not the immediately prior utterance that
needs to be rejected/clarified. It seems therefore that in such cases, certain bits of the utterance
to be clarified/rejected need to be repeated, or the clarification/rejection be sentential instead of
an NSU, so as to pick out unambiguously the (sub-)utterance that needs to be clarified/rejected.
E.g. a Reprise Fragment or a Literal Reprise (as noted previously, Purver (2004) shows that in
the BNC, the more distant a Clarification Request is from the trouble-source, the less elliptical
its form will be) in the case of clarification and the whole non-elliptical negation of the utterance
to be rejected in case of rejections.5 But QUD is used in Ginzburg’s model, both to constrain the
range of semantically relevant follow ups and to resolve NSUs. Thus, it appears that we might
need separate structures to play these roles, as in multi-party dialogues, the unresolvedness of
a question does not always coincide with the felicity of an elliptical follow-up specific to that
question. We will not go into any more detail in this regard but as Kronlid (2008) points out in the
his concluding discussion, Larsson’s (2002) ISSUES in addition to QUD, seems to be a possible
solution, whereby QUD would contain those questions constraining the set of elliptical follow-
ups while ISSUES will contain all questions which have not yet been resolved, including those
on QUD. Roughly then, utterances that are to be built as ‘pragmatically next’ to the questions on
ISSUES\QUD need to be sentential.
5This is what we’ve called ‘context re-raising’ (section 3.10), but unfortunately due to time and space
limitations haven’t really been able to identify what forms these take, or indeed exactly when it is necessary
to re-raise
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Grounding in ‘chunks’?
For primary side-participants, then, the cautiously optimistic grounding strategy seems viable.
But, as argued, this is only reasonable if, for any assertion in context, those side-participants
who cede the floor to a co-participant viz. the proxy, get a reasonable window of opportunity
to dissent from/clarify the assertion, while communal acceptance is also in place. This means
that there might be a need for some additional structure on a participant’s DGB, which would
keep track of the provisionally grounded material, that is, the material which a primary side-
participant has produced no feed-back on, while a co-member has in her stead. In this manner if
there’s any subsequent dissent from the assertion on the part of the side-participant, this material
can be easily retracted. On the other hand, if the conversation moves on to a new unrelated topic,
all the material on that temporary structure is moved to the asserter’s permanent FACTS; hence
grounding in chunks.
8.5.3 Contextual updates for Peripheral Participants: Systematic Divergence of DGBs
As summarised at the beginning of this chapter, the experimental data from chapters 6 and 7, indi-
cate that in a single multi-party conversation, there’s potential for a systematic conflict between
a peripheral and a primary participant’s interpretations of similar Reprise Fragments received
from the same individual, at the same points in the conversation. This was due to the distinctness
of the contexts against which these fragments were being assessed. We argued that this is evi-
dence for the emergence of distinct shared-contexts and that these are indexed to specific sets of
participants.
There was a tendency on the part of primary participants, to interpret fragments ‘incorrectly’
against the local conversational context despite the fact that the fragments contained unambigu-
ous semantic cues referring to a distant antecedent: the primary participants were strongly at-
tached to the local context. For locally peripheral/uninvolved participants on the other hand, this
tendency almost totally disappears. They are quite weakly attached to the local context. When
they respond, they almost always interpret the fragment correctly against the distant context, that
is, the last context in which they were a primary participant. Let’s make this more explicit:
Suppose A, B and C are discussing question Q1 and a set of sub-questions thereof, dur-
ing which all three are primary participants. They are publicly assumed to be responsible for
what is being said regarding Q1. Now suppose that the discussion moves on to an unrelated
question Q2 during which one of them, say A, becomes a peripheral side-participant, who is
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publicly known not to have any responsibility or indeed anything to say about Q2 and she does
not do so. The results from these experiments indicate that, while at this point, a Reprise Frag-
ment with Q1 as antecedent, exchanged between B and C is often assessed/resolved against Q2
(strong attachment to the local context), those addressed at A by B or C are almost always cor-
rectly assessed/resolved against Q1, i.e. while Q2 has priority over Q1 as QUD-Maximal on the
B.DGB.QUD and C.DGB.QUD, on A.DGB.QUD, Q1 seems to have priority over Q2 as QUD-
Maximal. Therefore at that point, A.DGB.QUD is distinct from C.DGB.QUD and B.DGB.QUD.
But note that A, the peripheral participant with respect to Q2, can, intuitively speaking, al-
ways access the material exchanged between B and C about Q2 elliptically and hence it seems
reasonable that she should have Q2 as Maximal on her QUD as well as Q1. But on B.DGB.QUD
and C.DGB.QUD, it seems that Q1 should have been downdated. So we might say in this regard
that the standard QUD-downdate rules are, for peripheral participants, suspended. Moreover,
the ordering on A’s QUD is an essentially partial one, as there is more than one QUD-Maximal
question. We will not go into any more detail in this regard.
What happens to A’s DGB.FACT S one might ask? Is she, as a peripheral participant dur-
ing Q2, adding the material grounded between B and C to her FACTS? This choice is indeed
underdetermined by the empirical evidence available, and depends on what FACTS is for. We
might say though, that since B and C know that A has no concern with respect to Q2, they need
not assume anything, at least about A’s level of acceptance. The question of whether A has
accepted the material overheard doesn’t even arise; e.g. if B and C move on to the subject of
where the two of them should meet tomorrow, with A as a peripheral participant, the question
of whether A has accepted whether B and C should meet in Chiswick seems irrelevant while
she is nevertheless ratified and if asked later, would probably know where A and B are going to
meet. So if FACTS is used to represent the grounded material on the acceptance level (repre-
senting the public commitments and obligations brought about by the illocutionary force of the
utterances exchanged: long-term beliefs, obligations etc.) then we should adopt a pessimistic
grounding strategy for the peripheral participant. If on the other hand the grounded material is
represented on the DGB separately on each of these levels (e.g. using an obligation layer like
that of Matheson, Poesio, and Traum (2000) for acceptance) then we might adopt a cautiously
optimistic strategy on the identification/understanding level. FACTS-incrementation for periph-
eral participants, seems therefore to be also slightly different than those for primary participants,
at least on the acceptance level. While in the absence of feedback a primary side-participant is
8.5. Contextual updates for Primary vs. Peripheral participants 191
assumed by the speaker and addressee to have accepted the utterances exchanged between them
(and effected the commitments brought about by them), they need not assume anything of this
sort for a peripheral side-participant.
8.5.4 Multiple DGBs?
Note that what we say above about FACTS-incrementation for peripheral participants implies
indirectly that participants should have more than one FACTS on their DGBs, each representing
the commitments arising for every other participant present as these do not seem to coincide
for peripheral and primary participants. While the primary participants (party members), upon
acceptance of p, subscribe - jointly and publicly - to the belief that p, they need not assume any-
thing for the peripheral participant. That is, although it seems that the primary participants can
assume safely, in the absence of negative feedback, that the peripheral participant has grounded
the material on the understanding level (such that the primary participants assume that the pe-
ripheral participant knows that they have subscribed to p), they need not assume anything about
the peripheral participant’s subscription to p. Participants, then, seem to need to have separate
FACTS for every other participant, to represent these divergent commitments.
On the other hand, insofar as participants keep track of the uneven updates/downdates to
QUD, discussed above, this is further motivation for multiple DGBs on the information state of
each participant, one for every other participant present. While an update may take place on one
of these DGBs, it need not on the others or rather it need not be the same update.
Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that although our experiments in the previous two chap-
ters clearly show, as formulated above, that within one multi-party conversation, the context
shared by a subgroup of participants may be distinct from those shared by other subgroups taken
from the same pool of ratified participants, we have not shown directly that a single participant
keeps track of these, i.e. although we’ve presented situations where there’s a systematic dispar-
ity between the contexts against which an elliptical clarification request (a Reprise Fragment) is
assessed by different participants (the recipients of the fragment), we have not shown that the
participant producing the clarification request is sensitive to this (prospective) disparity. Our ex-
periments do not show, in other words, that a fragment receives divergent interpretations from a
single participant, contingent upon whether the fragment comes from a peripheral or a primary
participant. Nevertheless, we would very much expect this to be true as it is supported by corpus
evidence from Walford (used in chapter 6 to motivate our hypothesis) and as alluded to previ-
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ously, indirectly by the evidence in Healey and Mills (2006). They showed that the same probe
question receives systematically different answers depending on whether the apparent origin of
the question was a peripheral or a primary participant. They have shown, in other words, that lev-
els of semantic coordination, or the conceptual conventions emergent in interaction are divergent
between primary and peripheral participants: an individual indexes these separately to different
participants. Insofar as we conceive of context as encoding such emergent ‘semantic ontologies’,
this is evidence that an individual keeps track, at least, of this particular aspect of the contexts
that she shares with others, separately in the same conversation.
In short, our results indicate that models of dialogue context need to augment individual
contributions with information about which participants have processed the contribution and to
what degree: they need to index contextual increments on each participant’s information state to
specific subsets of the rest of the participants.
8.6 Summary
This thesis is an attempt at articulating a theory of collective agency in multi-party conversa-
tional dialogue; i.e. how parties or alliances, as higher order entities than individuals, can act as
unified aggregates in carrying the conversation forward and thus be consequential units in how,
and on what level, grounding is achieved and how the conversational context develops for each
individual.
To this end, the thesis provides a typology of side-participants: primary vs. peripheral, deter-
mined by whether the side-participant in question is, at that point, a co-member of the same party
as the speaker or the addressee: a consequential distinction which has not been made in the liter-
ature. Peripheral participants, on this view, are ‘overhearers’ but independently of ratification or
presumed rights of repair/interjection. In this respect, this distinction constitutes a reformulation
of the insights offered by Clark and colleagues on how issues of grounding relate to participant
role.
Making this distinction has allowed us to provide an account of the idiosyncratic structure of
adjacency in multi-party dialogues. That is, it supports the view that adjacency structure is tree-
like, and hence can allow for distinct conversational tracks or contexts to be interleaved. Long-
distance resolution possibilities for ellipses can be accounted for in this manner. This leads to the
replacement of the Conversational Analytic notion of adjacency by the notion of context locality
as indexed to specific sub-groups of the participants, based on the distinction between primary
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and peripheral participants with systematically distinct possibilities for interpretation. Moreover,
we have argued that peripheral and primary participants effect divergent commitments as a result
of one and the same utterance. If the intuition is correct that participants actually keep track
of these divergent contexts (see below for an experimental design that would test this intuition
directly), then we’d be led to the conclusion that DGB-based models of context need to posit
multiple DGBs per participant, indexed to subgroups of the rest of the participants present, in
order to account for the adjacency structure of conversations of the type we have identified. This
does not at all seem to be a trivial task.
People’s ability to track conversational contexts over long distances would also have impor-
tant implications within the psycholinguistic domain. Namely, it would imply that we cannot
account for how interpretations are arrived at in egocentric terms alone, as the contexts against
which utterances are assessed by an individual cannot be determined without reference to who,
or rather what party, has issued the utterance. In other words, utterance interpretation (ellipsis
resolution in our case) is often sensitive to who the speaker of that utterance is.
Having said all this, as we’ve noted, the notion of party-hood is still far from sufficiently
explicated. The experimental methods used in this thesis have not allowed for a more local and
finer-grained study of why and how alliances take shape or emerge as a product of interaction,
e.g. local effects of Split Utterances on the formation of parties (see e.g. Howes, Healey, and
Mills (2009) for recent developments along these lines). The parties were, in our experiments,
determined in advance and in a sense forced by task-level objectives. Hence, conservatively
speaking, the results here only generalise to situations where there’s a public and clear agenda of
how each topic relates to each participant’s concerns and goals (e.g. 2 couples discussing where
to meet next with a 5th friend present who is not going) and so they do not generalise fully to
e.g. cocktail-party settings, in which alliances can be emergent from the interaction rather than
mutually known at the outset. Nonetheless, when they do so emerge, the phenomena identified
here are still expected to be at play.
To conclude, what we’ve dubbed Pragmatic Pluralism (emergence of distinct contexts in
the same conversation), could potentially have far reaching ramifications for those who try to
be determinate about the effect of each utterance on each and every participant’s mental state.
With parties as emergent, and consequential for how each individual’s context develops, it might
well be that this leads to an inescapable form of semantic non-determinism in dialogue, with
uncertainty about uptake of semantic content increasing as the number of participants get larger
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thus precluding direct interaction.
8.7 Open Problems and Future Work
8.7.1 Do participants keep track of the distinct dialogue contexts that emerge?
As noted above, our experiments do not show directly that a participant could keep track, sepa-
rately, of the distinct contexts that we showed she shares with other participants. Below we will
sketch the design of an experiment that would provide direct support for this.
Recall our experimental design in chapter 6. Instead of two Directors and one Matcher, in
this design we have one Director (D) and two Matchers (M1 and M2), such that the matching of
some of the Tangrams is the responsibility of M1 and the rest of M2. The tangrams are marked on
the Director’s interface as to whom the corresponding Matcher is. The matchers choose from the
same set of Tangrams. When a Tangram has been placed by one of the matchers, that Tangram
will not subsequently be available to the other.
The Director describes the tangrams to Matchers one by one. Identically to the previous
experiment, the fake probe Reprise Fragments (RF) always have distant antecedents, that is, the
antecedent always lies in one of the Director’s descriptions, within the stretch of talk associated
with the previous Tangram. The RFs are in two conditions: same dialogue context and different
dialogue context. In the former, the two consecutive Tangrams have been the responsibility of the
same Matcher, i.e. D has described both Tangrams to the same Matcher. In the latter condition,
the two consecutive Tangrams have been described to different Matchers.
The responses by the single Director to the fake probes would be captured and analysed in the
same way as before, for whether the response manifests a distant (correct) or a local (incorrect)
interpretation.
The hypothesis would be that the fragments in the different dialogue context condition, get
reliably more distant interpretations than those in the same dialogue context condition, i.e. that
there would be a systematic conflict between the Director’s interpretations of similar RFs, con-
tingent upon whether the RF comes from a locally peripheral or a locally primary participant.
This would show that so far as the Director is concerned, while the context that she shared with a
primary Matcher during the previous Tangram has ‘moved forward’, as a result of joint participa-
tion with that Matcher during the current Tangam, the context that she shared with a previously
primary Matcher, who is locally peripheral, has been ‘suspended’. Importantly, this would show
that the Director tracks the contexts that she shares with the two Matchers, separately; hence the
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need for multiple DGBs.
8.7.2 What is the essence of a party and how/why do they emerge?
We proposed above, that party formations seem to be strongly tied to topic and that they emerge
in virtue of relations holding between the participants’ publicly known, mutual responsibilities,
mutual conversational goals and concerns with respect to that topic. The essence, constitutive of
a party, seems to be the sharing of a goal/responsibility among its members, which others in the
conversation do not have and this is publicly known. Whether any of this is correct remains an
important open question. But it seems that parties, as such, become relevant in the interaction,
when the current question under discussion is relevant to that shared goal. But what is the cor-
rect notion of relevance here? In other words how do we identify, given a conversational goal,
whether an answer to a question under discussion contributes to that goal? If conversational
goals themselves are modelled as questions, could this relevance relation be modelled as what
Ginzburg (2009) calls ‘question dependence or influence’?
Moreover, it is certainly not true that the arrangement in which participants are organised
into parties, is always determined at the outset of a topic shift. More often than not parties are
emergent from the interaction itself as the various stances that the participants have towards the
current topic is gradually revealed. But how so exactly?
8.7.3 Formal treatment
We have presented above, some tentative ideas as to how Ginzburg’s KoS could be modified to
handle multi-party dialogues of the sorts we have identified in this thesis. The most important
change that seems necessary is that conversational update rules should be relativised to partici-
pant role - as determined by party membership.
As noted, it seems that questions on QUD, need to have a complex structure, possibly includ-
ing information about which participants belong to which parties, in addition to who the direct
addressees and side participants are (to manage turn-taking obligations). This problem remains
unaddressed. Moreover, we have provided very little detail as to exactly how e.g. conversational
update rules are to be relativised to participants in different roles, and hence the dynamics of the
divergent DGBs remains, for the most part, underspecified. The resulting grounding, querying
and assertion protocols, therefore, also remain unanalysed. We have not provided a treatment
of how/whether the different forms of intra-party ‘conferring’ (intra-party elliptical turn assign-
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ments, clarification interaction and discussion), in case of grounding failure by one member of a
party, lead to backtracking and indeed how backtracking could be accommodated in the model.
Moreover, as we have argued, it is quite likely that multiple DGBs per participant will be
needed, in order to account for the pragmatic structuring of multi-party dialogues. If this turns
our to be necessary, the dynamics of the multiple DGBs and the update rules responsible for their
transitions remain greatly underspecified, though what we have discussed above, does seem to
narrow down the choices to be made.
All in all, there is a great deal of work, both empirical and formal to be done.
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